European Russia was occupied by Indo-European and Ural-Altaic peoples from about the 2d millennium BC. Among the peoples present in the steppe north of the Black Sea were the \TCimmerians\t. They were conquered by the \TScythians\t in the 7th century BC. The Scythians in turn were largely displaced by the \TSarmatians\t in the 3d century BC. In the early centuries AD a succession of tribes, the \TGoths\t, the \THuns\t, and the \TAvars\t, ruled the area. The \TKhazars\t (7th century) and the Bulgars (8th century) established substantial states. Slavic settlements in the area are documented from the 6th century on. MEDIEVAL RUSSIA The \TSlavs\t probably came from southern Poland and the Baltic shore and settled in the region of mixed forest and meadowlands north of the fertile but unprotected steppe lands of the south. The Slavs engaged in agriculture, hunting, and fishing and gathered products of the forest. They settled beside the rivers and lakes along the water route that was used by \TViking\t warrior-traders (the Varangians) to reach Constantinople. Using their superior military and organizational skills, the Varangians exacted tribute from the Slavs and to this end consolidated their rule in key points on the route to Constantinople. About 862 a group of Varangians led by \TRurik\t took control of \TNovgorod\t. From there Rurik moved south and established (879) his authority in \TKiev\t, strategically located above the Dnepr rapids where the open steppe met with the belt of Slavic settlements in the forest-meadow region. Kievan Rus' Under Rurik's successor, Oleg (d. c.912), Kiev became the center of a federation of strong points controlled by Varangian "dukes" who soon became Slavicized in language and culture. Attempts by Duke \TSvyatoslav I\t (r. 945-72) to create an "empire" in the region between the Dnepr and Danube failed, but Kiev was effectively protected from nomads in the east by the Khazar state on the Volga. With the conversion (c.988) of Duke \TVladimir I\t to Eastern Christianity, Kiev developed into a major cultural center, with splendid architecture, richly adorned churches, and monasteries that spread Byzantine civilization. The political and cultural apogee of Kievan Rus' was reached under \TYaroslav\t the Wise, who ruled from 1019 to 1054. Politically, Kiev was the center of a federation of principalities tied together by their rulers who claimed to be descendants of Rurik. The unity of Kievan Rus' was more of an ideal than a reality (many internal feuds existed), but it served as an inspiration to later generations. The socioeconomic base of this polity has been a subject of controversy; liberal historians have singled out the trading role of the princes and their retinues (druzhina), whereas the Soviets have insisted on the primacy of agriculture and artisanal production. Probably trade was the mainstay of political power, and agriculture (complemented by hunting and fishing) was the major occupation of the population. Culturally, Kiev served as the agent of transmission for Byzantine civilization--Orthodox Christianity and its art (music, architecture, and mosaics); it also developed, however, into the creative center of a high-level indigenous culture represented, in literature, by the sermons of Hilarion (d. after 1055) and Vladimir Monomakh (d. 1125); in historiography, by the early-12th-century Primary Chronicle; in law, by Yaroslav's codification, Pravda; and in monastic life, by Kiev's 11th-century cave monastery (Lavra). This culture served as the common foundation for the later Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Great Russian civilizations. The decline of Kievan Rus' (starting in the late 11th century) was brought about by internecine feuds, by a change in Byzantine trade patterns--which made the old river route obsolete--and by the depopulation resulting from slaughter by nomadic invaders from the east. The end, however, came swiftly when the \TMongols\t, surging forth from Central Asia, overran the South Russian plain. Kiev was sacked in 1240, and the Mongol khans of the \TGolden Horde\t at Sarai on the Volga established their control over most of European Russia for about two centuries. Mongol Rule The overlordship of the Mongols (see also \LTatar\ls) proved costly in economic terms, because the initial conquest and subsequent raids to maintain the Russians in obedience were destructive of urban life and severely depleted the population. Equally costly--even to cities that escaped conquest, such as Novgorod--were the tribute payments in silver. Politically the yoke was not burdensome, for the Mongols ruled indirectly through local princes, and the church was even shown respect and exempted from tribute (enabling it to assume a cultural and national leadership role). The most deleterious long-lasting effect of Mongol rule was isolation from Byzantium and western Europe, which led to a turning inward that produced an aggressive inferiority complex. The exceptions were the free cities of Novgorod and \TPskov\t, ruled by oligarchies of merchants (the princes, such as \TAlexander Nevsky\t, were merely hired military leaders) in active contact with the \THanseatic League\t. Rise of Moscow In the shadow of Mongol overlordship and in the harsh environment of central Russia, to which the population had fled from the south, the society and polity of \TMoscow\t, or Muscovy, developed. Members of the ruling family of Kievan Rus' had seized free lands in the northeast and colonized them with peasants to whom they offered protection in return for payments in money and kind. Each one of these princes was full master