The Supreme Court of the United States, composed of a chief justice and eight associate justices, is at the apex of the American judicial system. Provisions for the establishment of the Supreme Court were made in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. In addition to vesting judicial power in a Supreme Court and other lower courts to be established by congressional legislation, Section 1 of this article states that federal judges "shall hold their offices during good behavior"--their removal therefore can only be by \Timpeachment\t procedures--and judges' compensation cannot be reduced while they hold office. Section 2 of Article III sets forth the extent of federal judicial power and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction--that is, the authority to hear a case without that case being first heard elsewhere--over cases in which a state or a diplomat is involved (the 11TH AMENDMENT, however, restricts to some extent federal jurisdiction over suits against states). The Court's appellate jurisdiction can be regulated by Congress. Justices are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The Constitution does not stipulate the size of the Court, leaving that determination to congressional statute. The familiar nine-member bench has been constant in size only since 1869; it began with six members in 1789 and had as many as ten justices in the period 1863-66. The Supreme Court of the United States is unique because it serves two functions, each of which must be carried on in a subtle relationship to the other. It is, first, a court of law, operating within the forms and rituals of Anglo-Saxon legal procedure with roots going back to 12th-century England; as such it is the highest court in the land, with a final authority over all adjudication whether originating in the federal or the state courts. Because its pronouncements on U.S. law are final, they become guides for every judge and lawyer in the nation. In addition to being a court of law, the Supreme Court is a policymaking body. It is a political institution in the sense that it exerts a commanding influence on the public policies of the United States, a fact that Alexis de Tocqueville recognized so perceptively in 1834 when he observed: "Scarcely any question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." The U.S. judicial system is complex, with authority dispersed vertically among layers of local, state, and federal governments and horizontally among the branches of the national government. Because the entire scheme is controlled by a written constitution that enunciates general rules to guide and control those who wield power, there is a need for someone to see that the rules are interpreted and followed. Early in the country's history the Supreme Court assumed the role of referee, or overseer, not only to declare definitively what the rules are but to make certain that all public officials--from police officer to the nation's president--obey them. When the Supreme Court declared the Texas and Georgia abortion statutes unconstitutional in \TRoe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton\t (1973), it was acting as a court in hearing argument on appeal from a lower federal court. Obviously, however, the court was also involved in a momentous public policy decision when it said that under the Constitution a woman has a right, although not unqualified, to terminate her pregnancy through an abortion. HOW CASES REACH THE COURT The Supreme Court is primarily a \Tcourt of appeals\t. Cases generally reach the Court either from the lower federal courts or from the state supreme courts. There are three possible routes by which a case may come to the Supreme Court. Certification A lower federal court may send up a question of law about which it desires instructions, a process called certification. Appeal Some cases are appealed to the Court as a matter of right under the Judiciary Act of 1925. Such cases fall into eight categories. A litigant may appeal from the highest state court in which a decision may be had if the court (1) has invalidated a federal statute or treaty; or (2) has upheld its own law or constitutional provision allegedly in conflict with federal laws, treaties, or the U.S. Constitution. A litigant may appeal from a federal court of appeals if (1) a federal law or treaty has been declared unconstitutional; or (2) a state law or constitutional provision has been held to conflict with a federal law, treaty, or the Constitution. Finally, it is possible to appeal directly from a federal district court to the Supreme Court if (1) a federal statute with a criminal penalty is invalidated; (2) a judgment has been rendered under the antitrust laws, the Interstate Commerce Act, or Title II of the Federal Communications Act; (3) a three-judge court has either issued or denied an injunction to restrain enforcement of a state or federal law; or (4) a one-judge court has held a federal law unconstitutional. The Court has some discretion in deciding whether to accept such cases. It may reject an appeal on the ground that the federal question raised is trivial or insubstantial, that the question was not validly raised in a state court, or that the state court's judgment might be sustained on an independent