Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp Path: peti.GUN.de!dino.dinoco.de!teralon!easix!flyer.GUN.de!unidui!zib-berlin.de!xlink.net!howland.reston.ans.net!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!agate!apple.com!amd!netcomsv!netcom.com!gbe From: gbe@netcom.com (Gary Edstrom) Subject: PGP FAQ (1/4) General Questions Message-ID: Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest) X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8] Date: Sat, 11 Dec 1993 22:34:10 GMT Lines: 964 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Frequently Asked Questions alt.security.pgp Revision 0.2 11 DEC 93 The following is a preliminary FAQ for alt.security.pgp. It is FAR from complete, but I wanted to start getting feedback on it. I also realize that the wording may still be a little rough around the edges, but I'm hoping to improve it it time. I will plan on posting an updated copy every couple of weeks. That should keep it from scrolling off most systems. Please read it over and let me know if I have any of my facts wrong. Also let me know if there is some commonly asked question that I didn't answer or answers that were not clear. It should be noted that most of the questions and answers concerning PGP apply equally well to the ViaCrypt(tm) version as well. All additions, deletions, or corrections to this list should be directed to me at gbe@netcom.com (Gary Edstrom). I will acknowledge all e-mail. Many examples in this FAQ may only apply to the MS-DOS version. For users of MAC, I would like to direct your attention to the document: "Here's How to MacPGP!" by Xenon I would like to thank everyone who sent me suggestions and information for this FAQ. In particular, I would like to thank Laszlo Baranyi who sent a copy of an old FAQ from which I obtained information for the section on PGP support products. Also I would like to thank Xenon for proof reading this first edition and for supplying many suggestions for improvements. The files making up this FAQ are available via anonymous FTP at netcom.com in /pub/gbe. The file names are faq-1.asc, faq-2.asc, faq-3.asc, and faq- 4.asc. The files are in simple ASCII text format. This release of the FAQ is being distributed in four parts. Part 4 will be of interest only to users in the United States. Part 1/4 1. Introductory Questions 2. General Questions 3. Keys 4. Security Questions 5. Message Signatures 6. Key Signatures 7. Revoking a key 8. Public Key Servers 9. Cypherpunks 10. Bugs 10. Suggestions 11. Related News Groups 12. Recommended Reading Part 2/4 Appendix I - Glossary of Cryptographic Terms Appeidix II - PGP add-ons and related programs Part 3/4 Appendex III - Testimony of Philip Zimmermann to Congress Appendix IV - Announcement of Philip Zimmermann Defense Fund Part 4/4 Appendix V - Unites States Congress Phone and FAX List ======================================================================== Gary B. Edstrom | Sequoia Software | PGP fingerprint: Internet: gbe@netcom.com | Programming Services | 2F F6 1B 28 6E A6 09 6C CompuServe: 72677,564 | P.O. Box 9573 | B0 EA 9E 4C C4 C6 7D 46 Fax: 1-818-247-6046 | Glendale, CA 91226 | Key available via finger What is PGP? Subscribe to alt.security.pgp and find out! ======================================================================== 1. Introductory Questions > What is PGP? PGP is a program that gives your electronic mail something that it otherwise doesn't have: Privacy. It does this by scrambling or encrypting the message so that nobody but the intended receiver can read it. When encrypted, the message just looks like a meaningless jumble of random characters. PGP has proven itself quite capable of resisting even the most sophisticated forms of analysis aimed at reading the encrypted text. While PGP is easy to use, it does give you enough rope so that you can hang yourself. Become thoroughly familiar with the various options in PGP before using it to send serious messages. For example, giving the following command "PGP -sat" will only sign a message, it will not encrypt it. Even though the output looks like it is encrypted, it really isn't. Anybody in the world would be able to recover the original text. > Why should I encrypt my mail? I'm not doing anything illegal! You should encrypt your e-mail for the same reason that you don't write all of your correspondence on the back of a post card. e-mail is actually far less secure than the postal system. With the post office, you at least put your letter inside an envelope to hide it from casual snooping. Take a look at the header area of any e-mail message that you receive and you will see that it has passed through a number of nodes on it's way to you. Every one of these nodes presents the opportunity for snooping. Xenon puts it like this: Crime? If you are not a politician, research scientist, investor, CEO, lawyer, celebrity, libertarian in a repressive society, investor, or person having too much fun, and you do not send e-mail about your private sex life, financial/political/legal/scientific plans, or gossip then maybe you don't need PGP, but at least realize that privacy has nothing to do with crime and is in fact what keeps the world from falling apart. Besides, PGP is FUN. You never had a secret decoder ring? Boo! -Xenon (Copyright 1993, Xenon) > What are public keys and private keys? With conventional encryption schemes, keys must be exchanged with everyone you wish to talk by some other method, such as a trusted courier. With conventional encryption, either the same key is used for both encryption and decryption or it is easy to convert either key to the other. With public key encryption, the encryption and decryption keys are different and it is impossible for an outsider to convert one to the other. Therefore, the encryption key can be made public knowledge, posted in a database somewhere. Anyone wanting to send you a message would obtain your encryption key from this database or some other source and encrypt his message to you. This process is not reversible with the encryption key. Therefore nobody other than the intended receiver can decrypt the message. Even the person who encrypted cannot reverse the process. When you receive a message, you use your secret decryption key to decrypt the message. This secret key never leaves your computer. > How much does PGP cost? Nothing! (Compare to ViaCrypt PGP at $98!) > Is encryption legal? In much of the civilized world, encryption is either legal, or at least tolerated. However, there are a some countries where such activities could put you in front of a firing squad! Check with the laws in your own country before using PGP or any other encryption product. > Is PGP legal? In addition to the comments about encryption listed above, there are a couple of additional issues of importance to those individuals residing in the United States or Canada. First, there is a question as to whether or not PGP falls under ITAR regulations with govern the exporting of cryptographic technology from the United States and Canada. This despite the fact that technical articles on the subject of public key encryption have been available legally world wide for a number of years. Any competent programmer would have been able to translate those articles into a workable encryption program. There is the possibility that ITAR regulations may be relaxed to allow for encryption technology. Second, a company called Public Key Partners (PKP) claims that it owns the patent to the RSA encryption algorithm in the United States. The idea of getting a patent on an algorithm is currently being challenged. Keep an eye on alt.security.pgp and talk.politics.crypto for the latest information. > Is there an archive site for messages posted to alt.security.pgp? laszlo@instrlab.kth.se (Laszlo Baranyi) says: "My memory says that ripem.msu.edu stores a backlog of both alt.security.pgp, and sci.crypt. But that site is ONLY open for ftp for those that are inside US." > Is there a commercial version of PGP available? Yes, by arraignment with the author of PGP, a company called ViaCrypt is marketing a version of PGP that is almost identical to the version currently available on Internet. Each can read or write messages to the other. ViaCrypt has all the appropriate licenses for using the various algorithms in PGP in a commercial environment. The list price of ViaCrypt PGP is $98 (US) for a single user license and is NOT available for export from the United States. In addition, it is presently available only for MS-DOS. While the present products are 100% compatible, it is not known if this will remain the case in the future. The address of ViaCrypt is: ViaCrypt David A. Barnhart Product Manager 2104 West Peoria Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85029 Tel: (602) 944-0773 Fax: (602) 943-2601 E-Mail: 70304.41@compuserve.com E-Mail: wk01965@worldlink.com Credit card orders only. (800)536-2664 (8-5 MST M-F) > What platforms has PGP been ported to and what are the latest version numbers? DOS: 2.3a MAC: 2.3 OS/2: 2.3a Unix: Amiga: Atari ST: 2.3 Archimedes: 2.3a Comadore Amiga: > Where can I obtain PGP? FTP sites soda.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp DOS & MAC ftp.demon.co.uk ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de ftp.funet.fi Also, try an archie search for pgp23. BBS sites The GRAPEVINE BBS in Little Rock Arkansas has set up a special account for people to download PGP for free. The SYSOP is Jim Wenzel, at jim.wenzel@grapevine.lrk.ar.us. The following phone numbers are applicable and should be dialed in the order presented (i.e., the first one is the highest speed line): (501) 753-6859, (501) 753-8121, (501) 791-0124. When asked to login use the following information: name: PGP USER ('PGP' is 1st name, 'USER' is 2nd name) password: PGP 2. General Questions > I sent a message to a person using version 2.2, but he can't decrypt it. What's wrong? Try uncommenting the line "pkcs_compat = 0" line in the config.txt file. By default, version 2.3 of PGP uses a different header format that is not compatible with earlier versions of PGP. Inserting this line into the config.txt file will force PGP to use the older header format. > What can I do to improve my systems performance during encryption or decryption. I want to keep the entire public key ring on my system, but it is just taking too long to find the key to encrypt or decrypt a message? The solution to this dilemma is to maintain 2 public key rings. The first ring, the normal pubring.pgp file, should contain only those individuals that you send messages to quite often. The second key ring can contain ALL of the keys for those occasions when the key you need isn't in your short ring. You will, of course, need to specify the key file name whenever encrypting messages using keys in your secondary key ring. Now, when encrypting or decrypting messages to individuals in your short key ring, the process will be a LOT faster. > When encrypting a message to multiple addresses, I notice that the length of the encrypted file only increases by a small amount for each additional address. Doesn't the program have to encrypt the entire message for each of the addresses? The reason that the message only grows by a small amount for each additional key is that the body of the message is only encrypted once using a random session key and the IDEA. It is only necessary then to encrypt this session key once for each address and place it in the header of the message. Therefore, the total length of a message only increases by the size of a header segment for each additional address. 3. Keys > Which key size should I use? PGP gives you 3 choices of key size: 384, 512, and 1024 bits. The larger the key, the more secure the RSA portion of the encryption is. The only place where the key size makes a large change in the running time of the program is during key generation. A 1024 bit key can take 8 times longer to generate than a 384 bit key. Fortunately, this is a one time process that doesn't need to be repeated unless you wish to generate another key pair. During encryption, only the RSA portion of the encryption process is affected by key size. The RSA portion is only used for encrypting the session key used by the IDEA. The main body of the message is totally unaffected by the choice of RSA key size. So unless you have a very good reason for doing otherwise, select the 1024 bit key size. > Why does PGP seem to take forever to add new keys to my public key ring? The time required to check signatures and add keys to your public key ring tends to grow as the square of the size of your existing public key ring. This can reach extreme proportions. I just recently added the entire 850KB public key ring form one of the key servers to my local public key ring. Even on my 66MHz 486 system, the process took over 10 hours. > How can I extract multiple keys into a single armored file? A number of people have more than one public key that they would like to make available. One way of doing this is executing the "-kxa" command for each key you wish to extract from the key ring into separate armored files, then appending all the individual files into a single long file with multiple armored blocks. This is not as convenient as having all of your keys in a single armored block. Unfortunately, the present version of PGP does not allow you to do this directly. Fortunately, there is an indirect way to do it. First, extract each of the desired keys into separate key files using the command "pgp -kxa ". It doesn't matter at this point if these temporary files are binary or armored. Next, create a new key file by adding the individual key files one by one using the command "pgp -ka ". This new key file will still be a binary file with a .pgp suffix and will contain only the keys that you are interested in. Finally, execute the command "pgp -a " to convert it to an armored file. This armored file now contains all of the desired keys just as if pgp had had a built in command to do it in the first place. > I tried encrypting the same message to the same address two different times and got completely different outputs. Why is this? Every time you run pgp, a different session key is generated. This session key is used for the IDEA. As a result, the entire header and body of the message changes. You will never see the same output twice, no matter how many times you encrypt the same message to the same address. > How do I specify which key to use when an individual has 2 or more public keys and the very same user ID on each, or when 2 different users have the same name? Instead of specifying the user's name in the ID field of the PGP command, you can use the key ID number. The format 0xNNNNNN where NNNNNN is the user's 6 character key ID number. You will recognize that this is the format for entering hex numbers in the C programming language. For example, any of the following commands could be used to encrypt a file to me. pgp -e "Gary Edstrom" pgp -e gbe@netcom.com pgp -e 0x90A9C9 This same method of key identification can be used in the config.txt file in the "MyName" variable to specify exactly which of the keys in the secret key ring should be used for encrypting a message. > What does the message "Unknown signator, can't be checked" mean when I am looking at key signatures usint the -kvv command? It means that the person who created that signature does not exist in your database. If at sometime in the future, you happen to add that individual to your database, then the signature line will read normally. It is completely harmless to leave these non checkable signatures in your database. They neither add to nor take away from the validity of the key in question. > How do I get PGP to display the trust parameters on a key? You can only do this when you run the the -kc option by itself on the entire database. The parameters will NOT be shown if you give a specific ID on the command line. The correct command is: "pgp -kc". The command "pgp -kc smith" will NOT show the trust parameters for smith. 