of his domain, which he administered and defended with the help of his retainers (\Tboyars\t). A semblance of family unity was maintained by the claim of common descent from Rurik and of a "national" consciousness based on the Kievan cultural heritage. Taking advantage of genealogy, Mongol favor, church support, geographic situation, and wealth, some of the local princes--for example, those of \TVladimir\t, \TYaroslavl\t, Moscow, Suzdal, and Tver--became dominant in their region and gradually forced the weaker rulers (along with their boyars) into their own service. Of these principalities Moscow gradually emerged as the most powerful. Its ruler Ivan I (Ivan Kalita; r. 1328-41) was granted the title grand duke of Vladimir by the khanate as well as the right to collect tribute for the Mongols from neighboring principalities. His grandson \TDimitry Donskoi\t won the first major Russian victory over the Mongols at Kulikovo (1380). Finally, after victory in a fierce civil war, the elimination of a main rival at Tver (1485), and the winning over of most small independent princes, \TIvan III\t, grand duke of Moscow (r. 1462-1505), emerged as the sole ruler in central Russia. The Golden Horde had regained control after Kulikovo, but a century later it was seriously weakened by internal strife. In 1480, therefore, Ivan III successfully challenged Mongol overlordship by refusing the tribute. Moscow's triumph was not complete, however, because another putative heir to Kiev remained--the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to whose rule many of the independent princes of the southwest and the large boyar retainers of Belorussia had gravitated. To the south and east the Muslim successors of the Golden Horde, the khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimea, were serious threats to Muscovy's security. Although Moscow's annexation of Novgorod (1478) and Pskov (1510) gave it access to the profitable Baltic trade and control over the far-flung colonial lands of the northeast, it also opened the gates to religious and cultural challenges to the spiritual and artistic self-sufficiency and provincialism of central Russia. A conflict arose between church and state as well as between cultural nativism and innovation; it ended, in the second quarter of the 16th century, in a compromise that reaffirmed and strengthened the political values of Moscow (autocracy) while respecting the economic power and position of the church and liberalizing its cultural life to admit the influences from the Balkans and western Europe. Yet the strain between those who wanted a spiritualistic church, divested of worldly wealth (the nonpossessors, or Volga Elders), and the possessors, followers of Joseph of Volokolamsk (d. 1515), who wished to retain the church's wealth and institutional power, continued to affect Muscovite cultural life. Organization of the Muscovite State The main political task of the grand dukes of Moscow was the absorption of formerly independent princes and their servitors into the service hierarchy of Moscow. This absorption was achieved by expanding the membership of the boyar council (duma) to include the newcomers. A system of precedence (mestnichestvo) based on both family status and service position kept the boyar class divided. In addition, from the late 15th century on, the grand duke created a class of military servitors (dvorianstvo) entirely subordinated to him by grants of land on a temporary basis, subject to performance of service. The peasantry remained outside this system, with village communes taking care of local fiscal and police matters. Towns were under the direct rule of the grand duke's representatives and enjoyed no municipal freedoms. The culmination of absolutism was dramatically symbolized by the grandson of Ivan III, \TIvan IV\t (r. 1533-84). Assuming (1547) the title of tsar, he underlined his claim to the succession of both Byzantium and the Golden Horde. The conquests of the khanates of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556) followed, putting the entire course of the Volga under Russian control. These conquests initiated further expansion (1581) into Siberia, whose western regions were conquered by the Cossack leader \TYermak Timofeyevich\t, sponsored by the Novgorod family of salt merchants, the Stroganovs. Relying on his absolute power and increased military potential, Ivan IV attempted to eliminate the competition of Lithuania and gain a port on the Baltic. The 25-year war (1558-83) against Poland-Lithuania, Livonia, and Sweden--accompanied by several devastating raids of Crimean Tatars against Moscow (for example, in 1571)--ended in failure and seriously debilitated the country. To mobilize all resources and cope with internal opposition, Ivan IV set up his own personal guard and territorial administration (oprichnina, 1565-72), whose exactions and oppression did great damage to both the economy and the social stability of the realm. The combined needs of the military servitor class for labor and of the government for tax-paying peasants led to legislation limiting the mobility of peasants. The edicts of Ivan's successors (Fyodor I, r. 1584-98, and \TBoris Godunov\t, r. 1598-1605) initiated a process that culminated in the complete enserfment of the Russian peasantry (Code of 1649). THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES The Muscovite dynasty ended in 1598 with the death of Ivan IV's son Fyodor I. Real power during Fyodor's reign had been exercised by his brother-in-law Boris Godunov, who was chosen to succeed him. Although Boris was a strong ruler, he was regarded by