ground of state law. Thus the right of appeal is subject to certain technical restrictions. Certiorari Most of the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court reach the bench on a writ of certiorari, a Latin term meaning to be informed of or to be made certain in regard to. In English practice certiorari was a writ that commanded judges of inferior courts to return records or certify proceedings for review by a higher court, and this is essentially its practical meaning today. Prior to 1925 approximately 80 percent of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was obligatory, and, as a matter of course, the Court was not able to keep its docket clear. As a result of Chief Justice William Howard \TTaft\t's efforts, however, Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1925 under the terms of which, with the exceptions noted above, most cases became reviewable in the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. In a practical sense this legislation means that a person who loses a case in the lower courts, although usually unable to appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of right, may petition the high court to grant a writ of certiorari. Because about 90 percent of the cases decided by the Supreme Court annually reach it by this method, the Court has considerable discretion over the kinds of cases it accepts. Under the Court's rules, certiorari is granted only "where there are special and important reasons therefor." Among these reasons are the following possibilities: when two federal courts of appeals or two 3-judge federal district courts have rendered conflicting decisions; when a state court or a federal appellate court has passed on an important question of federal law on which the Supreme Court has never made a pronouncement; or when a federal court has so far departed from the accepted canons of judicial proceedings as to call for exercise of the Supreme Court's powers. Generally the Court accepts only 10 to 15 percent of the certiorari petitions in a given year. The Process of Review When a litigant who loses in a lower court wishes to take the case to the Supreme Court, he or she may send a request for a hearing, whether by appeal or certiorari, to the office of the chief justice, who circulates it among the eight associate justices. All nine justices take part in the decision whether to hear the case. The number of requests runs from 4,000 to 5,000 annually, of which only about 150 are decided by full opinion. Every justice must personally review the records and decide which cases should be placed on the docket for a hearing. If four justices are in favor of taking a case, it is placed on the docket. If a case is rejected, the decision of the last court in which it was heard stands; such a rejection does not, the Court maintains, necessarily indicate approval of the lower court's ruling. Once a case is accepted for review, it is placed on one of three dockets, the original, the appellate, or the miscellaneous--the latter including a large number of petitions, often handwritten, filed by indigent persons, many of whom are serving time in prison. Any person who executes an oath that he or she is without any financial resources may, under a federal statute, sue in forma pauperis (as a poor person) in any federal court without paying filing fees, transcript costs, or any of the other expenses connected with a lawsuit. HOW THE COURT OPERATES The Supreme Court opens its sessions in October of each year and usually adjourns toward the end of June. Occasionally the term runs into July if the Court finds it necessary to decide an issue of unusual importance. Such was the case in 1971 and 1974 when the Court dealt with the Pentagon Papers case and Nixon tapes, respectively. On rare occasions it may call a special session, but it has done so only four times in this century. A normal session now lasts about 38 weeks, but the work load is so heavy that a justice can rarely take an extended summer vacation. During the term, the Court usually devotes 4 days in 2 weeks of each month to oral argument in cases it has chosen for full treatment; it then spends 2 weeks in recess for researching and writing opinions. For 88 years prior to 1961, the Court's public sessions opened at noon, Monday through Friday; the conference, a meeting of the nine justices at which the cases are discussed, was held on Saturday. Under present rules, initiated by Chief Justice Warren E. \TBurger\t in 1970, the Court holds open hearings from 10:00 AM until noon and from 1:00 to 3:00 PM on Monday through Thursday. There are now two conferences, one on Wednesday at 3 PM and a longer, all-day meeting on Friday. Attorneys submit written briefs to the Court. Oral argument gives the justices a chance to ask questions and add to their knowledge of a case. It also gives the public an opportunity to see the Court in action (188 seats are available on a first-come, first-served basis), although the Court's most important work is done behind closed doors. In the Court's early years, lawyers might have argued a case for days, but attorneys are now usually limited to 1 hour or sometimes half an hour. No opinion is written or decision rendered until after the Court has met in conference and