In the Persian Gulf War of January-February 1991, a U.S.-led coalition came to the aid of Kuwait, occupied by Iraqi military forces more than six months earlier, destroyed a major part of the Iraqi armed forces, and secured Iraq's compliance with the terms of United Nations resolutions passed during the interval. A successful invasion of Kuwait and southeastern Iraq followed intensive air, naval, and land bombardment by coalition forces. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT In 1975, Iran and Iraq signed an agreement that the middle of the channel of the \TShatt-al-Arab\t waterway would be confirmed as the border between the southeastern tip of Iraq and Iran's southwestern border. The area is strategically important to both nations, since it is the northern end of the \TPersian Gulf\t and is a region of significant oil deposits. The immediate area is Iraq's sole outlet to the sea, where Iraqi oil can be transported by tankers. In 1980, however, the Iraqi government of Saddam \THussein\t launched an attack on Iran, with the intention of seizing total control of the Shatt-al-Arab and adjacent territories (see \TIran-Iraq war\t). The war raged for eight years, with an estimated half million casualties on each side. Iraq was given substantial financial credits--estimated in the tens of billions of dollars--by Kuwait and other Arab Gulf states. In July 1990, however, Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of conspiring with the United States to hold down the price of petroleum by pumping more oil than the quota allowed them by the \TOrganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries\t (\TOPEC\t). Hussein demanded that all war debts from the lender nations be canceled. Hussein also accused Kuwait of stealing oil from the Rumaila oil field, which is on the Kuwait-Iraq border, but lies for the most part in Iraq. Iraq, moreover, having failed to enlarge its opening to the Persian Gulf by war with Iran, demanded that Kuwait turn over control of its strategically located Persian Gulf islands of Bubiyan and Warbah at the head of the gulf. Iraq abruptly broke off talks with Kuwait on Aug. 1, 1990. The next day, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Kuwait. The United States government promptly condemned the invasion, instituting economic sanctions against Iraq and freezing all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States. The \TUnited Nations\t Security Council unanimously denounced the invasion and the Soviet Union suspended arms shipments to Iraq, its longtime client. On August 6, the U.N. imposed a sweeping trade and arms embargo against Iraq; on August 6-8, President Bush, at the request of the government of Saudi Arabia, ordered military forces to that nation to protect it from what was perceived as a threatened Iraqi invasion. The fear was expressed that Iraqi possession of Saudi Arabian oil resources in addition to its own would give Saddam Hussein control of a significant percentage of the world's petroleum deposits. Iraq exported 80 to 90 percent of its oil through two pipelines, one through Saudi Arabia and the other through Turkey; by August 7, both nations had halted transit of Iraqi pipeline oil. ROAD TO WAR U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard B. \TCheney\t met with King \TFahd\t of Saudi Arabia and reportedly provided him with U.S. satellite intelligence indicating the threat of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi territory. With the agreement of the government of Saudi Arabia, the first deployment of U.S. forces, named Operation Desert Shield, involved U.S. fighters and fighter-bombers, \TAWACS\t radar planes, and paratroopers from the 82d Airborne Division. U.S. Navy carriers and their escorts, along with two \Tcruise missile\t equipped battleships, moved toward the area of operations. At an emergency meeting of the \TArab League\t, held in Cairo from August 9-10, twelve out of twenty-one member nations voted in favor of a resolution to condemn Iraq. Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman) dispatched military forces to Saudi Arabia. In mid-August, Saddam Hussein declared that foreign workers in Iraq and Kuwait would be detained as "guests" of his regime. More than a million foreigners--the great majority of them Asian and Arab workers--lived in the two countries. Other detained foreign nationals included several thousand Americans and thousands of western and eastern Europeans, Canadians, Australians, Japanese, and others. The Iraqi regime hinted that they would be detained as possible bargaining elements in the future and as "human shields" to protect military targets from attack. Late in August, the United Nations Security Council authorized the U.S.-led coalition of naval forces in the Persian Gulf to enforce an economic blockade of Iraq. Earlier Security Council resolutions had included condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and a demand for its evacuation, approval of a trade embargo, repudiation of Iraq's annexation decree, and a demand for the release of all foreign hostages. Soviet president Mikhail \TGorbachev\t, in a message to Saddam Hussein, warned that stronger Security Council measures would undoubtedly follow if Iraq did not leave Kuwait. The Soviet government went along with most U.N. resolutions against Iraq, but was careful to preserve its ties with Iraq, a longtime Soviet client state to which it had supplied vast quantities of military aid and extensive training of its armed forces. Soviet foreign minister Eduard \TShevardnadze\t outlined the Soviet position early in September, saying that "the international community cannot allow the emergence of predator states or pirate regimes." On October 29, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring that Iraq would be liable for all losses, damages, and injuries resulting from its invasion. It invited U.N. member states to begin collecting