many as a usurper. The exhausted country was, therefore, precipitated into turmoil marked by the appearance of a series of pretenders to the throne and provoking invasions by Poland, Sweden, and the Crimean Tatars (see \TTime of Troubles\t; 1598-1613). Disgruntled boyar families, enserfed peasants, \TCossacks\t, and lower clergy tried in turn to take advantage of the anarchy, but none succeeded. Eventually, a militia of noble servitors (dvoriane) and townspeople of the northeast, based in Nizhni Novgorod, expelled the Poles from Moscow, drove back the Swedes and Cossacks, and elected young \TMichael\t Romanov as tsar in 1613. The \TRomanov\t dynasty was to rule Russia until 1917. An Era of Conflict Beneath a veneer of traditional forms and static structures profound changes took place in the course of the 17th century, changes that resulted in religious, cultural, political, and socioeconomic disarray. Efforts at reforming the church structure and at modernizing the ritual along Byzantine and Ukrainian lines, led by \TNikon\t (patriarch from 1652 to 1666), were resisted in the name of earlier spiritualist traditions by large segments of the population (led by monks and parish priests). These \TOld Believers\t, about 25 percent of the population, were persecuted by the state and virtually split away from official culture and civil society. In suppressing the Old Believers the church lost much of its moral authority and autonomy vis-a-vis the state. The religious crisis exacerbated the cultural conflict over the extent and character of Westernization. Trade contacts, especially with England and the Dutch, brought foreigners to Russia, and diplomatic exchanges grew more frequent as Russia became involved in European military and diplomatic events. Technological innovations for military purposes brought in their wake Western (especially Polish) fashions and cultural goods, leading to new trends in art (the so-called Moscow baroque in architecture, literature, and icon painting). The cultural gap between the elites and the people was deepened by political, social, and economic conflicts: urban strife at times threatened the stability of the regime itself (for example, the salt riots of Moscow, 1648, and revolts in Pskov and Novgorod, 1650). The military servitors' struggle to establish full control (legalized by the Code of 1649) over their peasants led to numerous revolts. In 1670-71 dissatisfied Cossacks, persecuted Old Believers, escaped serfs, and disgruntled urban elements joined forces under Stenka \TRazin\t in a revolt that swept the entire Volga valley and threatened Moscow itself. The government, especially under Tsar \TAlexis\t (r. 1645-76), tried to cope with the difficulties by centralizing the local administrations (prikazy, or departments) under direct supervision of the boyar duma and the tsar, assisted by professional hereditary clerks (diaki). Naturally, the fiscal burden grew in proportion to centralization. To ensure domestic control and to carry on an active foreign policy (for example, the annexation of the Ukraine in 1654 and wars with Poland leading to a "perpetual peace" in 1686), a professional army of streltsy (musketeers) and foreign mercenaries and modernized technology were introduced. Although absolutism was retained intact, factionalism and palace coups became more frequent and made pursuing coherent policies difficult. When Tsar Fyodor III died in 1682 the situation was ripe for the energetic intervention of a genuine leader. After the brief but tumultuous regency of \TSophia\t, 1682-89, Fyodor's half brother Peter grasped the opportunity. The Reforms of Peter the Great By dint of his driving energy and ruthlessness, \TPeter I\t (r. 1682-1725) transformed Russia and brought it into the concert of European nations. A struggle of almost 20 years with \TCharles XII\t of Sweden (1700-21; see \TNorthern War, Great\t) and wars with Ottoman Turkey (1710-11) and Persia (1722-23) radically changed Russia's international position (symbolized by Peter's assumption of the new title of emperor in 1721). By the Treaty of Nystad (1721) with Sweden, Russia acquired the Baltic province of Livonia (including Estonia and most of Latvia), giving it a firm foothold on the Baltic Sea and a direct relationship with western Europe. In the south gains were modest, but they marked the beginning of a Russian imperial offensive on the Black and Caspian seas. These territorial gains, requiring much effort and great expenditures of labor and resources, forced Peter to transform the institutional framework of the state and to attempt a restructuring of society as well. The central administration was streamlined along functional lines: a set of colleges on the European model displaced the prikazy, and a senate of appointed officials replaced the boyar duma; the church was put under direct state administration with the abolition of the patriarchate and the establishment of a Holy Synod (1721) of appointed ecclesiastical members supervised by a lay official. A navy was created, and the army was reorganized along professional Western lines, the peasantry furnishing the recruits and nobility the officers. The local administration, however, remained a weak link in the institutional chain, although it maintained the vast empire in obedience. The peasantry was subjected to compulsory labor (as in the building of the new capital, Saint Petersburg, now \TLeningrad\t, begun in 1703) and to military service, and every individual adult male peasant was assessed with a head, or poll, tax. By these measures the state severed the last legal ties of the peasants to the