4. Security Questions > How secure is PGP? The big unknown in any encryption scheme based on RSA is whether or not there is an efficient way to factor huge numbers, or if there is some backdoor algorithm than break the code without solving the factoring problem. If no algorithms exist for either of these two approaches, then RSA is quite possibly the strongest part of the entire PGP program. > Can't you break PGP by trying all of the possible keys? This is one of the first questions that people ask when they are first introduced to cryptography. They do not understand the size of the problem. For the IDEA encryption scheme, an 80 bit key is required. Lets say that you had developed a special purpose chip that could try a billion keys per second. This is FAR beyond anything that could really be developed today. Let's also say that you could afford to throw a million such chips at the problem at the same time. It would still require over 38 years to try all of the possible 80 bit keys. While the speed of computers continues to increase and their cost decrease, it will still be a number of years before a successful brute force attack could be accomplished on an 80 bit key. By that time, we will probably be using systems with several hundered bits of key > Can the NSA crack RSA? This question has been asked many times. If the NSA were able to crack RSA, you would probably never hear about it from them. The best defense against this is the fact the algorithm for RSA is known world wide. There are many competent mathematicians / cryptographers outside the NSA and there is much research being done in the field right now. If any of them were to discover a hole in RSA, I'm sure that we would hear about it from them. I think that it would be hard to hide such a discovery. > How secure is the "for your eyes only" option (-m)? It is not secure at all. There are many ways to defeat it. Probably the easiest way is to simply redirect your screen output to a file as follows: pgp [filename] > [diskfile] > What if I forget my password? In a word: DON'T. If you loose your password, there is absolutely no way to recover any encrypted files. I use the following technique: I have a backup copy of my secret key ring on floppy, along with a sealed envelope containing the password. I keep these two items in separate safe locations, neither of which is my home or office. The password used on this backup copy is different from the one that I normally use on my computer. That way, even if some stumbles onto the hidden password and can figure out who it belongs to, it still doesn't do them any good, because it is not the one required to unlock the key on my computer. > How do I choose a password? All of the security that is available in PGP can be made absolutely useless if you don't choose a good random password to encrypt your secret key ring. Too many people use their birthday, their telephone number, or some easy to guess common word. For the ultimate in security, the characters of the password should be chosen completely at random. It may be a little harder to remember, but the added security is worth it. As an absolute minimum password, I would suggest a random combination of at least 8 letters and digits, with 12 being a better choice. With a 12 character password made up of the lower case letters a-z plus the digits 0-9, you have about 62 bits of key, which is 6 bits better than the 56 bit DES keys. If you wish, you can mix upper and lower case letters in your password to cut down the number of characters that are required to achieve the same level of security. I don't do this myself because I hate having to manipulate the shift key while entering a password. > How do I remember my password? This can be quite a problem especially if you are like me and have about a dozen different passwords that are required in your every day life. Writing them down someplace so that you can remember them would defeat the whole purpose of passwords in the first place. There is really no good way around this. Either remember it, or write it down someplace and risk having it compromised. > How do I verify that my copy of PGP has not been tampered with? If you do not presently own any copy of PGP, use great care on where you obtain your first copy. What I would suggest is that you get two or more copies from different sources that you feel that you can trust. Compare the copies to see if they are absolutely identical. This won't eliminate the possibility of having a bad copy, but it will greatly reduce the chances. If you already own a trusted version of PGP, it is easy to check the validity of any future version. There is a file called PGPSIG.ASC included with all new releases. It is a stand alone signature file for the contents of PGP.EXE. The signature file was created by the author of the program. Since nobody except the author has access to his secret key, nobody can tamper with either PGP.EXE or PGPSIG.ASC without it being detected. To check the signature, you MUST be careful that you are executing the OLD version of PGP to check the NEW. If not, the entire check is useless. Let's say that your existing copy of PGP is in sub directory C:\PGP and your new copy is in C:\NEW. You should execute the following command: \PGP\PGP C:\NEW\PGPSIG.ASC C:\NEW\PGP.EXE This will force your old copy of PGP to be the one that is executed. If you simply changed to the C:\NEW directory and executed the command "PGP PGPSIG.ASC PGP.EXE" you would be using the new version to check itself, and this is an absolutely worthless check. Once you have properly checked the signature of your new copy of PGP, you can copy all of the files to your C:\PGP directory. > How do I know that there is no trap door in the program? The fact that the entire source code for PGP is available makes it just about impossible for there to be some hidden trap door. The source code has been examined my countless individuals and no such trap door has been found. To make sure that your executable file actually represents the given source code, all you need to do is to re-compile the entire program. I did this with the DOS version 2.3a and the Borland C++ 3.1 compiler and found that the output exactly matched byte for byte the distributed executable file. > Can I put PGP on a network? In a word: NO If PGP is installed on a host computer, along with your secret key ring, and you are accessing it from a remote terminal, then your password is exposed when you enter it to anyone snooping on the network, or to anyone with access privileges on the host system. In addition, your plain text files must pass over the network before being encrypted, thus exposing them. > Why not use RSA alone rather than a hybrid mix of IDEA, MD5, & RSA? Two reasons: First, the hybrid mixture in PGP is actually stronger than a stand alone RSA scheme. Second, RSA encryption is MUCH slower than IDEA. The only purpose of RSA in most public key schemes is for the transfer of session keys to be used in the IDEA algorithm, or to encode signatures. > Aren't all of these security procedures a little paranoid? That all depends on how much your privacy means to you! Even apart from the government, there are many people out there who would just love to read your private mail. And many of these individuals would be willing to go to great lengths to compromise your mail. Look at the amount of work that has been put into some of the virus programs that have found their way into various computer systems. Even when it doesn't involve money, some people are obsessed with breaking into systems. Just about week ago, I saw a posting on alt.security.pgp where the return address had been altered to say "president@whitehouse.gov". In this case, the content of the message showed that it was obviously fake, but what about some of those other not so obvious cases. 5. Message Signatures > What is message signing? Let's imagine that you received a letter in the mail from someone you know named John Smith. How do you know that John was really the person who sent you the letter and that someone else simply forged his name? With PGP, it is possible to apply a digital signature to a message that is impossible to forge. If you already have a trusted copy of John's public encryption key, you can use it to check the signature on the message. It would be impossible for anybody but John to have created the signature, since he is the only person with access to the secret key necessary to create the signature. In addition, if anybody has tampered with an otherwise valid message, the digital signature will detect the fact. It protects the entire message. > What is clear signing and how do I do it? Sometimes you are not interested in keeping the contents of a message secret, you only want to make sure that nobody tampers with it, and to allow others to verify that the message is really from you. For this, you can use clear signing. Clear signing only works on text files, it will NOT work on binary files. The command format is: pgp -sat +clearsig=on The output file will contain your original unmodified text, along with an section headers and an armored PGP signature. In this case, PGP is not required to read the file, only to verify the signature. 6. Key Signatures > What is key signing? OK, you just got a copy of John Smith's public encryption key. How do you know that the key really belongs to John Smith and not to some impostor? The answer to this is key signatures. They are similar to message signatures in that they can't be forged. Let's say that you don't know that you have John Smith's real key. But let's say that you DO have a trusted key from Joe Blow. Let's say that you trust Joe Blow and that he has added his signature to John Smith's key. By inference, you can now trust that you have a valid copy of John Smith's key. That is what key signing is all about. This chain of trust can be carried to several levels, such as A trusts B who trusts C who trusts D, therefore A can trust D. You have control in the PGP configuration file over exactly how many levels this chain of trust is allowed to proceed. Be careful about keys that are several levels removed from your immediate trust. > How do I sign a key? From the command prompt, execute the following command: PGP -ks [-u userid] A signature will be appended to already existing on the specified key. Next, you should extract a copy of this updated key along with it's signatures using the "-kxa" option. An armored text file will be created. Give this file to the owner of the key so that he may propagate the new signature to whomever he chooses. It is not considered proper to send his updated key to a key server yourself unless he has given you explicit permission to do so. After all, he may not wish to have his key appear on a public server. By the same token, you should expect that any key that you give out will probably find it's way onto the public key servers, even if you really didn't want it there, since anyone having your public key can upload it. > Should I sign my own key? Yes, you should sing each personal ID on your key. This will prevent anyone from placing a phony address in the ID field of the key and possibly having your mail diverted to them. Do this even if you are the only person signing your key. 7. Revoking a key > My secret key ring has been stolen or lost, what do I do? Assuming that you selected a good solid random password to encrypt your secret key ring, you are probably still safe. It takes two parts to decrypt a message, the secret key ring, and it's password. Assuming you have a backup copy of your secret key ring, you should generate a key revocation certificate and upload the revocation to one of the public key servers. Prior to uploading the revocation certificate, you might add a new ID to the old key that tells what your new key ID will be. If you don't have a backup copy of your secret key ring, then it will be impossible to create a revocation certificate under the present version of pgp. This is another good reason for keeping a backup copy of your secret key ring. > I forgot my password. How can I create a key revocation certificate? YOU CAN'T! The way to avoid this delema in the first place is to create a key revocation certificate at the same time that you generate your key. That way you will have it ready to go should you need to revoke your key in the future. After you have generated your key pair initially, extract your key to an ASCII file using the -kxa option. Next, create a key revocation certificate and extract the revoked key to another ASCII file using the -kxa option again. Finally, delete the revoked key from your public key ring using the -kr option and put your non-revoked version back in the ring using the -ka option. Save the revocation certificate on a floppy so that you don't loose it if you crash your hard disk sometime. 