information on future claims as well as any evidence that could later lead to war crimes indictments. The U.N. Security Council voted on Nov. 29, 1990, to authorize "all necessary means" (in effect, the use of force) against Iraq if it did not withdraw its military from Kuwait by Jan. 15, 1991. The Council also asked Iraq to observe the Geneva Protocol that banned all use of chemical weapons. President Bush visited U.S. troops at the end of November in Saudi Arabia, where he conferred with General H. Norman \TSchwarzkopf\t, commander of U.S. and coalition forces. On December 6, Saddam Hussein announced that foreigners held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait would be released. Iraq's military forces, he said, had been strengthened to the point where the use of hostages as human shields was no longer necessary. By mid-December, most of the hostages had left. Proposals for talks between the governments of the United States and Iraq were exchanged from late November through most of December, but differences arose on the timing of such talks. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress debated the question of whether it was best to continue economic sanctions in the hope that Iraq would comply with the United Nations resolutions, or if military force was necessary. Secretary of State James \TBaker\t testified on December 5 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declaring that he was "very pessimistic" that sanctions would be effective. If military action became necessary, he declared, U.S. forces would strike "suddenly, massively, and decisively." Secretary Baker met with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva on Jan. 9, 1991, but Aziz refused to accept a personal letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein. The United States Congress opened debate on the question of war or peace on January 10, and the vote was held on January 12. The tally in the House of Representatives was 250 in favor and 183 opposed. A closer vote in the Senate showed 52 in favor of military action and 47 opposed. ALIGNMENT OF FORCES BEFORE THE CONFLICT As the January 15th deadline approached, massive land, air, and naval forces were drawn up in battle array in the region. Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations were estimated at 545,000, with eight additional divisions of the elite Republican Guard held in reserve. Iraqi armor, including advanced T-72 tanks provided in earlier years by the Soviet Union, reportedly totaled about 4,500. The Iraqi army, in addition, reportedly had about 3,250 artillery weapons and about 2,800 armored personnel carriers. Combat aircraft, including Mig-21 and Mig-29 Soviet jets, were estimated at about 700. United States forces, including those aboard ship, reportedly totaled about 540,000, including Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force personnel. More than 100 U.S. Navy ships, including the battleships Missouri and Wisconsin and the aircraft carriers Saratoga, Kennedy, Theodore Roosevelt, America, Midway, and Ranger, were stationed in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Aircraft reportedly totaled about 1,800 and helicopters 1,700. U.S. armor, including the advanced Abrams M1A1 tank, totaled more than 2,000. United States personnel in the Gulf region, according to military authorities, included more than 27,000 women. Military forces from other nations in the coalition included: Saudi Arabia, 118,000; Egypt, 45,000; Britain, 40,000; Syria, 21,000; France, 20,000; Pakistan, 11,000, Gulf Cooperation Council (United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait), 10,000; Bangladesh, 2,300; Morocco, 1,700; Niger, 500; Senegal, 500; and Czechoslovakia, 200. Fighting forces from Britain and France included substantial armored units, naval vessels, and air squadrons. Italy and Canada contributed a number of aircraft and naval vessels. Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and Spain sent naval vessels. The Soviet Union sent four ships, but they were under orders not to enter into offensive operations. Hungary, the Philippines, Romania, Sierra Leone, Singapore, and Sweden sent medical teams. Turkey allowed U.S. aircraft to use its Incirlik air base for bombing raids on Iraq, and tied down an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 Iraqi troops stationed in Iraq near the Turkish border. AIR CAMPAIGN AND SEA BOMBARDMENT The United Nations deadline for the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait expired on Jan. 15, 1991. The following day, massive strikes by American and coalition aircraft and Tomahawk Cruise missiles on U.S. Navy ships were launched on targets in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Iraq responded on January 17 with Scud missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel. Targets of the coalition air campaign included Iraq's "nuclear bomb potential," as well as command and control centers, air bases, chemical weapon facilities, radar and communications installations, Scud missile sites, oil refineries, power stations, and artillery and armored units. The offensive operation, called Desert Storm, initially included U.S., British, Saudi, and Kuwaiti aircraft. On the second day of combat, French and Italian aircraft participated. By January 23, Gen. Colin \TPowell\t, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that "air superiority" had been achieved "throughout the entire theater" of operations. On January 24, military spokesmen said that B-52 bombers were battering an estimated 100,000 troops in the elite Iraqi Republican Guard, who were said to be dug in with their armor and artillery in southern Iraq and along the Iraq-Kuwait border. By the first week of February, an estimated 150 Iraqi aircraft had fled to Iran; the Iranian government declared that the aircraft would be impounded until the end of the war. TECHNOLOGY OF THE WAR