land and transformed them into personal serfs, virtually chattel, who could be moved and sold at will. Other classes of society were not immune from state service either. Compulsory, lifelong service was imposed on the nobility, and their status was made dependent on ranks earned in military or administrative office (the Table of Ranks of 1722 also provided for automatic ennoblement of commoners through service). State service required education, and Peter introduced compulsory secular, Westernized schooling for the Russian nobleman. While resistance to compulsory service gradually forced its relaxation, education became an internalized value for most nobles who were culturally Westernized by the mid-18th century. Peter failed to reshape the merchants into a Western bourgeoisie, however, and his efforts at modernizing the economy had mixed results. The clergy turned into a closed castelike estate, losing its spiritual and cultural influence. The limitations of Peter's reforming drive were due to the inherent paradox of his policy and approach: he aimed at liberating the creative forces of Russian society, but he expected to accomplish this liberation only at his command and through compulsion, at a pace that precluded an adaptation of traditional patterns and values. He succeeded in transforming the upper class but failed to change the common people; the deep cultural gulf in the long run undermined the regime. The Imperial Succession Peter's impetuousness did not allow the new structure and patterns to congeal, and after his death (1725) instability plagued the new institutional setup. Having had his son, Alexis, tortured to death for alleged treason, Peter abolished the traditional practice of succession, declaring (1722) that the emperor could choose his successor. For the next half-century the throne was exposed to a series of palace coups instigated by cliques of favorites and dignitaries with the support of the Guards regiments. After the reign (1725-27) of Peter's widow, \TCatherine I\t, Peter II (r. 1727-30), \TAnna\t (r. 1730-40), Ivan VI (r. 1740-41), \TElizabeth\t (r. 1741-62), and \TCatherine II\t (r. 1762-96), who supplanted her husband, \TPeter III\t, all came to the throne in this manner. The only serious attempt at limiting the power of the throne (1730), however, failed because of divisions among the nobility and their continued dependence on state service. The autocracy managed to keep the nobility in subordination by promoting the economic status of that class through salaries, gifts, and the extension of its legal rights over the serfs, particularly following the traumatic experience of the great peasant uprising (1773-75) under Yemelian \TPugachev\t. The government proved unable to regularize its structure and practices through a code of laws because it was feared that such a code would delegate power to impersonal institutions. Personalized authority was favored by most subjects, however, as a protection against abuses of officials and as a source of rewards. The tension between a rational and automatic rule of law and a personalized authority was never resolved in imperial Russia. Expansion and Westernization Two important processes dominated the 18th century. The first was imperial expansion southward and westward. The southern steppe lands were gradually settled by Russians, and the autonomous local social groupings--especially the Cossacks (whose hetmanate in the Ukraine was abolished in 1764)--lost their status and were assimilated into Russian serf society. The process was formally completed by the Treaty of Kucuk Kainarji (1774), ending the first major \TRusso-Turkish War\t, by which Russia secured the northern shore of the Black Sea, and by the annexation (1783) of the Crimea, which put an end to the nomadic threats from the southeast. By extending (1783) serfdom to the Ukraine the economic integration of that area with Russia was achieved, and its large, prosperous estates were soon able to feed a growing urban population and to export grain abroad. The empire's expansion westward was the result of the Partitions of Poland (1772, 1792, 1795; see \TPoland, Partitions of\t), which awarded Russia most of the eastern and central regions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This expansion enhanced Russia's economic potential and brought it closer to western Europe, but it also burdened the empire with unsolvable national and religious problems and saddled it with onerous diplomatic, military, and police tasks. The second process shaping 18th-century Russia is best characterized as the cultural Westernization of the Russian elites. It was furthered by the establishment of new educational institutions (the Academy of Sciences, 1725; the University of Moscow, 1755; and military and private schools), the creation of a modern national literature along Western lines (exemplified in the work of Mikhail \TLomonosov\t and Aleksandr SUMAROKOV), and the beginnings of scientific research and discoveries (Lomonosov). Increased sophistication heightened yearnings for free expression and implementation of enlightened Western moral and social values. It led to a conflict between state control and educated society's demand for creative freedom and to the emergence of an oppositionist intelligentsia. In 1790, for example, Aleksandr \TRadishchev\t denounced the moral evils of serfdom in A Journey from Saint Petersburg to Moscow. Imperial expansion and cultural Westernization were accompanied by economic modernization. Russia became a notable producer of iron, lumber, and naval stores (pine products) and witnessed the expansion of