8. Public Key Servers > What are the Public Key Servers? Public Key Servers exist for the purpose of making your public key available in a common database where everybody can have access to it for the purpose of encrypting messages to you. While a number of key servers exist, it is only necessary to send your key to one of them. The key server will take care of the job of sending your key to all other known servers. As of 12/6/93 there are about 2,600 keys on the key servers. The rate of growth is increasing rapidly. > Where are the Public Key Servers? By it's nature, the list of public key servers is subject to much change. Therefore, the following list may be out of date by the time you read it. Keep an eye on alt.security.pgp for anouncements relating to the addition and deletion of key servers. Any additions, deletions, or corrections to this list should be posted to alt.security.pgp and mailed to the author for inclusion in future releases of the FAQ. Internet sites: pgp-public-keys@demon.co.uk Comments: Mark Turner FTP: ftp.demon.co.uk:/pub/pgp/pubring.pgp Verified 11 DEC 93 pgp-public-keys@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de Comments: Vesselin V. Bontchev FTP: ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de:/pub/virus/misc/pubkring.pgp Verified: 11 DEC 93 public-key-server@martigny.ai.mit.edu Comments: public-key-server-request@martigny.ai.mit.edu Verified: 11 DEC 93 pgp-public-keys@kiae.su Verified: 11 DEC 93 pgp-public-keys@sw.oz.au Not verified pgp-public-keys@dsi.unimi.it Not verified UUCP site: pgp-public-keys@jpunix.com John Perry perry@jpunix.com Not verified Watch alt.security.pgp for changes to this list. > What is the syntax of the key server commands? The remailer expects to see one of the following commands placed in the subject field. Not that only the ADD command uses the body of the message. ------------------------------------------------------------- ADD Your PGP public key (key to add is body of msg) INDEX List all PGP keys the server knows about (-kv) VERBOSE INDEX List all PGP keys, verbose format (-kvv) GET Get the whole public key ring GET userid Get just that one key MGET regexp Get all keys which match /regexp/ LAST Get all keys uploaded during last days ------------------------------------------------------------- If you wish to get the entire key ring and have access to FTP, it would be a lot more efficient to use FTP rather than e-mail. Using e-mail, the entire key ring can generate a many part message, which you will have to reconstruct into a single file before adding it to your key ring. 9. Cypherpunks > What are Cypherpunks? > What is the cypherpunks mailing list? Eric Hughes runs the "cypherpunk" mailing list dedicated to "discussion about technological defenses for privacy in the digital domain." Frequent topics include voice and data encryption, anonymous remailers, and the Clipper chip. Send email to cypherpunks-request@toad.com to be added or subtracted from the list. The mailing list itself is cypherpunks@toad.com. You don't need to be a member of the list in order to send messages to it, thus allowing the use of anonymous remailers to post your more sensitive messages that you just as soon would not be credited to you. (Traffic is sometimes up to 30-40 messages per day.) > What is the purpose of the Cypherpunk remailers? The purpose of these remailers is to take privacy one level further. While a third party who is snooping on the net may not be able to read the encrypted mail that you are sending, he is still able to know who you are sending mail to. This could possibly give him some useful information. This is called traffic flow analysis. To counter this type of attack, you can use a third party who's function is simply to remail your message with his return address on it instead of yours. Two types of remailers exist. The first type only accepts plain text remailing headers. This type would only be used if your goal was only to prevent the person to whom your are sending mail from learning your identity. It would do nothing for the problem of net eavesdroppers from learning to whom you are sending mail. The second type of remailer accepts encrypted remailing headers. With this type of remailer, you encrypt your message twice. First, you encrypt it to the person ultimately receiving the message. You then add the remailing header and encrypt it again using the key for the remailer that you are using. When the remailer receivers your message, the system will recognize that the header is encrypted and will use it's secret decryption key to decrypt the message. He can now read the forwarding information, but because the body of the message is still encrypted in the key of another party, he is unable to read your mail. He simply remails the message to the proper destination. At it's ultimate destination, the recipient uses his secret to decrypt this nested encryption and reads the message. Since this process of multiple encryptions and remailing headers can get quite involved, there are several programs available to simplify the process. FTP to soda.berkeley.edu and examine the directory /pub/cypherpunks/remailers for the programs that are available. > Where are the currently active Cypherpunk remailers? Any additions, deletions, or corrections to the following list should be posted on alt.security.pgp and forwarded to me for inclusion in a future release of the FAQ. The number appearing in the first column has the following meaning: 1: Remailer accepts only plain text headers. 2: Remailer accepts both plain text and encrypted headers. 3: Remailer accepts only encrypted headers. Only remailers who's operational status has been verified by me appear on this list. Remember, however, that this list is subject to change quite often. Always send yourself a test message through the Remailer before starting to use it for real. 1 hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 1 hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 1 hh@soda.berkeley.edu 1 nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 1 remail@tamsun.tamu.edu 2 ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 2 hal@alumni.caltech.edu [Fwd: hfinney@shell.portal.com] 2 elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 2 hfinney@shell.portal.com 2 remailer@utter.dis.org 1 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu [Fwd: hh@soda.berkeley.edu] 2 remailer@rebma.mn.org 3 remail@extropia.wimsey.com The following former Cypherpunk remailers are no longer in service. Either a message stating that the system had been shutdown was received, or the test message was returned due to an invalid address, or no test message was returned after three attempts. phantom@mead.u.washington.edu [Shutdown message returned] remail@tamaix.tamu.edu [Mail returned, invalid address] > Are there other anonymous remailers besides the cypherpunk remailers? Yes, the most commonly used remailer on the Internet is in Finland. It is known as anon.penet.fi. The syntax for sending mail through this remailer is different from the cypherpunk remailers. For example, if you wanted to send mail to me (gbe@netcom.com) through anon.penet.fi, you would send the mail to "gbe%netcom.com@anon.penet.fi". Notice that the "@" sign in my Internet address is changed to a "%". Unlike the cypherpunk remailers, anon.penet.fi directly supports anonymous return addresses. Anybody using the remailer is assigned an anonymous id of the form "an?????" where "?????" is filled in with a number representing that user. To send mail to someone when you only know their anonymous address, address your mail to "an?????@anon.penet.fi" replacing the question marks with the user id you are interested in. For additional information on anon.penet.fi, send a blank message to "help@anon.penet.fi". You will receive complete instructions on how to use the remailer, including how to obtain a password on the system. > Where can I learn more about Cypherpunks? FTP: soda.berkeley.edu Directory: /pub/cypherpunks > What is the command syntax? The first non blank line in the message must start with two colons (::). The next line must contain the user defined header "Request- Remailing-To: ". This line must be followed by a blank line. Finally, your message can occupy the rest of the space. As an example, if you wanted to send a message to me via a remailer , you would compose the following message: :: Request-Remailing-To: gbe@netcom.com [body of message] You would then send the above message to the desired remailer. Note the section labeled "body of message" may be either a plain text message, or an encrypted and armored PGP message addressed to the desired recipient. To send the above message with an encrypted header, use PGP to encrypt the entire message shown above to the desired remailer. Be sure to take the output in armored text form. In front of the BEGIN PGP MESSAGE portion of the file, insert two colons (::) as the first non- blank line of the file. The next line should say "Encrypted: PGP". Finally the third line should be blank. The message now looks as follows: :: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version 2.3a [body of pgp message] -----END PGP MESSAGE----- You would then send the above message to the desired remailer just as you did in the case of the non-encrypted header. Note that it is possible to chain remailers together so that the message passes through several levels of anonymity before it reaches it's ultimate destination. 10. Bugs > Where should I send bug reports? Post all of your bug reports concerning PGP to alt.security.pgp and forward a copy to me for possible inclusion in future releases of the FAQ. The following list of bugs is limited to version 2.3 and later. For bugs in earlier versions, refer to the documentation included with the program. > Version 2.3 for DOS has a problem with clear signing messages. Anyone using version 2.3 for DOS should upgrade to version 2.3a. 11. Related News Groups alt.privacy.clipper Clipper, Capstone, Skipjack, Key Escrow alt.security general security discussions alt.security.index index to alt.security alt.security.pgp discussion of PGP alt.security.ripem discussion of RIPEM alt.society.civil-liberty general civil liberties, including privacy comp.compression discussion of compression algorithms and code comp.org.eff.news News reports from EFF comp.org.eff.talk discussion of EFF related issues comp.patents discussion of S/W patents, including RSA comp.risks some mention of crypto and wiretapping comp.society.privacy general privacy issues comp.security.announce announcements of security holes misc.legal.computing software patents, copyrights, computer laws sci.math general math discussion 12. Recommended Reading > The Code Breakers The Story of Secret Writing By David Kahn The MacMillan Company, New York (1968) Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 63-16109 This has been the unofficial standard reference book on the history of cryptography for the last 25 years. It covers the development of cryptography from ancient times, up to 1967. It is interesting to read about the cat and mouse games that governments have been playing with each other even to this day. The book has long been out of print, so the only places that you are likely to find a copy is a used book store or a library. It is quite exhaustive in it's coverage with 1164 pages. > The following recommended reading list was lifted unedited except for formatting from the PGP documentation: Dorothy Denning, "Cryptography and Data Security", Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA 1982 Dorothy Denning, "Protecting Public Keys and Signature Keys", IEEE Computer, Feb 1983 Martin E. Hellman, "The Mathematics of Public-Key Cryptography," Scientific American, Aug 1979 Steven Levy, "Crypto Rebels", WIRED, May/Jun 1993, page 54. (This is a "must-read" article on PGP and other related topics.) Ronald Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, 1991 Xuejia Lai, "On the Design and Security of Block Ciphers", Institute for Signal and Information Processing, ETH-Zentrum, Zurich, Switzerland, 1992 Xuejia Lai, James L. Massey, Sean Murphy, "Markov Ciphers and Differential Cryptanalysis", Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT'91 Philip Zimmermann, "A Proposed Standard Format for RSA Cryptosystems", Advances in Computer Security, Vol III, edited by Rein Turn, Artech House, 1988 Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C", John Wiley & Sons, 1993 (coming in November) Paul Wallich, "Electronic Envelopes", Scientific American, Feb 1993, page 30. (This is an article on PGP) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLQpD4EHZYsvlkKnJAQHpjgQAkEp16X8bJHQR6embPEz5JdOa+sEjYMY1 kYYLTE4BMQie2muyST6aSPjw+x1A7K2Z6/ziuOeEqWQgPjEZdV978l9ASc0iVugm n0aJp8FzOSDnIM2N/4fXuXTd5Hm5lMQbT1P68LAbqGuGz2lrftw7qe4iRPhqC/lR h4f2OSm7KkE= =Xcyc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Gary B. Edstrom | Sequoia Software | PGP fingerprint: Internet: gbe@netcom.com | Programming Services | 2F F6 1B 28 6E A6 09 6C CompuServe: 72677,564 | P.O. Box 9573 | B0 EA 9E 4C C4 C6 7D 46 Fax: 1-818-247-6046 | Glendale, CA 91226 | Key available via finger What is PGP? Subscribe to alt.security.pgp and find out! Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp Path: peti.GUN.de!dino.dinoco.de!teralon!easix!flyer.GUN.de!unidui!zib-berlin.de!xlink.net!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!math.ohio-state.edu!