American F-117A \TStealth\t fighters were used effectively in evading Iraqi radar and delivering their ordnance on targets. Tomahawk cruise missiles, launched from ships in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, were described as precise and effective. The radar-guided Patriot antimissile missile scored numerous successes against Iraqi-launched Scud missiles. Laser-guided "smart bombs" were shown in videotapes hitting preselected targets with precision. Other "high-tech" tools included computerized tracking of incoming artillery rounds (allowing a split-second response) and enhanced night warfare capabilities through the use of sophisticated night vision equipment. Optical spy satellites, radar satellites, and high-flying reconnaissance aircraft were extensively used for bomb damage assessments and target selection. COUNTDOWN TO THE LAND WAR The Soviet government, increasingly critical of the conduct of the coalition air war against Iraq, its longtime client and aid recipient, tried in February to bring about a diplomatic solution to the Persian Gulf crisis. President Mikhail Gorbachev dispatched his special envoy, Yevgeny Primakov, to Iraq in mid-February and received the Iraqi foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, in Moscow, in an effort to work out a compromise. Although the Soviet government managed to come up with a peace plan that included some Iraqi concessions, it fell short of the Bush administration demand that Iraq accept unconditionally all 12 United Nations resolutions. Bush warned that Saddam Hussein had to accept those resolutions by the time a new ultimatum expired on February 23, or face a devastating land war. Heavy air attacks on targets in Iraq and Kuwait continued, with the number of total sorties (one mission by one plane) in the war reaching 86,000 as the deadline approached. THE 100-HOUR WAR With the expiration of the deadline, the ground war began on February 24. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf revealed his strategy a few days later, after the ceasefire. From August until mid-January, he explained, he had concentrated his steadily growing forces along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border and had practiced amphibious operations along the coast near the border to lead the Iraqis to believe there would be a massive land assault in that area supported by an amphibious landing. By mid-January, the Iraqi air force had been sufficiently damaged to the point that the Iraqi authorities were not able to monitor the movements of U.S. and coalition land forces. At that point, according to Schwarzkopf, he began a massive movement of military forces westward. Air attacks continued to soften up Iraqi troop concentrations in Kuwait and Republican Guard units in the interior; at the same time, bridges across the Euphrates River to the north were destroyed in order to block the escape routes of a retreating Iraqi army. U.S. \Tspecial forces\t landed deep in Iraq to pinpoint Scud missile sites and to make preparations to support invading coalition forces. On the morning of February 24, U.S. Marines, Saudi forces, and Egyptian and Syrian troops attacked along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, while U.S. Navy landing ships maneuvered off the coast as a feint to lead the Iraqis to believe an amphibious landing was imminent. Far to the west, on the extreme left flank of a 480-km (300-mile) front, very large U.S. airborne and armored units and French armor raced north, using "leapfrog" helicopter techniques to establish bases to receive the advancing ground forces. On February 25-26, while French armor guarded the western flank, massive U.S. forces wheeled eastward in a vast arc, aided by British armor, to drive to the Euphrates River, to cut off the Republican Guard, and to block the retreat of Iraqi forces to the northwest and west. In the meantime, U.S. army and Marine units, two British brigades, Saudi forces, and Pan-Arab troops moved into Kuwait to complete its liberation. By February 27, with Iraqi forces fleeing in disorder out of Kuwait and battered remnants of the Republican Guard retreating north toward \TBasra\t, Bush declared a cease-fire. AFTERMATH OF WAR On March 3, Iraqi military leaders agreed to stringent coalition terms for a cease-fire, including an exchange of prisoners, a separation of forces to avoid conflict, and Iraqi help in locating sea and land mines. A coalition withdrawal from southern Iraq was contingent on establishing a permanent cease-fire, with Iraqi compliance with all of the pertinent United Nations resolutions. On March 5, Baghdad radio announced that the Iraqi government annulled the annexation of Kuwait; it also declared that Kuwaiti assets seized after the August 1990 occupation would be restored. The United Nations Security Council on April 3 imposed stiff conditions for a formal end to the hostilities. The United Nations mandated the destruction of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities (the first of which was found greatly to exceed intelligence estimates). A fund for compensation of the victims of the war was created, requiring that 30 percent of Iraq's future oil revenues be applied to that purpose. Iraq also was required to cede territory to a UN-monitored demilitarized zone between the two countries. The Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States estimated that the Iraqi army had suffered 85,000 to 100,000 casualties, though U.S. military authorities cautioned that precise figures would probably never be known. Following the end of active operations, General Schwarzkopf said that 29 Iraqi divisions, or about 300,000 troops, had been rendered ineffective for combat. An estimated 50,000 prisoners of war had been taken. In the aftermath of the war, Hussein remained in power and was able to crush two major internal rebellions--by the Shiites in southern Iraq and the Kurds in the north. Coalition forces did not intervene. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled into the mountains of Turkey, and as many as one million crossed into Iran seeking refuge from Hussein's forces. The Allies created "safe havens" in northern Iraq and induced the refugees to return, but sporadic fighting continued. POSTWAR GOALS In a speech delivered on February 6, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared that the United States faced five important challenges in the Persian Gulf region. The first was that of setting up regional arms control and security arrangements to keep the peace, perhaps supervised by the Gulf Cooperation Council or the United Nations. A second was to organize international aid to reconstruct the economy of the region. A third involved healing the bitter animosities in the Arab world. A fourth, and highly important challenge, he said, was trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The fifth and last was the domestic challenge of better American energy conservation to decrease U.S. reliance on imported oil. French President Francois \TMitterrand\t summarized the major problems he saw in the postwar world: "The Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian problem, the problem of Lebanon, the control of weapon sales, disarmament, redistribution of resources, reconstruction of countries hit by the war." Secretary of State James Baker early in March conferred with the governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Israel, Syria, the Soviet Union, and Turkey. In Saudi Arabia, six Arab nations of the Persian Gulf, along with Egypt and Syria, endorsed Baker's long-range plan for a continued American naval presence in the region and occasional joint exercises with air and ground troops. They discussed the necessity of transforming the area into a region "free from weapons of mass destruction," which was understood to mean nuclear, biological, and chemical arms. The regional foreign ministers declared that the period following the liberation of Kuwait was the best time to bring about "a just and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of Palestine." Baker later met with Israeli officials and a delegation of Palestinian leaders from the Israeli-occupied \TWest Bank\t and \TGaza Strip\t. COSTS OF THE WAR Dead and Wounded According to government sources, U. S. combat deaths totaled 148 in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, and 213 were wounded. An estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Iraqi troops were killed, according to a Saudi Arabian estimate. Iraqi authorities put the number of their civilian dead at 1,591. Saudi Arabia had 33 combat deaths, Britain 24, Egypt 10, the United Arab Emirates 6, France 2, and Kuwait 1. Monetary Costs Through the middle of February 1991, the United States, which undertook by far the largest military commitment to the war and incurred the greatest expenses, had received pledges of monetary support of more than $50 billion. The main pledged contributors were: Saudi Arabia, $16.8 billion; Kuwait, $16 billion; Japan, $10.7 billion; and Germany, $6.6 billion. The money was to go into a special account in the U.S. Treasury called the Defense Cooperation Account. Estimates for the cost of the war to the United States, beginning January 16, were in the neighborhood of $500 million per day. Estimates for the total cost ranged from $40 to $50 billion. Preliminary estimates for the cost of rebuilding Kuwait were in the neighborhood of $40 billion. Damage to Iraq A United Nations mission that visited Iraq from March 10 to March 17 estimated that 17,000 Iraqis were homeless. As a result of the bombings and the embargo, the U.N. report stated, "the recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the infrastructure of what had been until January 1991 a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society." The report recommended an immediate end to the embargo on imports of food and other supplies to prevent "epidemic and famine." Estimates for reconstruction within Iraq ran to $100 billion or more. Environmental and Material Damage Coalition troops liberating Kuwait found a country ravaged by seven months of occupation, a population stunned by planned and random Iraqi pillage, rape, kidnapping, and destruction. An estimated 600 oil wells out of the total 1,000 in the country had been sabotaged and set afire by the retreating Iraqis. In addition, massive oil spills had been deliberately created by the Iraqi occupiers of Kuwait, the most serious one occurring in January, when an estimated 11 million gallons of crude oil were released into the Persian Gulf. On Jan. 16, 1992, President Bush issued a statement commemorating the first anniversary of the beginning of the war. "Kuwait is liberated and the legitimate government restored, the fires set by (Iraq's) retreating army are extinguished, the flow of oil from the gulf is secure from political and economic blackmail." An \TNBC\t/Wall Street Journal poll, reporting on January 11, noted a shift in U. S. public perceptions of the war: 63% believed that Bush had ended the war prematurely, ordering a cease-fire before Saddam Hussein was removed from power or eliminated. Bibliography: Al-Khalil, Samir, Republic of Fear: The Inside Story of Saddam's Iraq (1990); Allen, Thomas B., Berry, F. Clifton, and Polmar, Norman, War in the Gulf: From the Invasion of Kuwait to the Day of Victory and Beyond (1991); Brenner, Eliot, and Harwood, William, Desert Storm: The Weapons of War (1991); Groubard, Stephen R., Mr. Bush's War: Its Moral and Political Consequences (1991); Miller, Judith, and Mylroie, Laurie, Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf (1990); Ridgeway, James, ed., The March to War (1991); Sasson, Jean P., The Rape of Kuwait (1990); U.S. News and World Report Staff, Shield and Storm: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (1991).