urbanization and social amenities. Catherine II intensified these developments and reaped their benefits. She decided that Russian society should contribute more directly to economic activity. To this end she fostered security of property and person, at least for members of the upper classes. The nobility were freed from compulsory state service (1762) and guaranteed their property rights. The Statute on the Provinces (1775) and the Charters to the Nobility and the Towns (1785) involved noble and urban elites in local administration through elected officials. THE 19TH CENTURY Alexander I Catherine's grandson \TAlexander I\t, who succeeded to the throne after the brief reign (1796-1801) of his unbalanced father, \TPaul I\t, intended to give regular institutional form to the results of the social and cultural evolution of the 18th century. The first years of Alexander's reign were marked by intensive efforts at reforming the administration and at expanding the educational facilities. Although the reforms did not bring about constitutionalism or limit the autocracy, they did inaugurate rapid bureaucratization with better trained officials. Russia's involvement in the \TNapoleonic Wars\t proved a major impediment to the normal evolution of the country. \TNapoleon I\t's invasion of Russia in 1812, although ending in his own defeat, was hardly a victory for Russia. The wars proved costly, and the ultimate political gains (Finland, penetration into the Caucasus) were rather slim despite Alexander's diplomatic role after 1815 (notably in the \THoly Alliance\t). During the wars the younger generation of educated society had acquired self-confidence and a desire to be of use to their country and people; upon the return of peace they tried to put their ideals into practice. Unavoidably, this led to a clash with a government that was loath to give society genuine freedom and that, after 1815, became more restrictive and obscurantist. Secret societies were organized under the leadership of progressive officers, and, on the sudden death of Alexander I in December 1825, they tried to take over the government. This abortive insurrection of the \TDecembrists\t traumatized Alexander's successor, his brother \TNicholas I\t, into a policy of reaction and repression. Nicholas I Nicholas I's reign, however, was by no means static, and it proved seminal in many respects. In spite of strict censorship, the golden age of Russian literature occurred with the work of Aleksandr \TPushkin\t, Nikolai \TGogol\t, the young Fyodor \TDostoyevsky\t, Leo \TTolstoi\t, and Ivan \TTurgenev\t. Stimulated by this literary flowering, discussion circles sprang up in Moscow and Saint Petersburg in which the intelligentsia debated Russia's identity, its historical path and role, and its relationship to western Europe (the \TSlavophiles and Westernizers\t represented the two main lines of interpretation that emerged). Nicholas was unfavorably disposed to the humanities and limited admissions to the universities, but he promoted technical and professional training. During his reign a number of technical institutions of higher learning were founded, and state support for needy students in professional schools was expanded. By the end of the reign a cadre of well-trained professionals and officials had been prepared to carry out reforms. Nicholas's government also brought to a successful conclusion the codification of laws (1833; the achievement of Mikhail \TSperansky\t), which enabled an orderly and systematic economic development of the country. The building of railroads was initiated, the currency was stabilized, and protective tariffs were introduced. As a result private enterprise was activated, especially in consumer goods (textiles), in which even peasant capital and skill participated. These developments only served to underscore the backward nature of an agrarian economy based on serf labor. Nicholas was well aware of this, but, fearing political and social disturbances, he did not go beyond discussions in secret committees and the improvement of the administration of state peasants. The government's timidity was conditioned not only by fear of a peasant uprising and a distrust of the nobility but also by its international policies. Nicholas's reign was for the most part peaceful, although Russia did participate in securing Greek independence (1828-29) and in curtailing Turkish power in the Black Sea. Nicholas also acted as the "gendarme of Europe" when he crushed the Polish insurrection of 1831-33 and helped Austria subdue the Hungarians in 1849. The empire further expanded in the Far East (in the Amur River valley). At the end of his reign Nicholas embroiled Russia in the \TCrimean War\t (1853-56). Although the immediate cause of the war was a dispute over the guardianship of the Holy Places in Palestine, underlying the conflict was the \TEastern Question\t, the prolonged dispute over the disposition of the territories of the fast-declining Ottoman Empire. The Russians fought on home ground against British and French troops assisted by Sardinian and Austrian forces. The course of the war revealed the regime's weaknesses, and the death (1855) of Nicholas allowed his son, \TAlexander II\t, to conclude a peace (the Treaty of Paris, 1856) that debarred Russian warships from the Black Sea and Straits. Alexander II and Emancipation of the Serfs Russian society now expected and demanded far-reaching reforms, and Alexander acted accordingly. The crucial reform was the abolition of serfdom on Mar. 3 (N.S.), 1861. In spite of many shortcomings it was a great accomplishment that set Russia on the way