discussed the cases. The conference is unusual for a public body because it is closed to all but the nine justices. No official record is kept, and whatever is said remains forever secret unless the justices wish to divulge something, which they rarely do. Justice Hugo L. \TBlack\t believed so strongly in the principle of conference confidentiality that he specified in his will that the informal notes he had taken during conferences be destroyed at his death. Presiding over the conference is one of the most important tasks of the chief justice, who may in this role exert a special influence over colleague justices. The chief justice presents the cases for discussion, controls the debate, and assigns the writing of opinions. The chief justice presents his view of the case first, then elicits the opinions of the other justices in order of seniority. After all have expressed their views, a vote is taken in reverse order. If the chief justice is in the majority, he will later formally assign the writing of the opinion; if he is in dissent, the most senior justice in the majority makes the assignment. Although the assigning of opinions is simply a parceling out of the work, some political strategy is involved, because the opinion of a particular justice may carry more weight on a given question than that of others. Some develop special expertise; some are more highly respected generally. For example, Justice William \TBrennan\t, after writing the opinion in \TRoth v. United States\t (1957), became the Court's expert on obscenity and wrote the opinions in the significant obscenity cases that followed. It seemed most appropriate that Justice Black write the opinion in \TGideon v. Wainwright\t (1963), when the constitutional right to counsel was extended to state courts through the 14th Amendment, because Black had been advocating this right to counsel for a decade and a half. Chief justices tend to write some of the more controversial opinions, presumably to give the decisions greater prestige by stamping the imprimatur of the chief upon them; but they also generally make certain that all the justices are given an opportunity to speak for the Court in significant cases. Chief Justice Earl \TWarren\t, for example, wrote for the Court in cases involving public school desegregation, reapportionment of both houses of state legislatures, and application of the right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel at the police interrogation level in criminal proceedings. However, he assigned to others the opinions in key civil-liberties cases. Similarly, Chief Justice Burger was the Court's spokesperson in the case ordering President Nixon to obey a subpoena, but he assigned the abortion cases to Justice Harry A. \TBlackmun\t. All justices may record their own views of a case. If a justice is among the majority, but disagrees with the reasoning supporting the decision, that justice may write a concurring opinion in which the view is expressed that although the case was correctly decided, it should have been supported on different constitutional grounds. Any or all of those who believe that the case was wrongly decided may write dissenting opinions in which they marshal the arguments for their position. The total number of concurrences and dissents during a term is generally larger than the number of assigned opinions. Until John \TMarshall\t became chief justice in 1801, the Court presented its opinions seriatim, that is, each justice wrote an opinion of the law in each case, an arrangement that made it difficult for lawyers to determine precisely what had been decided. Marshall instituted the system described above, which has prevailed. Although some critics of the Court bemoan many of its decisions not being unanimous, it may be argued that given the difficult and controversial nature of the cases that they decide--the easier ones having already been disposed of by lower courts--it is a wonder that the justices agree as much as they do. Often they are unanimous, and rarely are so many opinions written in a case that the constitutional question involved remains unsettled. Recent examples of such a situation are \TNew York Times\t V. \TUnited States\t (1971) and \TUniversity of California v. Bakke\t (1978). Nine separate opinions were written in the first case and five in the second. In the Times case, which dealt with the Pentagon Papers, the Court held that the newspaper could be restrained from publishing certain classified documents; in the Bakke case, it ruled that a white applicant had been denied admission to the university because of his race. In each instance, however, the law was left fragmented and uncertain, inviting additional litigation. When a justice has completed a written opinion it is circulated among the other justices for comment. This review is done not only with the assigned majority opinion but with the concurrences and dissents as well. The final opinions that emerge from this interaction often differ from the original versions as the authors take into account the critiques of their colleagues, and occasionally a vote is changed. All of these negotiations are carried on in private, as are the original discussion and voting, and the final opinions are announced publicly from the bench. For