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!agate!apple.com!amd!netcomsv!netcom.com!gbe From: gbe@netcom.com (Gary Edstrom) Subject: PGP FAQ (2/4) Glossary & Support Products Message-ID: Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest) X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8] Date: Sat, 11 Dec 1993 22:35:17 GMT Lines: 441 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- alt.security.pgp FAQ Part 2/4 ======================================================================== Appendix I - PGP add-ons and related programs ======================================================================== Much of this section was lifted, unedited from an old FAQ supplied to me for the development of this list. This section will hopefully grow to contain a list of every utility that has been written. I would appreciate it if the authors of the various utilities could send me mail about their latest version, a description, if source code is available, and where to get it. I will then include the information in the next release of the FAQ. If you have a utility, but don't know how to make it widely available, send mail to David Vincenzetti who is crypto collection maintainer at ghost.dsi.unimi.it. That ftp-site is weekly mirrored at nic.funet.fi in area: /pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it ======================================================================== > There are utilities in the source code for PGP. Get pgp23srcA.zip and unpack with 'pkunzip -d pgp23srcA.zip' to get them all come up nicely sorted in subdirectorys. > PBBS Public Bulletin Board System (PBBS) ver 1.0 is a privacy-oriented host BBS application designed with the "anonymous movement's" diverse needs in mind. PBBS is a compact application at 75K, allowing it to be run off of a floppy disk if desired, and requires no telecommunications experience to operate. Installation of PBBS takes about 2 minutes flat, and is easy to set up and maintain. Don't let the size fool you however, it packs a powerful set of Zmodem, Ymodem, and Xmodem assembly- language protocols, supports speeds up to 57,600 bps, door support, full ANSI-emulation, and many more features! Public BBS is an eclectic and powerful BBS and also the first bulletin board system designed to work with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), the public-key encryption program. A unique Post Office within PBBS allows users to send each other private "postcards" or to upload and download PGP-encrypted messages to other user's mail boxes. PBBS also contains a comprehensive public message base with "anonymous" read, write, and reply options. PBBS has a built in Emergency Self-Destruct sequence for the sysop that desires an extra level of security. The ESD option will completely shred all PBBS-related files on disk, assuring the sysop that his or her BBS will not be compromised in any way. Look for Public BBS to be released on all I Internet sites and FidoNet BBS's as PBBS10.ZIP in October 1993. PBBS will change the face of cyber-fringe telecommunications forever! Questions or comments please e-mail James Still at . > rat-pgp.el rat-pgp.el is a GNU Emacs interface to the PGP public key system. It lets you easily encrypt and decrypt message, sign messages with your secret key (to prove that it really came from you). It does signature verification, and it provides a number of other functions. The package is growing steadily as more is added. It is my intention that it will eventually allow as much functionality as accessing PGP directly. The most recent version of rat-pgp.el is always available via anonymous FTP at ftp.ccs.neu.edu, directory /pub/ratinox/emacs-lisp/rat-pgp.el. > mailcrypt.el From: jsc@monolith.mit.edu (Jin S Choi) Newsgroups: gnu.emacs.sources,alt.security.pgp,alt.security.ripem Subject: mailcrypt.el (mail encryption/decryption using RIPEM and/or PGP) Date: 01 Aug 1993 12:45:52 GMT This is an elisp package for encrypting and decrypting mail. I wrote this to provide a single interface to the two most common mail encryption programs, PGP and RIPEM. You can use either or both in any combination. includes: VM mailreader support. Support for addresses with spaces and <>'s in them. Support for using an explicit path for the encryption executables. Key management functions. The ability to avoid some of the prompts when encrypting. Assumes mc-default-scheme unless prefixed." For ver 0.3b, jsc@monolith.mit.edu (Jin S Choi) writes: This will be the last posting of this program to the alt.security.* newsgroups. Any further releases will be going to gnu.emacs.sources only. I will also at some time be submitting this to the elisp archive. > PGPPAGER ver. 1.1 Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp From: abottone@minerva1.bull.it (Alessandro Bottonelli) Subject: pgppager 1.1 sources Date: Tue, 6 Jul 1993 11:37:06 GMT pgppager, designed to be possibly integrated with elm mail reader. This programs reads from a specified file or from stdin if no file is specified and creates three temporary files i(header, encrypted, and trailer) as needed, in order to store the header portion in clear text, the encrypted portion still in cipher text, and the trailer portion of the clear text. Then, if applicable, the clear text header is outputted, the encrypted portion is piped through pgp as needed, then the trailer (if any) is outputted. THIS PROCESS IS TRANSPARENT TO NON PGP ENCRYPTED TEXTS > PGPSHE22 PGPShell v2.2 is a dramatic update to this easy-to-use program that makes using Philip Zimmermann's Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) public-key encryption software easy. Supports all of PGP's command-line arguments with a graphical user interface (GUI), mouse, windowed popup boxes with scroll bars for easy UserID, footprint, and signature key viewing on your public key ring. Built-in file viewer for reading decrypted messages. Use your favorite text editor to compose messages then automatically encrypt them. Requires PGP (ver 2.0 or higher), can run on any PC XT, AT, 286+, mono or color. Mouse optional. Freeware. available as 65430 Aug 3 11:40 garbo.uwasa.fi [128.214.87.1] /pc/crypt/pgpshe22.zip and Hieroglyphic Voodoo Machine BBS at 1.303.443.2457 > MENU.ZIP Menushell for MSDOS. (Requires 4DOS or Norton's NDOS) You can customize the menu for your own preferences. The name 'MENU' violates file naming conventions on ftp-sites, so I guess it's hard to find this program somewhere else. Exists at ghost.dsi.unimi.it area: /pub/crypt/ (ask archie about 4DOS, a comand.com replacement) > PGP-NG.ZIP At nic.funet.fi; /pub/crypt/pgp-ng.zip. A norton Guide database for PGP ver 2.0. Easy to find info for programmers about all the functions in the source code, and users can more easily find their subject. Is any update for the current version planned? Ask archie about the 2 Norton guide clones that are out on the net. > Subject: Front End Announcement: PGP with TAPCIS Sender: usenet@ttinews.tti.com (Usenet Admin) Reply-To: 72027.3210@compuserve.com Date: Tue, 3 Aug 1993 00:58:17 GMT TAPCIS is a popular navigator/offline message reader used on PCs to access CompuServe. An add-on program, TAPPKE (TAPcis Public Key Encryption), has been uploaded to the CompuServe TAPCIS Support Forum library under "scripts and tools;" this program is an interface between TAPCIS message-writing facilities and PGP. When you compose messages in TAPCIS, they get collected into a batch in a .SND file along with some control information about where and how the messages are to be posted or mailed; next time you go on-line to CompuServe, TAPCIS processes any messages waiting in its .SND files. The TAPPKE add-on can be run before you do this transmission step. TAPPKE scans messages in a .SND file, and any message that contains a keyword (##PRIVATE## or ##SIGNATURE##) is extracted and just that message is handed to PGP for encryption or signature, then reinserted into the .SND file for transmission. All this is a simplified interface to make it more convenient to encrypt/sign messages while still using the normal (and familiar)message composition features of TAPCIS. TAPPKE doesn't do any encryption itself, it merely invokes an external encryption engine to perform the indicated tasks; you can even use it with encryption programs other than PGP if you set up a few environment variables so TAPPKE will know what encryption program to run and what command-line arguments to feed it. The default configuration assumes PGP. I don't see any point in posting TAPPKE anywhere besides on CompuServe, since the only people who would have any use for it are TAPCIS users, and they by definition have access to the CompuServe TAPCIS forum libraries. However, it's free (I released it to the public domain, along with source code), so anyone who wants to propagate it is welcome to do so. Some mailers apparently munge my address; you might have to use bsmart@bsmart.tti.com -- or if that fails, fall back to 72027.3210@compuserve.com. Ain't UNIX grand? " > HPACK78 PGP-compatible archiver 114243 Nov 20 07:08 garbo.uwasa.fi:/pc/arcers/hpack78.zip 146470 Dec 3 01:01 garbo.uwasa.fi:/pc/doc-soft/hpack78d.zip 511827 Dec 3 14:46 garbo.uwasa.fi:/pc/source/hpack78s.zip 667464 Dec 5 16:43 garbo.uwasa.fi:/unix/arcers/hpack78src.tar.Z where hpack78.zip is the MSDOS executable, hpack78d.zip is the Postscript documentation, hpack78s.zip is the source code, and hpack78src.tar.Z is the source code again but in tar.Z format (note that the latter is a tiny bit more recent that hpack78s.zip and contains changes for the NeXT). There is a (rather primitive) Macintosh executable somewhere on garbo as well, possibly /mac/arcers/hpack78mac.cpt. OS/2 32-bit versions of HPACK available for anonymous FTP from the UK. `ftp.demon.co.uk' [158.152.1.65] in ~/pub/ibmpc/pgp pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz p_gutmann@cs.aukuni.ac.nz gutmann_p@kosmos.wcc.govt.nz peterg@kcbbs.gen.nz peter@nacjack.gen.nz peter@phlarnschlorpht.nacjack.gen.nz (In order of preference - one of 'ems bound to work) > PGPUTILS.ZIP at ghost.dsi.unimi.it /pub/crypt/ is a collection of BAT- files, and PIF-files for windows. > ENCRYPT.COM is a VMS mail script that works fine for joleary@esterh.wm.estec.esa.nl (John O'Leary) > PWF10 A Windows front end for PGP For all those MS Windows users who want a point and click PGP front end, PGP WinFront 1.0 (PWF10) is for you. This program is an easy to use Windows front end for PGP. You can access main PGP features more easily than from DOS. This program features: > A simple file management system > The ability to create plaintext files to encrypt very easily using the editor of your choice > A quick way to shell to DOS to access esoteric PGP features > Allows you to edit the command line to access the more specialised features of PGP > Plus more Check it out; ITS FREE and available by email. TO GET THIS PROGRAM (PWF10.ZIP): 1) Send an email message to rbarclay@trentu.ca 2) The subject MUST READ: GET PWF 3) The body can be left blank. You will be sent a two part signed Radix-64 ASCII Armoured zip file. Use PGP to de-armour it. Read the document file fully. This program has a number of features not mentioned here and you wouldn't want to miss them. -- ross barclay ======================================================================== Appendix II - Glossary of Cryptographic Terms ======================================================================== Chosen Plain Text Attack This is the next step up from the Known Plain Text Attack. In this version, the cryptoanalysit can choose what plain text message he wishes to encrypt and view the results, as opposed to simply taking any old plain text that he might happen to lay his hands on. If he can recover the key, he can use it to decode all data encrypted under this key. This is a much stronger form of attack than known plain text. The better encryption systems will resist this form of attack. Clipper A chip developed by the United States Government that was to be used as the standard chip in all encrypted communications. Aside from the fact that all details of how the Clipper chip work remain classified, the biggest concern was the fact that it has an acknowledged trap door in it to allow the government to eavesdrop on anyone using Clipper provided they first obtained a wiretap warrant. This fact, along with the fact that it can't be exported from the United States, has lead a number of large corporations to oppose the idea. DES (Data Encryption Standard) A data encryption standard developed by the United States Government. Even when it was developed, it was criticized for not being a strong enough standard and because the research that went into the development of the standard remained classified. Concerns were raised that there might be hidden trap doors in the logic that would allow the government to break anyone's code if they wanted to listen it. DES uses a 56 bit key to encrypt an 8 byte data block. Even without any trap door in the DES logic, the 56 bit key just doesn't provide strong enough security. Today, it would be feasible, to build a machine that could crack a 56 bit key in under a day's time. It is not known if such a machine has really been built, but the fact that it is feasible tends to weaken the security of DES substantially. EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation) The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) was founded in July, 1990, to assure freedom of expression in digital media, with a particular emphasis on applying the principles embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to computer-based communication. For further information, contact: Electronic Frontier Foundation 1001 G St., NW Suite 950 East Washington, DC 20001 +1 202 347 5400 +1 202 393 5509 FAX Internet: eff@eff.org IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm) Developed in Switzerland and licensed for non commercial use in PGP. IDEA uses an 80 bit user supplied key to perform a series of nonlinear mathematical transformations on a 64 bit data block. ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) ITAR are the regulations covering the exporting of weapons and weapons related technology from the United States. For some strange reason, the government claims that data encryption is a weapon and comes under the ITAR regulations. There is presently a move in congress to relax the section of ITAR dealing with cryptographic technology. Known Plain Text Attack A method of attack on a crypto system where the cryptoanalysit has matching copies of plain text, and it's encrypted version. With weaker encryption systems, this can improve the chances of cracking the code and getting at the plain text of other messages where the plain text is not known. MD5 (Message Digest Algorithm #5) The message digest algorithm used in PGP is the MD5 Message Digest Algorithm, placed in the public domain by RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5's designer, Ronald Rivest, writes this about MD5: "It is conjectured that the difficulty of coming up with two messages having the same message digest is on the order of 2^64 operations, and that the difficulty of coming up with any message having a given message digest is on the order of 2^128 operations. The MD5 algorithm has been carefully scrutinized for weaknesses. It is, however, a relatively new algorithm and further security analysis is of course justified, as is the case with any new proposal of this sort. The level of security provided by MD5 should be sufficient for implementing very high security hybrid digital signature schemes based on MD5 and the RSA public-key cryptosystem." NSA (National Security Agency) The following was lifted unedited except for formatting from the sci.crypt FAQ: The NSA is the official communications security body of the U.S. government. It was given its charter by President Truman in the early 50's, and has continued research in cryptology till the present. The NSA is known to be the largest employer of mathematicians in the world, and is also the largest purchaser of computer hardware in the world. Governments in general have always been prime employers of cryptologists. The NSA probably possesses cryptographic expertise many years ahead of the public state of the art, and can undoubtedly break many of the systems used in practice; but for reasons of national security almost all information about the NSA is classified. PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail) The following was lifted unedited except for formatting from the sci.crypt FAQ: How do I send encrypted mail under UNIX? [PGP, RIPEM, PEM, ...]? Here's one popular method, using the des command: cat file | compress | des private_key | uuencode | mail Meanwhile, there is a de jure Internet standard in the works called PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail). It is described in RFCs 1421 through 1424. To join the PEM mailing list, contact pem-dev-request@tis.com. There is a beta version of PEM being tested at the time of this writing. There are also two programs available in the public domain for encrypting mail: PGP and RIPEM. Both are available by FTP. Each has its own newsgroup: alt.security.pgp and alt.security.ripem. Each has its own FAQ as well. PGP is most commonly used outside the USA since it uses the RSA algorithm without a license and RSA's patent is valid only (or at least primarily) in the USA. RIPEM is most commonly used inside the USA since it uses the RSAREF which is freely available within the USA but not available for shipment outside the USA. Since both programs use a secret key algorithm for encrypting the body of the message (PGP used IDEA; RIPEM uses DES) and RSA for encrypting the message key, they should be able to interoperate freely. Although there have been repeated calls for each to understand the other's formats and algorithm choices, no interoperation is available at this time (as far as we know). PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) PKP (Public Key Partners) Claim to have a patent on RSA. RIPEM See PEM RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) RSA is the public key encryption method used in PGP. RSA are the initials of the developers of the algorithm which was done at tax payer expense. The basic security in RSA comes from the fact that, while it is relatively easy to multiply two huge prime numbers together to obtain their product, it is computationally difficult to go the reverse direction: to find the two prime factors of a given composet number. It is this one-way nature of RSA that allows an encryption key to be generated and disclosed to the world, and yet not allow a message to be decrypted. TEMPEST TEMPEST is a standard for electromagnetic shielding for computer equipment. It was created in response to the discovery that information can be read from computer radiation (e.g., from a CRT) at quite a distance and with little effort. Needless to say, encryption doesn't do much good if the cleartext is available this way. It is a good bet that the typical home computer would fail all of the TEMPEST standards by a long shot. So, if you are doing anything illegal, don't expect PGP to save you. The government could just set up a monitoring van outside your home and read everything that you are doing on your computer. Short of shelling out the ten thousand dollars or so that it would take to properly shield your computer, a good second choice would probably be a laptop computer running on batteries. No emissions would be fed back into the power lines, and the amount of power being fed to the display and being consumed by the computer is much less than the typical home computer and CRT. This provides a much weaker RF field for snoopers to monitor. It still isn't safe, just safer. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLQo/t0HZYsvlkKnJAQFwKAQAm6kpW3QaVE0kLx05y5vHbKuVp7uZc65u o1pMUZcwXjIu/ZaRv2phCk7xhIFPVwxmEEO3c4h0iaROThQE/NKS9y76xdmIIhf2 EeKX+MU6AU9QuiuiW0/k9Ba7rHOuPjyzvQpahgFldk1o/lPy2n6lfaPMXSdS0FDC QB6geqLvutw= =uogS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Gary B. Edstrom | Sequoia Software | PGP fingerprint: Internet: gbe@netcom.com | Programming Services | 2F F6 1B 28 6E A6 09 6C CompuServe: 72677,564 | P.O. Box 9573 | B0 EA 9E 4C C4 C6 7D 46 Fax: 1-818-247-6046 | Glendale, CA 91226 | Key available via finger What is PGP? Subscribe to alt.security.pgp and find out! Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp Path: peti.GUN.de!dino.dinoco.de!teralon!easix!flyer.GUN.de!unidui!zib-berlin.de!xlink.net!howland.reston.ans.net!math.ohio-state.edu!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!agate!apple.com!amd!netcomsv!netcom.com!gbe From: gbe@netcom.com (Gary Edstrom) Subject: PGP FAQ (3/4) Legislative Action Message-ID: Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest) X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8] Date: Sat, 11 Dec 1993 22:36:24 GMT Lines: 422 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- alt.security.pgp FAQ Part 3/4 ======================================================================= Appendix III - Testimony of Philip Zimmermann to Congress. Reproduced by permission. ======================================================================= ======================================================================= - From netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!sdd.hp.com!col.hp.com!csn!yuma!ld231782 Sun Oct 10 07:55:51 1993 Xref: netcom.com talk.politics.crypto:650 comp.org.eff.talk:20832 alt.politics.org.nsa:89 Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.politics.org.nsa Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!sdd.hp.com!col.hp.com!csn!yuma!ld231782 From: ld231782@LANCE.ColoState.Edu (L. Detweiler) Subject: ZIMMERMANN SPEAKS TO HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE Sender: news@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account) Message-ID: Date: Sun, 10 Oct 1993 04:42:12 GMT Nntp-Posting-Host: turner.lance.colostate.edu Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523 Lines: 281 Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 11:57:54 MDT From: Philip Zimmermann Subject: Zimmerman testimony to House subcommittee Testimony of Philip Zimmermann to Subcommittee for Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment US House of Representatives 12 Oct 1993 Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Philip Zimmermann, and I am a software engineer who specializes in cryptography and data security. I'm here to talk to you today about the need to change US export control policy for cryptographic software. I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here and commend you for your attention to this important issue. I am the author of PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), a public-key encryption software package for the protection of electronic mail. Since PGP was published domestically as freeware in June of 1991, it has spread organically all over the world and has since become the de facto worldwide standard for encryption of E-mail. The US Customs Service is investigating how PGP spread outside the US. Because I am a target of this ongoing criminal investigation, my lawyer has advised me not to answer any questions related to the investigation. I. The information age is here. Computers were developed in secret back in World War II mainly to break codes. Ordinary people did not have access to computers, because they were few in number and too expensive. Some people postulated that there would never be a need for more than half a dozen computers in the country. Governments formed their attitudes toward cryptographic technology during this period. And these attitudes persist today. Why would ordinary people need to have access to good cryptography? Another problem with cryptography in those days was that cryptographic keys had to be distributed over secure channels so that both parties could send encrypted traffic over insecure channels. Governments solved that problem by dispatching key couriers with satchels handcuffed to their wrists. Governments could afford to send guys like these to their embassies overseas. But the great masses of ordinary people would never have access to practical cryptography if keys had to be distributed this way. No matter how cheap and powerful personal computers might someday become, you just can't send the keys electronically without the risk of interception. This widened the feasibility gap between Government and personal access to cryptography. Today, we live in a new world that has had two major breakthroughs that have an impact on this state of affairs. The first is the coming of the personal computer and the information age. The second breakthrough is public-key cryptography. With the first breakthrough comes cheap ubiquitous personal computers, modems, FAX machines, the Internet, E-mail, digital cellular phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), wireless digital networks, ISDN, cable TV, and the data superhighway. This information revolution is catalyzing the emergence of a global economy. But this renaissance in electronic digital communication brings with it a disturbing erosion of our privacy. In the past, if the Government wanted to violate the privacy of ordinary citizens, it had to expend a certain amount of effort to intercept and steam open and read paper mail, and listen to and possibly transcribe spoken telephone conversation. This is analogous to catching fish with a hook and a line, one fish at a time. Fortunately for freedom and democracy, this kind of labor-intensive monitoring is not practical on a large scale. Today, electronic mail is gradually replacing conventional paper mail, and is soon to be the norm for everyone, not the novelty is is today. Unlike paper mail, E-mail messages are just too easy to intercept and scan for interesting keywords. This can be done easily, routinely, automatically, and undetectably on a grand scale. This is analogous to driftnet fishing-- making a quantitative and qualitative Orwellian difference to the health of democracy. The second breakthrough came in the late 1970s, with the mathematics of public key cryptography. This allows people to communicate securely and conveniently with people they've never met, with no prior exchange of keys over secure channels. No more special key couriers with black bags. This, coupled with the trappings of the information age, means the great masses of people can at last use cryptography. This new technology also provides digital signatures to authenticate transactions and messages, and allows for digital money, with all the implications that has for an electronic digital economy. (See appendix) This convergence of technology-- cheap ubiquitous PCs, modems, FAX, digital phones, information superhighways, et cetera-- is all part of the information revolution. Encryption is just simple arithmetic to all this digital hardware. All these devices will be using encryption. The rest of the world uses it, and they laugh at the US because we are railing against nature, trying to stop it. Trying to stop this is like trying to legislate the tides and the weather. It's like the buggy whip manufacturers trying to stop the cars-- even with the NSA on their side, it's still impossible. The information revolution is good for democracy-- good for a free market and trade. It contributed to the fall of the Soviet empire. They couldn't stop it either. Soon, every off-the-shelf multimedia PC will become a secure voice telephone, through the use of freely available software. What does this mean for the Government's Clipper chip and key escrow systems? Like every new technology, this comes at some cost. Cars pollute the air. Cryptography can help criminals hide their activities. People in the law enforcement and intelligence communities are going to look at this only in their own terms. But even with these costs, we still can't stop this from happening in a free market global economy. Most people I talk to outside of Government feel that the net result of providing privacy will be positive. President Clinton is fond of saying that we should "make change