to becoming a full-fledged modern society. The main defects of the emancipation settlement were that cancellation of labor obligations took place gradually, the peasants were charged for the land they received in allotment (through a redemption tax), and the allotments proved inadequate in the long run. The last was a consequence of demographic pressures due to the administrative provisions of the act that restricted the mobility of the peasants and tied them to their village commune, which was held responsible for the payment of taxes; the former serfs remained second-class citizens and were denied full access to regular courts. Nevertheless, 20 million peasants became their own masters, they received land allotments that preserved them from immediate proletarization, and the emancipation process was accomplished peacefully. Three other major reforms followed emancipation. The first was the introduction (1864) of elected institutions of local government, zemstvos, which were responsible for matters of education, health, and welfare; however, the zemstvos had limited powers of taxation, and they were subjected to close bureaucratic controls. Secondly, reform of the judiciary introduced jury trials, independent judges, and a professional class of lawyers. The courts, however, had no jurisdiction over "political" cases, and the emperor remained judge of the last resort. Finally, in 1874, the old-fashioned military recruiting system gave way to universal, compulsory 6-year military service. The impetus for reform was thwarted and arrested by external and domestic events. Externally, the Polish rebellion of 1863-64 gave pause to the government and, by exacerbating nationalistic feelings, strengthened the conservative opposition to further reforms. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 undermined the financial equilibrium, and chauvinistic passions were aroused when the Treaty of San Stefano, which greatly increased Russian influence in the Balkans, was substantially revised by the Congress of Berlin (see \TBerlin, Congress of\t). At home in the 1860s radical university students and nihilist (see \Tnihilism\t) critics such as Nikolai \TChernyshevsky\t voiced dissatisfaction with the pace and direction of the reforms. Radical associations were formed to propagandize socialist ideas, and student youth "went to the people" in 1874-76 to enlighten and revolutionize the peasantry. Repressed by the government, the young radicals turned to terrorism. Eventually a group of \Tnarodniki\t (populists) called the People's Will condemned the emperor to death, and after several dramatic but unsuccessful attempts they killed him on Mar. 13 (N.S.), 1881. Alexander III Alexander II's violent death inaugurated the conservative and restrictive reign of his son \TAlexander III\t. Nonetheless, the process of social and economic change released by the reforms could not be arrested. Now society proved more dynamic and took the lead in the drive for modernization and liberalization; the government, on the other hand, incapable of giving up its autocratic traditions, acted as a barrier. The deepening agrarian crisis--dramatized by the famine of 1891--turned the active elements from criticism to overt opposition. At the same time, industrialization energetically pushed by Sergei \TWitte\t, minister of finance (1892-1903), brought in its wake labor conflict, urban poverty, and business cycles. Nicholas II Alexander was succeeded by his son \TNicholas II\t in 1894. The new emperor soon dashed society's hopes for political and social reform. To deflect attention from the worsening social situation and to neutralize the revitalized revolutionary movement, especially among the workers, the government embarked on imperialist adventures in the Far East, provoking a war with Japan (1904-05; see \TRusso-Japanese War\t). Russia suffered a humiliating defeat, although the peace terms (Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905) were less onerous thanks to U.S. president Theodore \TRoosevelt\t's mediation and Japan's exhaustion. The war triggered widespread disturbances within Russia, including rural violence, labor unrest (in Saint Petersburg troops fired on a large crowd of demonstrating workers; Bloody Sunday, Jan. 22, 1905), and naval mutinies (most notably, that led by sailors of the battleship Potemkin in Odessa, June 1905). The turmoil of the \TRussian Revolution of\t 1905 culminated in the general strike of October, which forced Nicholas II to grant a constitution. Russia received a representative legislative assembly, the \TDuma\t, elected by indirect suffrage. The executive, however, remained accountable only to the emperor. Limited as its powers were (the suffrage was further restricted in 1907), the Duma made the government more responsive to public opinion. From 1906 to 1911 the government was directed by Pyotr \TStolypin\t, who combined repressive action with land reforms to improve the position of the peasants. The new political activity contributed to the remarkable upsurge of Russia's artistic and intellectual creativity (called the Silver Age) that lasted until the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Russia became a major contributor to modern Western culture, through the work, most notably, of painter Wassily \TKandinsky\t, composer Igor \TStravinsky\t, the symbolist writers (see \Tsymbolism\t, literature), and impresario Serge \TDiaghilev\t. Thus the years 1905-14 were a period of great complexity and ferment. To many this feverish intellectual creativity, which had its social and political counterpart in rural unrest, industrial