Workshops
|
Workshops
|
Dave Haynie and other colleagues of Commodore (USA) have until today (?) the opinion that the CD32, sold in sufficient numbers, could have prevented Commodore from falling.
I don't share this opinion. The CD32-"project" was declared as top secret and we, "the technic guys", were not allowed to know a single word of it. H. Jost did everything to keep us from "sabotaging" this project, too (as if it were our intent to harm Commodore).
We saw the CD32 for the first time when it appeared in the Quelle-catalogue [a big german mail-order company - remark from translator]. So we asked whether this was really a product from us or a misprint.
Before, there were only rumors that Commodore was developing a 32-bit game console. In Germany existed a CD32 prototype that was handed around in the sales department in an old, ragged leather suitcase. I had the luck to get a glance at it (although everyone was threatened with hard punishment if we should hear about it - but we had our ways :-)). So I grabbed the device (it had to be back in the suitcase as soon as possible), disassembled it quickly, put the circuit board on a photocopier, re-assembled the thing and back into the case it went.
>From the copy we could at least guess what this thing was about. Official protests were impossible because then we would have had to explain how we knew about it. So we just let the sales and marketing department do their job. As I said above, the Amiga-group was strictly out of this business.
Some time later, we were shown the thing and had to present it to the sales department (Hermann Hähner - he later went to Acorn) and the head of marketing (Karola Bode - went to Gateway and works now for Compaq). But of course at first we couldn't, because it was totally new for us.
After we had 2 or 3 hours to examine the CD32, it was obvious to us that the horror had reached a new dimension. The so called "prototype" was at this time practically the release version. The case didn't fit together completely, the power switch could get stuck, and the joypad was quite uncommon (compared to the systems >from SEGA and the SNES from Nintendo).
Except a demo-CD, the was no software available for the CD32. So we presented the machine to the two of them and were plainly told that this thing wasn't going to stand any chances and was not a competitor to the other consoles (at this time there wasn't a word about the ability to expand it to a fully fledged Amiga). Of course we were "totally astonished" by such arguments. At this time we thought that we were the worst at Commodore.....
At the same time, the sales department worked on a voucher that should be included with every CD32. Of course we protested, because a console without any games was the worst joke ever. But the sales dept. had the problem that the CD32 had to be placed in the market, but without any titles this launch had to go wrong. Thank God that then, shortly before the planned lauch, "OSCAR" and "DIGGERS" came out and could be bundled with the CD32.
Even before the whole CD32 business, I had (driven by pure frustation) sent a fax to Irving Gould (Chairman of the Board) in which I applied for the job of Mehdi Ali and/or Helmut Jost. I didn't get an answer and re-sent it a fortnight later. At this time I didn't care anymore if I got fired or not, because this was only a question of time, as we saw some time later. I knew how it was going to end since beginning of 1992, although I never provoked it.
I offered Irving to employ me for half the money. It would have been sufficient to make only half as much mistakes to "save" Commodore.
The only reaction on my "application" came indirectly: My presence at the Cebit 1993 was "not necessary". Maybe they were afraid that I would meet Irving Gould and he would get a heart attack at my sight. I didn't go to the Cebit myself either. For me, 1993 was the year of "giving up". There was nothing left to do.
At the time of the CD32, Helmut Jost wasn't at Commodore anymore. Maybe this was a result of my fax, but I think there were other (financial) reasons. Alwin Stumpf was hired as the new manager. He came early (?) 1993 ..... I think it was January or February.
When he came, many still had the hope that everything would turn out to the better, but some (I was among them) were afraid that he was only hired for the liquidation of Commodore.
In a personnel assembly we wanted to clarify these points but we were told nothing precisely. Alwin just said that we had to make a sales revenue of xx millions per quarter or our jobs would be at danger. But as our works council asked if there would be really no layoffs if we made that margin, there was no answer.
Just to mention that we made enough sales but employees were fired nonetheless. You could say in tenpacks. The whole thing could have been bearable if they would have been notified in time to look for another job, but it just got many of us out of nothing.
Well, after all, 1993 was a "quiet" year. Alwin Stumpf avoided to make decisuions wherever possible. In my rage I went as far as offering him multiple choices in my memos so that he just had to mark an answer.
This caused no reaction either. When I first caught him personally, around July/August 1993, I asked him why he didn't fire the overpaid "superiors" (for one of them they could have employed four of us for a month).....no answer.....then I asked him why Commodore Germany didn't proceed on its own, on what he answered (literally!), that he wasn't inclined. He wanted to produce and sell multimedia hardware with his brother-in-law in the east.
My comment: "not inclined" is a great answer and shows how much social responsibility some people have. :-( Orders and "moderate" financial resources were still there at this time.
After we got our dismissals and had about 3 weeks to do "something" and I just could not get to rest, I proposed to Wilfried Häring to organize a meeting with Mehdi Ali.
I just couldn't imagine that Mehdi Ali really was the a**hole he was always decribed as. Sure, Mehdi Ali had a financial background and didn't know much about computers but I just couldn't get it in my head that everything was HIS fault. In Dave's video, he doesn't get a good reputation either and I can't speak for Commodore USA (Westchester), I just can give my own impression.
"Again", we tried it over Petro Tyschtschenko. He said he would try to organize a meeting. In the meantime, Wilfried and I had written a paper were pointed out the necessary steps and markingting possibilities for existing products (from the view of Commodore Germany). It weren't revolutionary plans, this just wasn't possible anymore. We merely wanted to sell out some corpses which would have brought some money for the "future".
About 2 weeks before our leaving I looked out of the window and saw Petro arrive with Mehdi. Here I saw our chance, since getting a real "appointment" was very unlikely. So we went down the stairs, intercepted them at the elevator and asked for a conversation among 6 eyes. Mehdi wasn't eager about that but offered us to express our concerns between the elevator and the vending machine.
That's what we did, and got the disappointing answer from Mehdi that he found our efforts commendable, but these actions wouldn't save Commodore anymore. There just wasn't enough money. He said furthermore, that he would pass our papers to Alwin Stumpf (oh, thank you) who then would get in contact with us.
That was the last blow for us. Alwin then came to us (more to Wilfried, because I wasn't interested in talking to him anymore), and was a little sour, because we did the Mehdi-thing "over his head". Then he offered Wilfried Häring to sell these corpses for a share. Wilfried informed me of that and that Alwin wanted to talk with me about that matter, too. I refused.
On 30-Sep-1993, 13 colleagues and I went away. Persons like Doc Peter Kittel went (considering their year in the company etc.) at the very end, early 1994.
Sven Drieling wrote:
So I pick up this question :-)
I'm not quite sure...in our conversation he seemed quite serious, not zonked nor uninterested...just objective...I "believe" that he putted to much trust in the managers of the several branches...that's _my_ impression, although Mehdi got quite a bad reputation in Dave's video...whether all this is justified...I watched the video and the conversation several times, it seemed to me like it was about another person.
But maybe he just pulled himself together at our meeting.
Rainer Benda«
To be continued...