our friend". These sweeping technological changes have big implications, but are unstoppable. Are we going to make change our friend? Or are we going to criminalize cryptography? Are we going to incarcerate our honest, well-intentioned software engineers? Law enforcement and intelligence interests in the Government have attempted many times to suppress the availability of strong domestic encryption technology. The most recent examples are Senate Bill 266 which mandated back doors in crypto systems, the FBI Digital Telephony bill, and the Clipper chip key escrow initiative. All of these have met with strong opposition from industry and civil liberties groups. It is impossible to obtain real privacy in the information age without good cryptography. The Clinton Administration has made it a major policy priority to help build the National Information Infrastructure (NII). Yet, some elements of the Government seems intent on deploying and entrenching a communications infrastructure that would deny the citizenry the ability to protect its privacy. This is unsettling because in a democracy, it is possible for bad people to occasionally get elected-- sometimes very bad people. Normally, a well-functioning democracy has ways to remove these people from power. But the wrong technology infrastructure could allow such a future government to watch every move anyone makes to oppose it. It could very well be the last government we ever elect. When making public policy decisions about new technologies for the Government, I think one should ask oneself which technologies would best strengthen the hand of a police state. Then, do not allow the Government to deploy those technologies. This is simply a matter of good civic hygiene. II. Export controls are outdated and are a threat to privacy and economic competitivness. The current export control regime makes no sense anymore, given advances in technology. There has been considerable debate about allowing the export of implementations of the full 56-bit Data Encryption Standard (DES). At a recent academic cryptography conference, Michael Wiener of Bell Northern Research in Ottawa presented a paper on how to crack the DES with a special machine. He has fully designed and tested a chip that guesses DES keys at high speed until it finds the right one. Although he has refrained from building the real chips so far, he can get these chips manufactured for $10.50 each, and can build 57000 of them into a special machine for $1 million that can try every DES key in 7 hours, averaging a solution in 3.5 hours. $1 million can be hidden in the budget of many companies. For $10 million, it takes 21 minutes to crack, and for $100 million, just two minutes. That's full 56-bit DES, cracked in just two minutes. I'm sure the NSA can do it in seconds, with their budget. This means that DES is now effectively dead for purposes of serious data security applications. If Congress acts now to enable the export of full DES products, it will be a day late and a dollar short. If a Boeing executive who carries his notebook computer to the Paris airshow wants to use PGP to send email to his home office in Seattle, are we helping American competitivness by arguing that he has even potentially committed a federal crime? Knowledge of cryptography is becoming so widespread, that export controls are no longer effective at controlling the spread of this technology. People everywhere can and do write good cryptographic software, and we import it here but cannot export it, to the detriment of our indigenous software industry. I wrote PGP from information in the open literature, putting it into a convenient package that everyone can use in a desktop or palmtop computer. Then I gave it away for free, for the good of our democracy. This could have popped up anywhere, and spread. Other people could have and would have done it. And are doing it. Again and again. All over the planet. This technology belongs to everybody. III. People want their privacy very badly. PGP has spread like a prairie fire, fanned by countless people who fervently want their privacy restored in the information age. Today, human rights organizations are using PGP to protect their people overseas. Amnesty International uses it. The human rights group in the American Association for the Advancement of Science uses it. Some Americans don't understand why I should be this concerned about the power of Government. But talking to people in Eastern Europe, you don't have to explain it to them. They already get it-- and they don't understand why we don't. I want to read you a quote from some E-mail I got last week from someone in Latvia, on the day that Boris Yeltsin was going to war with his Parliament: "Phil I wish you to know: let it never be, but if dictatorship takes over Russia your PGP is widespread from Baltic to Far East now and will help democratic people if necessary. Thanks." Appendix -- How Public-Key Cryptography Works - --------------------------------------------- In conventional cryptosystems, such as the US Federal Data Encryption Standard (DES), a single key is used for both encryption and decryption. This means that a key must be initially transmitted via secure channels so that both parties have it before encrypted messages can be sent over insecure channels. This may be inconvenient. If you have a secure channel for exchanging keys, then why do you need cryptography in the first place? In public key cryptosystems, everyone has two related complementary keys, a publicly revealed key and a secret key. Each key unlocks the code that the other key makes. Knowing the public key does not help you deduce the corresponding secret key. The public key can be published and widely disseminated across a communications network. This protocol provides privacy without the need for the same kind of secure channels that a conventional cryptosystem requires. Anyone can use a recipient's public key to encrypt a message to that person, and that recipient uses her own corresponding secret key to decrypt that message. No one but the recipient can decrypt it, because no one else has access to that secret key. Not even the person who encrypted the message can decrypt it. Message authentication is also provided. The sender's own secret key can be used to encrypt a message, thereby "signing" it. This creates a digital signature of a message, which the recipient (or anyone else) can check by using the sender's public key to decrypt it. This proves that the sender was the true originator of the message, and that the message has not been subsequently altered by anyone else, because the sender alone possesses the secret key that made that signature. Forgery of a signed message is infeasible, and the sender cannot later disavow his signature. These two processes can be combined to provide both privacy and authentication by first signing a message with your own secret key, then encrypting the signed message with the recipient's public key. The recipient reverses these steps by first decrypting the message with her own secret key, then checking the enclosed signature with your public key. These steps are done automatically by the recipient's software. - -- Philip Zimmermann 3021 11th Street Boulder, Colorado 80304 303 541-0140 E-mail: prz@acm.org - -- ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU ======================================================================== Appendix IV - Anouncement of Philip Zimmermann Defense Fund. Reproduced by permission. ======================================================================== - From prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU Thu Oct 14 23:16:32 1993 Return-Path: Received: from ncar.ucar.edu by mail.netcom.com (5.65/SMI-4.1/Netcom) id AA05680; Thu, 14 Oct 93 23:16:29 -0700 Received: from sage.cgd.ucar.edu by ncar.ucar.EDU (5.65/ NCAR Central Post Office 03/11/93) id AA01642; Fri, 15 Oct 93 00:15:34 MDT Received: from columbine.cgd.ucar.edu by sage.cgd.ucar.EDU (5.65/ NCAR Mail Server 04/10/90) id AA22977; Fri, 15 Oct 93 00:14:08 MDT Message-Id: <9310150616.AA09815@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU> Received: by columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU (4.1/ NCAR Mail Server 04/10/90) id AA09815; Fri, 15 Oct 93 00:16:57 MDT Subject: PGP legal defense fund To: gbe@netcom.com (Gary Edstrom) Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 0:16:56 MDT From: Philip Zimmermann In-Reply-To: <9310112013.AA07737@netcom5.netcom.com>; from "Gary Edstrom" at Oct 11, 93 1:13 pm From: Philip Zimmermann Reply-To: Philip Zimmermann X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL0] Status: OR Date: Fri, 24 Sep 1993 02:41:31 -0600 (CDT) From: hmiller@orion.it.luc.edu (Hugh Miller) Subject: PGP defense fund As you may already know, on September 14 LEMCOM Systems (ViaCrypt) in Phoenix, Arizona was served with a subpoena issued by the US District Court of Northern California to testify before a grand jury and produce documents related to "ViaCrypt, PGP, Philip Zimmermann, and anyone or any entity acting on behalf of Philip Zimmermann for the time period June 1, 1991 to the present." Phil Zimmermann has been explicitly told that he is the primary target of the investigation being mounted from the San Jose office of U.S. Customs. It is not known if there are other targets. Whether or not an indictment is returned in this case, the legal bills will be astronomical. If this case comes to trial, it will be one of the most important cases in recent times dealing with cryptography, effective communications privacy, and the free flow of information and ideas in cyberspace in the post-Cold War political order. The stakes are high, both for those of us who support the idea of effective personal communications privacy and for Phil, who risks jail for his selfless and successful effort to bring to birth "cryptography for the masses," a.k.a. PGP. Export controls are being used as a means to curtail domestic access to effective cryptographic tools: Customs is taking the position that posting cryptographic code to the Internet is equivalent to exporting it. Phil has assumed the burden and risk of being the first to develop truly effective tools with which we all might secure our communications against prying eyes, in a political environment increasingly hostile to such an idea -- an environment in which Clipper chips and Digital Telephony bills are our own government's answer to our concerns. Now is the time for us all to step forward and help shoulder that burden with him. Phil is assembling a legal defense team to prepare for the possibility of a trial, and he needs your help. This will be an expensive affair, and the meter is already ticking. I call on all of us, both here in the U.S. and abroad, to help defend Phil and perhaps establish a groundbreaking legal precedent. A legal trust fund has been established with Phil's attorney in Boulder. Donations will be accepted in any reliable form, check, money order, or wire transfer, and in any currency. Here are the details: To send a check or money order by mail, make it payable, NOT to Phil Zimmermann, but to Phil's attorney, Philip Dubois. Mail the check or money order to the following address: Philip Dubois 2305 Broadway Boulder, CO USA 80304 (Phone #: 303-444-3885) To send a wire transfer, your bank will need the following information: Bank: VectraBank Routing #: 107004365 Account #: 0113830 Account Name: "Philip L. Dubois, Attorney Trust Account" Any funds remaining after the end of legal action will be returned to named donors in proportion to the size of their donations. You may give anonymously or not, but PLEASE - give generously. If you admire PGP, what it was intended to do and the ideals which animated its creation, express your support with a contribution to this fund. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Posted to: alt.security.pgp; sci.crypt; talk.politics.crypto; comp.org.eff.talk; comp.society.cu-digest; comp.society; alt.sci.sociology; alt.security.index; alt.security.keydist; alt.security; alt.society.civil-liberty; alt.society.civil-disob; alt.society.futures - -- Hugh Miller | Asst. Prof. of Philosophy | Loyola University Chicago FAX: 312-508-2292 | Voice: 312-508-2727 | hmiller@lucpul.it.luc.edu PGP 2.3A Key fingerprint: FF 67 57 CC 0C 91 12 7D 89 21 C7 12 F7 CF C5 7E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLQo/PUHZYsvlkKnJAQEZgAP7BFPC9qaH4Brv61IkFFxQ4QVarSduIRT9 b1Gh4KSywXD5+X1yAgsM3rLIU81WI16mgbN6ESABwBSefD6oYhr7qiGmG6WGE06v vCqyJzKwoAgYQ3H4CL6MWs5s+eX7n1o+s/KMeK76zYib8JxiWzFUfaPTHQt8WX7k h85RpQB+Ejs= =Js9u -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Gary B. Edstrom | Sequoia Software | PGP fingerprint: Internet: gbe@netcom.com | Programming Services | 2F F6 1B 28 6E A6 09 6C CompuServe: 72677,564 | P.O. Box 9573 | B0 EA 9E 4C C4 C6 7D 46 Fax: 1-818-247-6046 | Glendale, CA 91226 | Key available via finger What is PGP? Subscribe to alt.security.pgp and find out! Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp Path: peti.GUN.de!dino.dinoco.de!teralon!easix!flyer.GUN.de!unidui!zib-berlin.de!netmbx.de!Germany.EU.net!EU.net!howland.reston.ans.net!