many years the Court adhered to the tradition, originating in the 19th century, of announcing its opinions only on Mondays, but in 1965, Chief Justice Warren declared that in the future, cases would be reported as they became ready for decision at any session of the Court. He said after his retirement that the new arrangement was for the benefit of the press, to give reporters more time to read and analyze opinions before filing them with their editors. The justice who has written the majority opinion, which becomes the official opinion of the Court, delivers it from the bench. Over the years the style has varied with the individual justice. Some simply read the opinion in full; others summarize the major points. Justice Felix \TFrankfurter\t used to amaze reporters and onlookers by expounding his opinions from memory, including the citing of volume and page numbers of pertinent cases bearing on the one at hand. The process of handing down opinions may take from an hour to several days, depending on the number of decisions and the styles of the justices involved. It is a sober and dignified procedure throughout, from the moment the red velvet draperies are opened and the black-robed justices take their seats to the time the chief justice declares the session ended. A Supreme Court justice has one of the most demanding jobs in the world. Over a half-century ago Chief Justice Taft would rise at 5:15 a.m., work for almost 4 hours before walking to the Capitol where the Court was housed, and, after the end of the Court session at 4:30 p.m., work until 10:00 p.m. with an hour out for dinner. Taft talked of the "exhausting character" of the judicial work (a reason for his efforts to have the Judiciary Act of 1925 passed in order to lighten the work load). Charles Evans \THughes\t, who had been an active lawyer, governor of New York, and a vigorous presidential candidate, said that service on the Court was the toughest job of all. Today the justices are more hard-pressed than ever. They handle the ever-increasing business partly by confining the number of cases in which they render a full opinion to a minimum, but they also use a larger number of law clerks. Each justice takes on top-ranking law graduates who serve for a year or two and handle much of the preliminary work leading to a final opinion or to a justice's decision to vote for or against granting review. Some former law clerks have become justices themselves, including, on the present Court, William \TRehnquist\t, John Paul \TStevens\t, and Byron \TWhite\t. THE COURT AS A POLITICAL FORCE From the day on which Chief Justice Marshall rendered the historic decision in \TMarbury v. Madison\t (1803), which established the principle of \Tjudicial review\t--that is, the right of the Court to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional--the Supreme Court has had a significant impact on U.S. public policy. John Marshall not only implanted the cornerstone but constructed the entire foundation of U.S. constitutional law. In \TGibbons v. Ogden\t (1824) he interpreted the commerce power--the power the Constitution gives Congress to regulate interstate commerce--in the broadest possible terms, and in \TMcCulloch v. Maryland\t (1819) he firmly wrote the Federalist doctrines of national supremacy and implied powers into the Constitution of the United States. Marshall's successor as chief justice, Roger B. \TTaney\t, helped precipitate the Civil War with his opinion in \TDred Scott v. Sandford\t (1857) that free blacks and slaves were not citizens of the United States within the meaning of the Constitution. For the most part, however, the Marshall doctrines were strengthened and extended during the Taney era (1836-64). The post-Civil War period contained two parallel developments: the curbing of state regulatory powers through the use of the \Tdue process\t clause of the 14TH AMENDMENT (adopted in 1868) and the restriction of national power through a narrow interpretation of the powers of Congress, particularly that of regulating interstate commerce. Important among these decisions were those in \TMunn v. Illinois\t (1877); Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897); Smyth v. Ames (1898); \TLochner v. New York\t (1905); and Adair v. United States (1908). A major constitutional crisis arose during the 1930s over the question of federal and state regulation of the economy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, angered by the Supreme Court's invalidation of much of his recovery legislation, notably in \TSchechter Poultry Corporation v. United States\t (1935) and \TCarter v. Carter Coal Company\t (1936), proposed to Congress that the size of the Court be increased from 9 to 15 justices--in effect asking for permission to pack the Court with supportive members. The plan failed, but within a year the Supreme Court was upholding economic regulatory legislation. Important cases were \LNational Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp\loration (1937); Mulford v. Smith (1939); and \TUnited States v. Darby\t (1941). The Supreme Court emerged once again as a major force in American life under the chief justiceship of Earl Warren from 1953 to 1969. Known for its consistent protection of civil liberties, the Warren Court