discontent, revolutionary agitation, and nationalist excesses (for example, the \Lpogrom\ls against the Jews), proved that the imperial regime was nearing its inevitable end, which the outbreak of war only served to delay. On the other side, liberals and moderate progressives saw in these phenomena harbingers of Russia's decisive turn to political democracy and social and economic progress, which was abruptly stopped in 1914. In any event Russia went to war in August 1914. Determined to prevent further Austro-Hungarian encroachment in the Balkans, the Russian government rallied to the support of Serbia when Austria-Hungary declared war on that Balkan nation. Russia's alliance with France and Britain (see \TTriple Entente\t) and Austria-Hungary's with Germany helped transform the local Balkan conflict into \TWorld War I\t. The strains of that bloody and disastrous conflict produced a breakdown of both the political system and the social fabric in Russia. Food riots in Petrograd (formerly Saint Petersburg) and other cities toppled the monarchy in March (N.S.; February, O.S.) 1917. THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS Following the abdication of the emperor the Duma established a provisional government, headed first by Prince Georgy Lvov (1861-1925) and later by Aleksandr \TKerensky\t. The government's authority was challenged, however, by an increasingly radical Soviet (council) of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, and it could not stem the tide of disintegration. Eventually agrarian unrest, mass desertions at the front, turmoil in the cities, and disaffection of the non-Russian nationalities gave the Bolsheviks (see \TBolsheviks and Mensheviks\t) under Vladimir Ilich \TLenin\t an opening to seize power in November (N.S.; October, O.S.) 1917. Thus the second of the two \TRussian Revolutions of\t 1917 occurred. Lenin's Regime The Bolsheviks (soon renamed the Communist party of the \TUSSR\t) immediately announced sweeping reforms: the abolition of private property and redistribution of land, the establishment of workers' control of industry, the replacement of the old system of justice with revolutionary tribunals, and many more. Elections to a Constituent Assembly were held in November, but the Bolsheviks, although they had a majority in the industrial centers, won only 25 percent of the seats. The assembly was dissolved after one day, and one-party Communist rule was established. The breakdown of society continued, however, even after the \TUSSR\t left the war (by the humiliating terms of the Treaty of \TBrest-Litovsk\t, March 1918). The end of World War I marked only the beginning of a civil war that lasted until 1921 and in the course of which the country underwent an orgy of violence and suffered famine, epidemics, and total economic collapse. The Bolsheviks managed to retain control of the center of Russia and eventually defeated the White Russian armies and their foreign supporters. During the civil war the Bolsheviks attempted to carry out sweeping nationalization of the economy under tight centralized control. The policies of War Communism caused further disruption, however. In 1921, with his party still in power but the country prostrate, Lenin inaugurated the \TNew Economic Policy\t, which allowed society to regain coherence and strength by permitting some private enterprise, especially in the agrarian sector. At the same time, foreign help and trade enabled the Soviet government to reconstruct the basic industrial plant. Stalin's Regime When Lenin died in January 1924, a prolonged succession struggle ensued. The chief contenders were Joseph \TStalin\t and Leon \TTrotsky\t, between whom other powerful figures such as Nikolai \TBukharin\t, Lev \TKamenev\t, and Grigory \TZinoviev\t shifted their allegiances. By 1928, however, Stalin had effectively broken all his rivals and was the clear leader of the country. In 1928, Stalin ended the New Economic Policy, and, with the help of new social elements (homeless youths, young workers, semiintellectuals), which he mobilized, he embarked on what has been called the second revolution. In fact it was the first revolution that the Bolsheviks were able to carry out successfully: agriculture was collectivized (at tremendous human cost; see \Tkulaks\t), and a fast pace of industrialization was initiated. By the mid-1930s an impressive industrial plant was in operation, although it had been erected at the price of several million lives. To eliminate all potential opposition and to secure his personal power Stalin purged the ranks of the party. The \TGreat Purge\t, launched in 1934, developed a momentum of its own. In addition to the political and military leadership, it engulfed technicians, scholars, artists, and members of the scientific and scholarly elite. Realizing that the effectiveness of fear had reached a limit in 1939, Stalin halted the purge, and the country regained a degree of normalcy even though most purge victims remained in labor camps (see \TGulag\t). During the 1930s the \TUSSR\t sought to move out of diplomatic isolation, joining the League of Nations in 1934 and seeking improved relations with the Western democracies in the face of the rising threat from Nazi Germany. By 1939, however, Stalin was convinced that the Western powers would tolerate unlimited German expansion in the east. In August 1939, therefore, he concluded a pact with Adolf Hitler (see \TNazi-Soviet Pact\t), in which the two powers agreed to divide Poland between them. The German invasion of Poland began \TWorld War II\t. Despite his efforts Stalin failed to keep peace with Hitler, who