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!agate!apple.com!amd!netcomsv!netcom.com!gbe From: gbe@netcom.com (Gary Edstrom) Subject: PGP FAQ (4/4) Congressional Phone List Message-ID: Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest) X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8] Date: Sat, 11 Dec 1993 22:37:06 GMT Lines: 680 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- alt.security.pgp FAQ Part 4/4 ======================================================================== Appendix V - United States Congress Phone and FAX List ======================================================================== Since PGP is such a political piece of software, I felt that it would be appropriate to include a phone and fax list for the executive and legislative branches of the United States government. If you care at all about the issue of personal privacy, please write to your local representitives and the President expressing your feelings. ======================================================================== US GOVERNMENT ADDRESSES 1 February 1993 The White House === ===== ===== President Bill Clinton 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20500 (202) 456-1414 Switchboard (202) 456-1111 Comment line (202) 456-2883 FAX 1 (202) 456-2461 FAX 2 75300.3115@compuserve.com EMail president@whitehouse.gov EMail First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20500 (202) 456-6266 Vice President Albert Gore Old Executive Office Building Washington, DC 20500 (202) 456-2326 vice-president@whitehouse.gov EMail The Cabinet === ======= Commerce - -------- Ronald H. Brown Department of Commerce 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20230 (202) 482-4901 Defense - ------- Les Aspin Department of Defense The Pentagon Washington, DC 20301 (703) 697-5737 State - ----- Warren Christopher Department of State 2201 C Street, NW Washington, DC 20520 (202) 647-6575 (202) 647-7120 FAX Justice - ------- Janet Reno Attorney General Department of Justice 10th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 514-2007 (202) 514-5331 FAX Treasury - -------- Lloyd Bentsen Department of the Treasury 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20220 (202) 622-2960 (202) 622-1999 FAX Federal Information Center - ------- ----------- ------ (800) 726-4995 US Senate, 103rd Congress phone and fax numbers =============================================== Information from US Congress Yellow Book, January 1993 p st name phone fax = == ======================== ============== ============== R AK Murkowski, Frank H. 1-202-224-6665 1-202-224-5301 R AK Stevens, Ted 1-202-224-3004 1-202-224-1044 D AL Heflin, Howell T. 1-202-224-4124 1-202-224-3149 D AL Shelby, Richard C. 1-202-224-5744 1-202-224-3416 D AR Bumpers, Dale 1-202-224-4843 1-202-224-6435 D AR Pryor, David 1-202-224-2353 na D AZ DeConcini, Dennis 1-202-224-4521 1-202-224-2302 R AZ McCain, John 1-202-224-2235 na D CA Boxer, Barbara 1-202-225-5161 na D CA Feinstein, Diane 1-202-224-3841 na D CO Campbell, Ben N. 1-202-225-4761 1-202-225-0228 R CO Brown, Henry 1-202-224-5941 na D CT Dodd, Christopher J. 1-202-224-2823 na D CT Lieberman, Joseph I. 1-202-224-4041 1-202-224-9750 D DE Biden Jr., Joseph R. 1-202-224-5042 na R DE Roth Jr., William V. 1-202-224-2441 1-202-224-2805 D FL Graham, Robert 1-202-224-3041 na R FL Mack, Connie 1-202-224-5274 1-202-224-8022 D GA Nunn, Samuel 1-202-224-3521 1-202-224-0072 R GA Coverdell, Paul 1-202-224-3643 na D HI Akaka, Daniel K. 1-202-224-6361 1-202-224-2126 D HI Inouye, Daniel K. 1-202-224-3934 1-202-224-6747 D IA Harkin, Thomas 1-202-224-3254 1-202-224-7431 R IA Grassley, Charles E. 1-202-224-3744 na R ID Craig, Larry E. 1-202-224-2752 1-202-224-2573 R ID Kempthorne, Dirk 1-202-224-6142 1-202-224-5893 D IL Moseley-Braun, Carol 1-202-224-2854 na D IL Simon, Paul 1-202-224-2152 1-202-224-0868 R IN Coats, Daniel R. 1-202-224-5623 1-202-224-8964 R IN Lugar, Richard G. 1-202-224-4814 na R KS Dole, Robert 1-202-224-6521 1-202-224-8952 R KS Kassebaum, Nancy L. 1-202-224-4774 1-202-224-3514 D KY Ford, Wendell H. 1-202-224-4343 na R KY McConnell, Mitch 1-202-224-2541 1-202-224-2499 D LA Breaux, John B. 1-202-224-4623 na D LA Johnston, J. Bennett 1-202-224-5824 na D MA Kennedy, Edward M. 1-202-224-4543 1-202-224-2417 D MA Kerry, John F. 1-202-224-2742 na D MD Mikulski, Barbara A. 1-202-224-4654 1-202-224-8858 D MD Sarbanes, Paul S. 1-202-224-4524 1-202-224-1651 D ME Mitchell, George J. 1-202-224-5344 na R ME Cohen, William S. 1-202-224-2523 1-202-224-2693 D MI Levin, Carl 1-202-224-6221 na D MI Riegle Jr., Donald 1-202-224-4822 1-202-224-8834 D MN Wellstone, Paul 1-202-224-5641 1-202-224-8438 R MN Durenberger, David 1-202-224-3244 na R MO Bond, Christopher S. 1-202-224-5721 1-202-224-8149 R MO Danforth, John C. 1-202-224-6154 na R MS Cochran, Thad 1-202-224-5054 na R MS Lott, Trent 1-202-224-6253 1-202-224-2262 D MT Baucus, Max 1-202-224-2651 na R MT Burns, Conrad R. 1-202-224-2644 1-202-224-8594 R NC Faircloth, D. M. 1-202-224-3154 1-202-224-7406 R NC Helms, Jesse 1-202-224-6342 na D ND Conrad, Kent 1-202-224-2043 na D ND Dorgan, Byron L. 1-202-225-2611 1-202-225-9436 D NE Exon, J. J. 1-202-224-4224 na D NE Kerrey, Joseph R. 1-202-224-6551 1-202-224-7645 R NH Gregg, Judd 1-202-224-3324 na R NH Smith, Robert 1-202-224-2841 1-202-224-1353 D NJ Bradley, William 1-202-224-3224 1-202-224-8567 D NJ Lautenberg, Frank R. 1-202-224-4744 1-202-224-9707 D NM Bingaman, Jeff 1-202-224-5521 na R NM Domenici, Pete V. 1-202-224-6621 1-202-224-7371 D NV Bryan, Richard H. 1-202-224-6244 na D NV Reid, Harry 1-202-224-3542 1-202-224-7327 D NY Moynihan, Daniel P. 1-202-224-4451 1-202-224-9293 R NY D'Amato, Alfonse M. 1-202-224-6542 1-202-224-5871 D OH Glenn, John 1-202-224-3353 na D OH Metzenbaum, Howard 1-202-224-2315 1-202-224-6519 D OK Boren, David L. 1-202-224-4721 na R OK Nickles, Donald 1-202-224-5754 1-202-224-6008 R OR Hatfield, Mark O. 1-202-224-3753 na R OR Packwood, Robert 1-202-224-5244 na D PA Wofford, Harris 1-202-224-6324 1-202-224-4161 R PA Specter, Arlen 1-202-224-4254 na D RI Pell, Claiborne 1-202-224-4642 1-202-224-4680 R RI Chafee, John H. 1-202-224-2921 na D SC Hollings, Ernest F. 1-202-224-6121 na R SC Thurmond, Strom 1-202-224-5972 1-202-224-1300 D SD Daschle, Thomas A. 1-202-224-2321 1-202-224-2047 R SD Pressler, Larry 1-202-224-5842 1-202-224-1630 D TN Mathews, Harlan 1-202-224-1036 1-202-228-3679 D TN Sasser, James 1-202-224-3344 na D TX Krueger, Robert 1-202-224-5922 na R TX Gramm, Phil 1-202-224-2934 na R UT Bennett, Robert 1-202-224-5444 na R UT Hatch, Orrin G. 1-202-224-5251 1-202-224-6331 D VA Robb, Charles S. 1-202-224-4024 1-202-224-8689 R VA Warner, John W. 1-202-224-2023 1-202-224-6295 D VT Leahy, Patrick J. 1-202-224-4242 na R VT Jeffords, James M. 1-202-224-5141 na D WA Murray, Patty 1-202-224-2621 1-202-224-0238 R WA Gorton, Slade 1-202-224-3441 1-202-224-9393 D WI Feingold, Russell 1-202-224-5323 na D WI Kohl, Herbert H. 1-202-224-5653 na D WV Byrd, Robert C. 1-202-224-3954 1-202-224-4025 D WV Rockefeller, John D. 1-202-224-6472 1-202-224-1689 R WY Simpson, Alan K. 1-202-224-3424 1-202-224-1315 R WY Wallop, Malcolm 1-202-224-6441 1-202-224-3230 103rd Congress phone and fax numbers ==================================== The following information is from the US Congress "Yellow Book," Jan. 1993. Four seats were vacant at that time, in CA, MS, OH, and WI. The list below of 436 people includes 5 non-voting members, from Guam (GU), Puerto Rico (PR), Samoa (SA), Virgin Islands (VI), and DC. (some of those abbreviations may be wrong) p st representative phone fax = == ============================= ============== ============== R AK Young, Donald 1-202-225-5765 1-202-225-5765 D AL Bevill, Thomas 1-202-225-4876 1-202-225-0842 D AL Browder, Glen 1-202-225-3261 1-202-225-9020 D AL Cramer Jr, Robert E. 1-202-225-4801 na D AL Hilliard, Earl F. 1-202-225-2665 na R AL Bachus, Spencer 1-202-225-4921 na R AL Callahan, H. L. 1-202-225-4931 1-202-225-0562 R AL Everett, Terry 1-202-225-2901 na D AR Lambert, Blanche 1-202-225-4076 na D AR Thornton, Raymond 1-202-225-2506 1-202-225-9273 R AR Dickey, Jay 1-202-225-3772 1-202-225-8646 R AR Hutchinson, Tim 1-202-225-4301 na D AZ Coppersmith, Sam 1-202-225-2635 1-202-225-2607 D AZ English, Karan 1-202-225-2190 1-202-225-8819 D AZ Pastor, Ed 1-202-225-4065 1-202-225-1655 R AZ Kolbe, James T. 1-202-225-2542 1-202-225-0378 R AZ Kyl, Jon L. 1-202-225-3361 na R AZ Stump, Robert 1-202-225-4576 1-202-225-6328 D CA Becerra, Xavier 1-202-225-6235 1-202-225-2202 D CA Beilenson, Anthony 1-202-225-5911 na D CA Berman, Howard L. 1-202-225-4695 na D CA Brown Jr., George E. 1-202-225-6161 1-202-225-8671 D CA Condit, Gary 1-202-225-6131 1-202-225-0819 D CA Dellums, Ronald V. 1-202-225-2661 1-202-225-9817 D CA Dixon, Julian C. 1-202-225-7084 1-202-225-4091 D CA Dooley, Calvin M. 1-202-225-3341 1-202-225-9308 D CA Edwards, Donald 1-202-225-3072 1-202-225-9460 D CA Eshoo, Anna G. 1-202-225-8104 na D CA Fazio, Vic 1-202-225-5716 1-202-225-0354 D CA Filner, Bob 1-202-225-8045 na D CA Hamburg, Dan 1-202-225-3311 na D CA Harman, Jane 1-202-225-8220 na D CA Lantos, Thomas 1-202-225-3531 na D CA Lehman, Richard H. 1-202-225-4540 na D CA Martinez, Matthew G. 1-202-225-5464 1-202-225-4467 D CA Matsui, Robert T. 1-202-225-7163 1-202-225-0566 D CA McCandless, Alfred 1-202-225-5330 1-202-226-1040 D CA Miller, George 1-202-225-2095 1-202-225-5609 D CA Mineta, Norman Y. 1-202-225-2631 na D CA Pelosi, Nancy 1-202-225-4965 1-202-225-8259 D CA Roybal-Allard, Lucille 1-202-225-1766 1-202-226-0350 D CA Schenk, Lynn 1-202-225-2040 1-202-225-2042 D CA Stark, Fortney H. 1-202-225-5065 na D CA Torres, Esteban E. 1-202-225-5256 na D CA Tucker III, Walter R. 1-202-225-7924 1-202-225-7926 D CA Waters, Maxine 1-202-225-2201 na D CA Waxman, Henry A. 1-202-225-3976 1-202-225-4099 D CA Woolsey, Lynn 1-202-225-5161 na R CA Baker, Bill 1-202-225-1880 1-202-225-2150 R CA Calvert, Ken 1-202-225-1986 na R CA Cox, Christopher 1-202-225-5611 1-202-225-9177 R CA Cunningham, Randy 1-202-225-5452 1-202-225-2558 R CA Doolittle, John T. 1-202-225-2511 1-202-225-5444 R CA Dornan, Robert K. 1-202-225-2965 1-202-225-3694 R CA Dreier, David 1-202-225-2305 1-202-225-4745 R CA Gallegly, Elton 1-202-225-5811 na R CA Herger, Walter W. 1-202-225-3076 1-202-225-1609 R CA Horn, Steve 1-202-225-6676 na R CA Huffington, Michael 1-202-225-3601 na R CA Hunter, Duncan L. 1-202-225-5672 1-202-225-0235 R CA Kim, Jay C. 1-202-225-3201 1-202-226-1485 R CA Lewis, Jerry 1-202-225-5861 1-202-225-6498 R CA McKeon, Howard P. 1-202-225-1956 1-202-226-0683 R CA Moorhead, Carlos J. 1-202-225-4176 1-202-226-1279 R CA Packard, Ronald 1-202-225-3906 1-202-225-0134 R CA Pombo, Richard 1-202-225-1947 1-202-226-0861 R CA Rohrabacher, Dana 1-202-225-2415 1-202-225-7067 R CA Royce, Ed 1-202-225-4111 na R CA Thomas, Bill 1-202-225-2915 na D CO Schroeder, Patricia 1-202-225-4431 1-202-225-5842 D CO Skaggs, David E. 1-202-225-2161 na R CO Allard, Wayne 1-202-225-4676 1-202-225-8630 R CO Hefley, Joel 1-202-225-4422 1-202-225-1942 R CO McInnis, Scott 1-202-225-4761 1-202-226-0622 R CO Schaefer, Daniel 1-202-225-7882 1-202-225-7885 D CT DeLauro, Rosa 1-202-225-3661 1-202-225-4890 D CT Gejdenson, Samuel 1-202-225-2076 1-202-225-4977 D CT Kennelly, Barbara B. 1-202-225-2265 1-202-225-1031 R CT Franks, Gary 1-202-225-3822 1-202-225-5085 R CT Johnson, Nancy L. 1-202-225-4476 1-202-225-4488 R CT Shays, Christopher 1-202-225-5541 1-202-225-9629 D DC Norton, Eleanor Holmes 1-202-225-8050 1-202-225-3002 R DE Castle, Michael N. 1-202-225-4165 1-202-225-2291 D FL Bacchus, James 1-202-225-3671 1-202-225-9039 D FL Brown, Corrine 1-202-225-0123 1-202-225-2256 D FL Deutsch, Peter 1-202-225-7931 1-202-225-8456 D FL Gibbons, Samuel M. 1-202-225-3376 na D FL Hastings, Alcee L. 1-202-225-1313 1-202-225-0690 D FL Hutto, Earl 1-202-225-4136 1-202-225-5785 D FL Johnston II, Harry 1-202-225-3001 1-202-225-8791 D FL Meek, Carrie 1-202-225-4506 1-202-226-0777 D FL Peterson, Peter 1-202-225-5235 1-202-225-1586 R FL Bilirakis, Michael 1-202-225-5755 1-202-225-4085 R FL Canady, Charles T. 1-202-225-1252 na R FL Diaz-Balart, Lincoln 1-202-225-4211 1-202-225-8576 R FL Fowler, Tillie 1-202-225-2501 na R FL Goss, Porter J. 1-202-225-2536 1-202-225-6820 R FL Lewis, Thomas 1-202-225-5792 1-202-225-1860 R FL McCollum, William 1-202-225-2176 na R FL Mica, John L. 1-202-225-4035 1-202-226-0821 R FL Miller, Dan 1-202-225-5015 1-202-226-0828 R FL Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana 1-202-225-3931 1-202-225-5620 R FL Shaw Jr., E. C. 1-202-225-3026 1-202-225-8398 R FL Stearns, Clifford B. 1-202-225-5744 1-202-225-3973 R FL Thurman, Carol L. 1-202-225-1002 1-202-226-0329 R FL Young, C. W. 1-202-225-5961 1-202-225-9764 D GA Bishop, Sanford 1-202-225-3631 1-202-225-2203 D GA Darden III, George 1-202-225-2931 na D GA Deal, Nathan 1-202-225-5211 1-202-225-8272 D GA Johnson, Don 1-202-225-4101 1-202-226-1466 D GA Lewis, John 1-202-225-3801 1-202-225-0351 D GA McKinney, Cynthia 1-202-225-1605 1-202-226-0691 D GA Rowland, J. R. 1-202-225-6531 na R GA Collins, Mac 1-202-225-5901 1-202-225-2515 R GA Gingrich, Newt 1-202-225-4501 1-202-225-4656 R GA Kingston, Jack 1-202-225-5831 1-202-226-2269 R GA Linder, John 1-202-225-4272 na D GU Underwood, Robert A. 1-202-225-1188 1-202-226-0341 D HI Abercrombie, Neil 1-202-225-2726 na D HI Mink, Patsy T. 1-202-225-4906 1-202-225-4987 D IA Smith, Neal 1-202-225-4426 na R IA Grandy, Fred 1-202-225-5476 na R IA Leach, James 1-202-225-6576 1-202-226-1278 R IA Lightfoot, James R. 1-202-225-3806 1-202-225-6973 R IA Nussle, James Allen 1-202-225-2911 1-202-225-9129 D ID LaRocco, Larry 1-202-225-6611 na R ID Crapo, Michael D. 1-202-225-5531 na D IL Collins, Cardiss 1-202-225-5006 1-202-225-8396 D IL Costello, Jerry F. 1-202-225-5661 1-202-225-0285 D IL Durbin, Richard J. 1-202-225-5271 1-202-225-0170 D IL Evans, Lane 1-202-225-5905 1-202-225-5396 D IL Lipinski, William O. 1-202-225-5701 1-202-225-1012 D IL Poshard, Glendal W. 1-202-225-5201 1-202-225-1541 D IL Reynolds, Mel 1-202-225-0773 na D IL Rostenkowski, Daniel 1-202-225-4061 na D IL Rush, Bobby L. 1-202-225-4372 1-202-226-0333 D IL Sangmeister, George 1-202-225-3635 1-202-225-4447 D IL Yates, Sidney R. 1-202-225-2111 1-202-225-3493 R IL Crane, Philip M. 1-202-225-3711 na R IL Ewing, Thomas 1-202-225-2371 1-202-225-8071 R IL Fawell, Harris W. 1-202-225-3515 1-202-225-9420 R IL Gutierrez, Luis V. 1-202-225-8203 1-202-225-7810 R IL Hastert, J. D. 1-202-225-2976 1-202-225-0697 R IL Hyde, Henry J. 1-202-225-4561 1-202-226-1240 R IL Manzullo, Donald 1-202-225-5676 1-202-225-5284 R IL Michel, Robert H. 1-202-225-6201 1-202-225-9461 R IL Porter, John E. 1-202-225-4835 1-202-225-0157 D IN Buyer, Steve 1-202-225-5037 na D IN Hamilton, Lee H. 1-202-225-5315 1-202-225-1101 D IN Jacobs Jr., Andrew 1-202-225-4011 na D IN Long, Jill 1-202-225-4436 na D IN McCloskey, Frank 1-202-225-4636 1-202-225-4688 D IN Roemer, Timothy 1-202-225-3915 1-202-225-6798 D IN Sharp, Philip R. 1-202-225-3021 na D IN Visclosky, Peter J. 1-202-225-2461 1-202-225-2493 R