will be remembered particularly for three revolutionary decisions: \TBrown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas\t (1954), which outlawed segregation in the public schools and spearheaded the civil rights movement of the 1950s and '60s; \TBaker v. Carr\t (1962), which ordered equitable reapportionment of the state legislatures and guaranteed a close approximation of the "one man-one vote" principle; and \TMiranda v. Arizona\t (1966), which curbed coercive police techniques by insisting that prior to any interrogation a suspect must be told of his or her rights, including the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. The independence, integrity, and responsibility of the Supreme Court were brought into sharp focus when it unanimously ordered President Richard M. Nixon to obey Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski's subpoena directing the president to surrender tape recordings of conversations made in the White House. Within a few days of the decision in \TUnited States v. Richard M. Nixon\t (1974), the president resigned. Under the chief justiceship (1969-86) of Warren Burger, the Court upheld the major decisions made during the Warren years but generally took a less "activist" stance than in the preceding period. Conservative opposition to the 1973 \TRoe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton\t decisions (striking down state laws prohibiting abortions), and to the ruling in \TEngel v. Vitale\t (outlawing prayer in the public schools) was strong and persistent. A movement to reverse them by constitutional amendment was backed by President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. During the 1970s, efforts made by colleges and businesses to compensate for past discrimination to minorities by granting them preferential treatment were challenged in the courts. In \TUniversity of California v. Bakke\t (1978) the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a white student excluded from the university in order to make room for minority applicants but allowed race to be considered as a factor in admitting students to federally funded institutions. A notable event of this period was President Reagan's appointment in 1981 of Sandra Day O'CONNOR as the first woman Supreme Court justice. In 1983 the Court ruled that racially discriminatory private schools are ineligible for tax exemption (Bob Jones v. United States), thus rejecting a position taken by the Reagan administration. It also declared unconstitutional the legislative \Tveto\t (see \TImmigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha\t). A conservative majority in 1984 redirected the law in several areas. The justices upheld the principle of seniority over minority preference in jobs (Firefighters v. Stotts) and a city's right to include a Nativity scene in a public Christmas display (Lynch v. Donnelly). Controversially, the \Texclusionary rule\t was relaxed in two decisions that granted permission to use: (1) a defective search warrant under certain conditions (United States v. Leon) and (2) illegally obtained evidence with proof that it "inevitably" would have been discovered lawfully (Nix v. Williams). In several 1985 rulings the Court reaffirmed church-state separation, notably by striking down an Alabama law providing for a moment of silent prayer in public schools. In 1986 (the year in which William H. \TRehnquist\t became chief justice) the Court, in three cases, endorsed the limited use of affirmative action in the workplace to cure past discrimination. It later (1989), however, overruling its own unanimous decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971), moved the burden of proving de facto job discrimination to employees (Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio). In 1990-91, in a series of cases further restricting the protections afforded criminal defendants, the Court ruled coerced confessions admissable when "harmless" (Arizona v. Fulminante), limited death-row appeals to a single on in most cases (McCleskey v. Zant), aqualified the Miranda rule (McNeil v. Wisconsin), and allowed warrantless car searches in certain cases (California v. Acevedo). The retirements in 1987, 1990, and 1991 of Lewis F. \TPowell\t, Jr., William J. \TBrennan\t, Jr., and Thurgood \TMarshall\t, respectively, and their replacement by Anthony M. \TKennedy\t (1988), David H. Souter (1990), and Clarence \TThomas\t (1991), transformed the Court into an activist conservative body. Robert J. Steamer Bibliography: Abraham, Henry J., Freedom of the Court, 4th ed. (1982), The Judiciary, 6th ed. (1983), and Justices and Presidents, 2d ed. (1985); Baum, Lawrence, et al., The Supreme Court, 2d ed. (1985); Congressional Quarterly, Supreme Court, Justice and the Law, 3d ed. (1983); Cox, Archibald, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government (1976) and The Court and the Constitution (1987); Currie, David P., The Constitution in the Supreme Court (1991); Hodder-Williams, Richard, The Politics of the U.S. Supreme Court (1980); Perry, Michael J., The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (1982; repr. 1984); Rehnquist, William H., The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is (1987); Steamer, Robert J., Chief Justice (1986).