invaded the \TUSSR\t on June 22, 1941. The war was extraordinarily difficult and bloody. The Germans came within 30 km (about 20 mi) of Moscow, cut off Leningrad completely, and occupied some parts of the Caucasus. The Red Army, however, managed to hold fast. In the prolonged Battle of Stalingrad (1942-43; see \TStalingrad, Battle of\t) the tide was finally turned, and the Red Army began to advance westward. At the end of the war Soviet troops occupied Eastern and parts of Central Europe, and within the next few years Soviet-type regimes were imposed on Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and East Germany. Stalin also proceeded to launch an aggressive campaign of ideological conformity both within the \TUSSR\t and in the Communist world at large, contributing to the development of \Tcold war\t with the West. He died in March 1953 on the eve of what seemed about to become a second purge wave. The Post-Stalin Period Nikita \TKhrushchev\t and his successors managed to keep the Soviet system intact. The international position of the \TUSSR\t waxed stronger as many countries (especially of the Third World) became dominated by Marxist and pro-Soviet leaders. At the same time, a powerful rival for leadership of the Communist world arose in China. Leonid \TBrezhnev\t, who took over in 1964, pursued a policy of detente with Western nations and repression of political dissent at home. Productivity lagged and the economy experienced difficulty in the Brezhnev period. In the 1980s the \TUSSR\t was involved in a civil war in Afghanistan. After Brezhnev's death (1982) and a period of transition under Yuri \TAndropov\t and Konstantin \TChernenko\t, the rise to power (1985) of the innovative Mikhail \TGorbachev\t brought dramatic changes to the Soviet system. A new openness to change, along with a relaxation of censorship and political repression, gave rise to a wave of nationalist agitation among the non-Russian peoples of the \TUSSR\t and moves toward independence by the nations of Eastern Europe. Detente with the West, which had languished in the later Brezhnev years, was revived, and steps were taken to end the \TUSSR\t's longstanding quarrel with China. Experimentation in the economic sector led to labor unrest and protest over shortages of consumer goods. Gorbachev's policy of \Tperestroika\t (economic reconstruction) and \Tglasnost\t (openness) raised hopes that conditions under his rule might be more relaxed than under his predecessors. But the Soviet gross national product fell sharply in 1990 and 1991, as did industrial and farm production, and foreign debt climbed. An increasingly restive Soviet population experienced increasing food shortages combined with significantly higher prices. Tensions developed between reformers such as president of the Russian republic Boris \TYeltsin\t and hard-liners in the military, the \TKGB\t, the Communist party, and the ministry of interior. Gorbachev's attempt to satisfy the demands of the reformers and the hard-liners reached a crisis point the day before a new union treaty was to be signed, a treaty that would transform the nation into a Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics, with a radically changed relationship between Moscow and the constituent republics. A junta, dominated by high-ranking leaders of the military, the Communist party, and the \TKGB\t, seized power on Aug. 19, 1991, put Gorbachev under house arrest and declared that he had been removed from office. Boris Yeltsin denounced the coup d'etat as illegal and rallied support from vast Moscow crowds who flocked to the parliament building of the Russian republic. Key military units, however, declined to follow the orders of the junta; in a few days the coup d'etat had failed and Gorbachev returned to power. Yeltsin declared that the Communist party had been "the organizing and inspiring force" behind the seizure of power. On Aug. 24, Gorbachev resigned as head of the party, telling its leadership to disband, and in effect removed the party from its 74-year rule of the nation. Yeltsin on the same day recognized the independence of Estonia and Latvia (Lithuanian independence had already been recognized). Within a matter of days the parliaments of Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, Kirghizia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan declared their republics independent. On August 29, the Soviet parliament voted to suspend the activities of the Communist party. Late in 1991 the economy was in disarray, and several of the republics were torn by ethnic strife. The \TUSSR\t as it had been constituted since the 1920s had ceased to exist. In December Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the five Central Asian republics formed a new \TCommonwealth of Independent States\t to replace the Soviet Union. Marc Raeff Bibliography: Auty, Robert, and Obolensky, Dimitri, eds., An Introduction to Russian History, vol. 1, in Companion to Russian Studies (1976); Blum, Jerome, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (1981); Carr, Edward H., A History of Soviet Russia, 7 vols. (1951-60); Cherniavsky, Michael, ed., Structure of Russian History (1970); Cohen, S. F., Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917 (1985); Conquest, Robert, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (1990); Dmytryshyn, Basil, A History of Russia (1977); Fainsod, Merle, and Hough, Jerry F., How Russia Is Governed (1979); Fennell, John, The Crisis of Medieval Russia (1983); Florinsky, Michael T., Russia: A History and an Interpretation, 2 vols. 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