IN Burton, Daniel 1-202-225-2276 1-202-225-0016 R IN Myers, John T. 1-202-225-5805 na D KS Glickman, Daniel 1-202-225-6216 na D KS Slattery, James 1-202-225-6601 1-202-225-1445 R KS Meyers, Jan 1-202-225-2865 1-202-225-0554 R KS Roberts, Pat 1-202-225-2715 1-202-225-5375 D KY Baesler, Scotty 1-202-225-4706 na D KY Barlow, Tom 1-202-225-3115 1-202-225-2169 D KY Mazzoli, Romano L. 1-202-225-5401 na D KY Natcher, William H. 1-202-225-3501 na R KY Bunning, James 1-202-225-3465 1-202-225-0003 R KY Rogers, Harold 1-202-225-4601 1-202-225-0940 D LA Fields, Cleo 1-202-225-8490 1-202-225-8959 D LA Hayes, James A. 1-202-225-2031 1-202-225-1175 D LA Jefferson, William 1-202-225-6636 1-202-225-1988 D LA Tauzin, W. J. 1-202-225-4031 1-202-225-0563 R LA Baker, Richard H. 1-202-225-3901 1-202-225-7313 R LA Livingston, Robert 1-202-225-3015 1-202-225-0739 R LA McCrery, James 1-202-225-2777 1-202-225-8039 D MA Frank, Barney 1-202-225-5931 1-202-225-0182 D MA Kennedy II, Joseph P. 1-202-225-5111 1-202-225-9322 D MA Markey, Edward J. 1-202-225-2836 1-202-225-8689 D MA Meehan, Martin T. 1-202-225-3411 1-202-226-0771 D MA Moakley, John Joseph 1-202-225-8273 1-202-225-7304 D MA Neal, Richard E. 1-202-225-5601 1-202-225-8112 D MA Olver, John W. 1-202-225-5335 1-202-226-1224 D MA Studds, Gerry E. 1-202-225-3111 1-202-225-2212 R MA Blute, Peter I. 1-202-225-6101 1-202-225-2217 R MA Torkildsen, Peter G. 1-202-225-8020 1-202-225-8037 D MD Cardin, Benjamin L. 1-202-225-4016 na D MD Hoyer, Steny H. 1-202-225-4131 1-202-225-4300 D MD Mfume, Kweisi 1-202-225-4741 1-202-225-3178 D MD Wynn, Albert R. 1-202-225-8699 1-202-225-8714 R MD Bartlett, Roscoe G. 1-202-225-2721 na R MD Bentley, Helen D. 1-202-225-3061 1-202-225-4251 R MD Gilchrest, Wayne T. 1-202-225-5311 1-202-225-0254 R MD Morella, Constance 1-202-225-5341 1-202-225-1389 D ME Andrews, Thomas H. 1-202-225-6116 1-202-225-9065 R ME Snowe, Olympia J. 1-202-225-6306 na D MI Barcia, James A. 1-202-225-8171 1-202-225-2168 D MI Bonior, David E. 1-202-225-2106 1-202-226-1169 D MI Carr, Robert 1-202-225-4872 1-202-225-1260 D MI Collins Jr., Barbara 1-202-225-2261 1-202-225-6645 D MI Conyers Jr., John 1-202-225-5126 1-202-225-0072 D MI Dingell, John D. 1-202-225-4071 1-202-225-7426 D MI Ford, William D. 1-202-225-6261 na D MI Kildee, Dale E. 1-202-225-3611 na D MI Levin, Sander M. 1-202-225-4961 1-202-226-1033 D MI Stupak, Bart 1-202-225-4735 1-202-225-4744 R MI Camp, David Lee 1-202-225-3561 1-202-225-9679 R MI Henry, Paul B. 1-202-225-3831 na R MI Hoekstra, Peter 1-202-225-4401 na R MI Knollenberg, Joe 1-202-225-5802 1-202-226-2356 R MI Smith, Nick 1-202-225-6276 na R MI Upton, Frederick S. 1-202-225-3761 1-202-225-4986 D MN Minge, David 1-202-225-2331 na D MN Oberstar, James L. 1-202-225-6211 1-202-225-0699 D MN Penny, Timothy J. 1-202-225-2472 1-202-225-0051 D MN Peterson, Collin C. 1-202-225-2165 1-202-225-1593 D MN Sabo, Martin O. 1-202-225-4755 na D MN Vento, Bruce F. 1-202-225-6631 na R MN Grams, Rod 1-202-225-2271 1-202-225-9802 R MN Ramstad, James M. 1-202-225-2871 1-202-225-6351 D MO Clay, William L. 1-202-225-2406 1-202-225-1725 D MO Danner, Pat 1-202-225-7041 na D MO Gephardt, Richard A. 1-202-225-2671 1-202-225-7452 D MO Skelton, Ike 1-202-225-2876 1-202-225-2695 D MO Volkmer, Harold L. 1-202-225-2956 1-202-225-7834 D MO Wheat, Alan 1-202-225-4535 1-202-225-5990 R MO Emerson, Bill 1-202-225-4404 1-202-225-9621 R MO Hancock, Melton D. 1-202-225-6536 1-202-225-7700 R MO Talent, James M. 1-202-225-2561 1-202-225-2563 D MS Montgomery, G. V. 1-202-225-5031 1-202-225-3375 D MS Parker, Paul M. 1-202-225-5865 1-202-225-5886 D MS Taylor, Gene 1-202-225-5772 1-202-225-7074 D MS Whitten, Jamie L. 1-202-225-4306 1-202-225-4328 D MT Williams, Pat 1-202-225-3211 na D NC Clayton, Eva 1-202-225-3101 na D NC Hefner, W. G. 1-202-225-3715 1-202-225-4036 D NC Lancaster, H. M. 1-202-225-3415 1-202-225-0666 D NC Neal, Stephen L. 1-202-225-2071 1-202-225-4060 D NC Price, David E. 1-202-225-1784 1-202-225-6314 D NC Rose, Charles 1-202-225-2731 1-202-225-2470 D NC Valentine, Tim 1-202-225-4531 1-202-225-1539 D NC Watt, Melvin 1-202-225-1510 1-202-225-1512 R NC Ballenger, Thomas C. 1-202-225-2576 1-202-225-0316 R NC Coble, Howard 1-202-225-3065 1-202-225-8611 R NC McMillan, J. A. 1-202-225-1976 na R NC Taylor, Charles Hart 1-202-225-6401 1-202-251-0794 D ND Pomeroy, Earl 1-202-225-2611 1-202-226-0893 D NE Hoagland, Peter 1-202-225-4155 na R NE Barrett, William E. 1-202-225-6435 na R NE Bereuter, Douglas 1-202-225-4806 1-202-226-1148 D NH Swett, Richard N. 1-202-225-5206 na R NH Zeliff Jr., William 1-202-225-5456 1-202-225-4370 D NJ Andrews, Robert E. 1-202-225-6501 na D NJ Hughes, William J. 1-202-225-6572 1-202-226-1108 D NJ Klein, Herbert C. 1-202-225-5751 na D NJ Menendez, Robert 1-202-225-7919 1-202-226-0792 D NJ Pallone Jr., Frank 1-202-225-4671 1-202-225-9665 D NJ Payne, Donald M. 1-202-225-3436 1-202-225-4160 D NJ Torricelli, Robert 1-202-224-5061 1-202-225-0843 R NJ Franks, Bob 1-202-225-5361 1-202-225-9460 R NJ Gallo, Dean A. 1-202-225-5034 1-202-225-0658 R NJ Roukema, Marge 1-202-225-4465 1-202-225-9048 R NJ Saxton, H. J. 1-202-225-4765 1-202-225-0778 R NJ Smith, Christopher 1-202-225-3765 1-202-225-7768 R NJ Zimmer, Richard A. 1-202-225-5801 1-202-225-9181 D NM Richardson, William 1-202-225-6190 na R NM Schiff, Steven H. 1-202-225-6316 1-202-225-4975 R NM Skeen, Joseph 1-202-225-2365 1-202-225-9599 D NV Bilbray, James H. 1-202-225-5965 1-202-225-8808 R NV Vucanovich, Barbara 1-202-225-6155 1-202-225-2319 D NY Ackerman, Gary L. 1-202-225-2601 na D NY Engel, Eliot L. 1-202-225-2464 na D NY Flake, Floyd H. 1-202-225-3461 1-202-226-4169 D NY Hinchey, Maurice D. 1-202-225-6335 na D NY Hochbrueckner, G. 1-202-225-3826 1-202-225-0776 D NY LaFalce, John J. 1-202-225-3231 na D NY Lowey, Nita M. 1-202-225-6506 1-202-225-0546 D NY Maloney, Carolyn B. 1-202-225-7944 na D NY Manton, Thomas J. 1-202-225-3965 na D NY McNulty, Michael R. 1-202-225-5076 1-202-225-5077 D NY Nadler, Jerrold 1-202-225-5635 1-202-225-6923 D NY Owens, Major R. 1-202-225-6231 1-202-226-0112 D NY Rangel, Charles B. 1-202-225-4365 1-202-225-0816 D NY Schumer, Charles E. 1-202-225-6616 1-202-225-4183 D NY Serrano, Jose E. 1-202-225-4361 1-202-225-6001 D NY Slaughter, Louise M. 1-202-225-3615 1-202-225-7822 D NY Towns, Edolphus 1-202-225-5936 1-202-225-1018 D NY Velazquez, Nydia M. 1-202-225-2361 1-202-226-0327 R NY Boehlert, Sherwood 1-202-225-3665 1-202-225-1891 R NY Fish Jr., Hamilton 1-202-225-5441 1-202-225-0962 R NY Gilman, Benjamin A. 1-202-225-3776 na R NY Houghton, Amory 1-202-225-3161 1-202-225-5574 R NY King, Peter T. 1-202-225-7896 1-202-226-2279 R NY Lazio, Rick A. 1-202-225-3335 na R NY Levy, David A. 1-202-225-5516 1-202-225-4672 R NY McHugh, John M. 1-202-225-4611 na R NY Molinari, Susan 1-202-225-3371 1-202-226-1272 R NY Paxon, L. W. 1-202-225-5265 1-202-225-5910 R NY Quinn, Jack 1-202-225-3306 1-202-226-0347 R NY Solomon, Gerald B. 1-202-225-5614 1-202-225-1168 R NY Walsh, James T. 1-202-225-3701 1-202-225-4042 D OH Applegate, Douglas 1-202-225-6265 na D OH Brown, Sherrod 1-202-225-3401 na D OH Fingerhut, Eric D. 1-202-225-5731 na D OH Hall, Tony P. 1-202-225-6465 na D OH Kaptur, Marcy 1-202-225-4146 1-202-225-7711 D OH Mann, Davis S. 1-202-225-2216 na D OH Sawyer, Thomas C. 1-202-225-5231 1-202-225-5278 D OH Stokes, Louis 1-202-225-7032 1-202-225-1339 D OH Strickland, Ted 1-202-225-5705 1-202-226-0331 D OH Traficant Jr., James 1-202-225-5261 1-202-225-3719 R OH Boehner, John Andrew 1-202-225-6205 1-202-225-0704 R OH Gillmor, Paul E. 1-202-225-6405 na R OH Hobson, David L. 1-202-225-4324 na R OH Hoke, Martin R. 1-202-225-5871 1-202-226-0994 R OH Kasich, John R. 1-202-225-5355 na R OH Oxley, Michael G. 1-202-225-2676 na R OH Pryce, Deborah 1-202-225-2015 1-202-226-0986 R OH Regula, Ralph 1-202-225-3876 1-202-225-3059 D OK Brewster, Billy Kent 1-202-225-4565 na D OK English, Glenn 1-202-225-5565 1-202-225-8698 D OK McCurdy, David 1-202-225-6165 1-202-225-9746 D OK Synar, Michael 1-202-225-2701 1-202-225-2796 R OK Inhofe, James M. 1-202-225-2211 1-202-225-9187 R OK Istook, Ernest Jim 1-202-225-2132 na D OR DeFazio, Peter A. 1-202-225-6416 na D OR Furse, Elizabeth 1-202-225-0855 na D OR Kopetski, Michael J. 1-202-225-5711 1-202-225-9477 D OR Wyden, Ronald 1-202-225-4811 na R OR Smith, Robert F. 1-202-225-6730 na D PA Blackwell, Lucien E. 1-202-225-4001 1-202-225-7362 D PA Borski, Robert A. 1-202-225-8251 1-202-225-4628 D PA Coyne, William J. 1-202-225-2301 na D PA Foglietta, Thomas M. 1-202-225-4731 1-202-225-0088 D PA Holden, Tim 1-202-225-5546 1-202-226-0996 D PA Kanjorski, Paul E. 1-202-225-6511 1-202-225-9024 D PA Klink, Ron 1-202-225-2565 na D PA Margolies-Mezvinsky, Marjorie 1-202-225-6111 1-202-226-0798 D PA McHale, Paul 1-202-225-6411 1-202-225-5320 D PA Murphy, Austin J. 1-202-225-4665 1-202-225-4772 D PA Murtha, John P. 1-202-225-2065 1-202-225-5709 R PA Clinger Jr., William 1-202-225-5121 1-202-225-4681 R PA Gekas, George W. 1-202-225-4315 1-202-225-8440 R PA Goodling, William F. 1-202-225-5836 1-202-226-1000 R PA Greenwood, Jim 1-202-225-4276 1-202-225-9511 R PA McDade, Joseph M. 1-202-225-3731 1-202-225-9594 R PA Ridge, Thomas J. 1-202-225-5406 na R PA Santorum, Richard J. 1-202-225-2135 1-202-225-7747 R PA Shuster, Bud 1-202-225-2431 na R PA Walker, Robert S. 1-202-225-2411 na R PA Weldon, Curt 1-202-225-2011 1-202-225-8137 D PR Romero-Barcelo, Carlos 1-202-225-2615 1-202-225-2154 D RI Reed, John F. 1-202-225-2735 1-202-225-9580 R RI Machtley, Ronald K. 1-202-225-4911 1-202-225-4417 D SA Faleomavaega, Eni F.H. 1-202-225-8577 na D SC Clyburn, James E. 1-202-225-3315 1-202-225-2302 D SC Derrick, Butler 1-202-225-5301 na D SC Spratt Jr., John M. 1-202-225-5501 1-202-225-0464 R SC Inglis, Bob 1-202-225-6030 na R SC Ravenel Jr., Arthur 1-202-225-3176 na R SC Spence, Floyd 1-202-225-2452 1-202-225-2455 D SD Johnson, Timothy P. 1-202-225-2801 1-202-225-2427 D TN Clement, Robert 1-202-225-4311 1-202-226-1035 D TN Cooper, James 1-202-225-6831 1-202-225-4520 D TN Ford, Harold E. 1-202-225-3265 na D TN Lloyd, Marilyn 1-202-225-3271 1-202-225-6974 D TN Tanner, John S. 1-202-225-4714 1-202-225-1765 R TN Duncan Jr., John J. 1-202-225-5435 1-202-225-6440 R TN Gordon, Bart 1-202-225-4231 1-202-225-6887 R TN Quillen, James H. 1-202-225-6356 1-202-225-7812 R TN Sundquist, Donald 1-202-225-2811 1-202-225-2814 D TX Andrews, Michael A. 1-202-255-7508 na D TX Brooks, Jack 1-202-225-6565 1-202-225-1584 D TX Bryant, John 1-202-225-2231 na D TX Chapman, Jim 1-202-225-3035 1-202-225-7265 D TX Coleman, Ronald D. 1-202-225-4831 na D TX Edwards, Chet 1-202-225-6105 1-202-225-0350 D TX Frost, Martin 1-202-225-3605 1-202-225-4951 D TX Geren, Peter 1-202-225-5071 1-202-225-2786 D TX Gonzalez, Henry B. 1-202-225-3236 1-202-225-1915 D TX Green, Gene 1-202-225-1688 1-202-225-9903 D TX Hall, Ralph M. 1-202-225-6673 1-202-225-3332 D TX Johnson, Eddie Bernice 1-202-225-8885 na D TX Laughlin, Gregory H. 1-202-225-2831 1-202-225-1108 D TX Ortiz, Solomon P. 1-202-225-7742 1-202-226-1134 D TX Pickle, J. J. 1-202-225-4865 na D TX Sarpalius, Bill 1-202-225-3706 1-202-225-6142 D TX Stenholm, Charles W. 1-202-225-6605 1-202-225-2234 D TX Tejeda, Frank 1-202-225-1640 na D TX Washington, Craig A. 1-202-225-3816 na D TX Wilson, Charles 1-202-225-2401 1-202-225-1764 D TX de la Garza, E 1-202-225-2531 1-202-225-2534 R TX Archer, William 1-202-225-2571 1-202-225-4381 R TX Armey, Richard K. 1-202-225-7772 1-202-225-7614 R TX Barton, Joseph 1-202-225-2002 1-202-225-3052 R TX Bonilla, Henry 1-202-225-4511 na R TX Combest, Larry 1-202-225-4005 na R TX DeLay, Thomas 1-202-225-5951 na R TX Fields, Jack 1-202-225-4901 na R TX Johnson, Sam 1-202-225-4201 na R TX Smith, Lamar S. 1-202-225-4236 1-202-225-8628 D UT Orton, William H. 1-202-225-7751 1-202-226-1223 D UT Shepherd, Karen 1-202-225-3011 1-202-226-0354 R UT Hansen, James V. 1-202-225-0453 1-202-225-5857 D VA Boucher, Rick 1-202-225-3861 na D VA Byrne, Leslie L. 1-202-225-1492 na D VA Moran Jr., James P. 1-202-225-4376 1-202-225-0017 D VA Payne Jr., Lewis F. 1-202-225-4711 1-202-226-1147 D VA Pickett, Owen B. 1-202-225-4215 1-202-225-4218 D VA Scott, Robert C. 1-202-225-8351 1-202-225-3854 D VA Sisisky, Norman 1-202-225-6365 1-202-226-1170 R VA Bateman, Herbert H. 1-202-225-4261 1-202-225-4382 R VA Bliley Jr., Thomas J. 1-202-225-2815 na R VA Goodlatte, Robert W. 1-202-225-5431 1-202-225-9681 R VA Wolf, Frank R. 1-202-225-5136 na D VI de Lugo, Ron 1-202-225-1790 1-202-225-9392 I VT Sanders, Bernard 1-202-225-4115 1-202-225-6790 D WA Cantwell, Maria 1-202-225-6311 1-202-225-2286 D WA Dicks, Norman D. 1-202-225-5916 na D WA Foley, Thomas S. 1-202-225-2006 na D WA Inslee, Jay 1-202-225-5816 1-202-226-1137 D WA Kreidler, Mike 1-202-225-8901 1-202-226-2361 D WA McDermott, James A. 1-202-225-3106 1-202-225-9212 D WA Swift, Al 1-202-225-2605 1-202-225-2608 D WA Unsoeld, Jolene 1-202-225-3536 1-202-225-9095 R WA Dunn, Jennifer 1-202-225-7761 na D WI Barrett, Thomas M. 1-202-225-3571 na D WI Gunderson, Steve 1-202-225-5506 1-202-225-6195 D WI Kleczka, Gerald D. 1-202-225-4572 na D WI Obey, David R. 1-202-225-3365 na R WI Klug, Scott 1-202-225-2906 na R WI Petri, Thomas E. 1-202-225-2476 1-202-225-2356 R WI Roth, Toby 1-202-225-5665 1-202-225-0087 R WI Sensenbrenner, F. J. 1-202-225-5101 1-202-225-3190 D WV Mollohan, Alan B. 1-202-225-4172 1-202-225-7564 D WV Rahall II, Nick Joe 1-202-225-3452 1-202-225-9061 D WV Wise Jr., Robert E. 1-202-225-2711 1-202-225-7856 R WY Thomas, Craig 1-202-225-2311 1-202-225-0726 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLQo+ZEHZYsvlkKnJAQGZvQP+IPY4vY0BQESmgBO2FjoH1ZN8cYOKo+au N2caf5U//5q2K9KhGbOUysEKGjlkAUTyrtW1gixkzn3KzcQ9o/sNkjwGTXh2vqgu U9cFTjO2OexCtPgDCrgpQVtFCn115V/YgjTjylTRo0ce9WG9+iVV8IJmgskMMDm2 PS1nuj/Ze18= =PYU3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Gary B. Edstrom | Sequoia Software | PGP fingerprint: Internet: gbe@netcom.com | Programming Services | 2F F6 1B 28 6E A6 09 6C CompuServe: 72677,564 | P.O. Box 9573 | B0 EA 9E 4C C4 C6 7D 46 Fax: 1-818-247-6046 | Glendale, CA 91226 | Key available via finger What is PGP? Subscribe to alt.security.pgp and find out!