· : ¦ . _________ ________ _____________ ._____¦ | · __ / : ___________/ _ \ \ __ _ / | \ |____: : \_/ -A : \______ \ | \_ _: \_/ \_/ | \ ¦ | ¦ \_ ··D_ / / _/ | / |___/ \_ | : : | |_______/ `N· _/ \ \_________/ | \________/ ¦ |_____¦ ¦ | : \__________/ \ ¦ \_ : : \__________| \___________/ . · . »»»» PRESENTS «««« OVERLORD - ENGLISH MANUAL ========================== PART ONE --====-- TYPED BY SHARD - N&B PART ONE - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ================================ PLANNING FOR COMBAT: THE BUILD - UP ----------------------------------- DIGEST OF OPERATION OVERLORD What follows is a unique document taken from the Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.I, 30th July, 1943. It postulates what form an invasion plan could or should take and provides a valuable study for what was formally suggested and what actually happened one year later (see the actual historical account elsewhere for comparison). 1. The object of Operation "Overlord" is to mount and tarry out an operation, with forces and equipment established in the United Kingdom, and with target date the 1st May, 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed. The lodgement area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some 26 to 30 divisions and enable that force to be augmented by follow up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of three to five divisions per month. Selection of a Lodgement Area. 2. In order to provide sufficient port facilities to maintain these large forces, it will be necessary to select a lodgement area which includes a group of major ports. We must plan on the assumption that ports, on capture, will be seriously damaged and probably blocked. It will take some time to restore normal facilities. We shall thus be forced to rely on maintenance over beaches for an extended period. 3. A study of the beaches on the Belgian and Channel coasts shows that the beaches with the highest capacity for passing vehicles and stores inland are those in the Pas de Calais and the Caen-Cotentin area. Of these the Caen beaches are the most favourable as they are, unlike the others, sheltered from the prevailing winds. Naval and air considerations point to the area between the Pas de Calais and the Cotentin as the most suitable for the initial landing, air factors of optimum air support and rapid provision of airfields indicating the Pas de Calais as the best choice, with Caen as an acceptable alternative. 4. Thus taking beach capacity and air and naval considerations together, it appears that either the Pas de Calais area or the Caen Cotentin area is the most suitable for the initial main landing. 5. As the area for the initial landing, the Pas de Calais has many obvious advantages such that good air support and quick turn around for our shipping can be achieved. On the other hand, it is a focal point of the enemy fighters disposed for defence, maximum enemy air activity can be brought to bear over this area with the minimum movement of his air forces. Moreover, the Pas de Calais is the most strongly defended area on the whole French coast. The defences would require very heavy and sustained bombardment from sea and air: penetration would be slow and the result of the bombardment of beach exits would severely limit the rate of build up. Further, this area does not offer good opportunities for expansion. It would be necessary to develop the bridgehead to include either the Belgian ports as far as Antwerp or the Channel ports Westwards to include Havre and Rouen. However, both an advance to Antwerp across the numerous water obstacles and a long flank march of some 120 miles to the Seine ports must be considered unsound operations of war unless the German forces are in a state not far short of final collapse. 6. In the Caen Cotentin area it would be possible to make our initial landing either partly on the Cotentin Peninsula and partly on the Caen beaches, wholly in the Cotentin or wholly on the Caen beaches. An attack with part of our forces in the Cotentin and part on the Caen beaches is however, considered to be unsound. It would entail dividing our limited forces by the low lying marshy ground and intricate river system at the neck of the Cotentin Peninsula, thus exposing them to defeat in detail. 7. An attack against the Cotentin Peninsula, on the other hand, has a reasonable chance of success and would ensure the early capture of the port of Cherbour. Unfortunately, very few airfields exist in the Cotentin, that area is not suitable for rapid airfield development. Furthermore, the narrow neck of the Peninsula would give the Germans an easy task in preventing us from breaking out and expanding our initial bridge head. Moreover, during the period of our consolidation in the Cotentin the Germans would have time to reinforce their coastal troops in the Caen area, rendering a subsequent amphibious assault in that area much more difficult. 8. There remains the attack on the Caen beaches. The Caen sector is weakly held, the defences are relatively light and the beaches are of high capacity and sheltered from the prevailing winds. Inland, the terrain is suitable for airfield development and for the consolidation of the initial bridgehead and much of it is unfavourable for counter attacks by panzer divisions. Maximum enemy air opposition can only be brought to bear at the expense of the enemy air defence screen covering the approaches to Germany and the limited number of enemy airfields within range of the Caen area facilitates local neutralisation of the German fighter force. The sector suffers from the disadvantage that considerable effort will be required to provide adequate air support to our assault forces and some time must elapse before the capture of a major port. After a landing in the Caen sector it would be necessary to seize either the Seine group of ports or the Brittany group of ports. To seize the Seine ports would entail forcing a crossing of the Seine, which is likely to require greater forces than we can build up through the Caen beaches and the port of Cherbourg. It should, however, be possible to seize the Brittany ports between Cherbourg and Nantes and on them build up sufficient forces for our final advance Eastwards. Provided that the necessary air situation can first be achieved, the chances of a successful attack and of rapid subsequent development are so much greater in this sector than in any other that it is considered that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. The Lodgement Area Selected. 9. In the light of these factors, it is considered that our initial landing on the Continent should be effected in the Caen area, with a view to the eventual seizure of a lodgement area comprising the Cherbourg Brittany group of ports (from Cherbourg to Nantes). Opening Phase up to the Capture of Cherbourg. 10. The opening phase in the seizing of this lodgement area would be the effecting of a landing in the Caen sector with a view to the early capture and development of airfield sites in the Caen area and of the port of Cherbourg. 11. The main limiting factors affecting such an operation are the possibility of attaining the necessary air situation, the number of offensive divisions which the enemy can make available for counter attack in the Caen area, the availability of landing ships and craft and of transport aircraft and the capacity of the beaches and ports in the sector. 12. Although the strength of the G.A.F. available in 1944 on the Western front cannot be forecast at this stage, we can confidently expect that we shall have a vast numerical superiority in bomber forces. The first-line strength of the German fighter force is, however, showing a steady increase and although it is unlikely to equal the size of the force at our disposal, there is no doubt that our fighters will have a very large commitment entailing dispersal and operations at maximum intensity. Our fighters will also be operating under serious tactical disadvantage in the early stages, which will largely offset their numerical superiority. Before the assault takes place, therefore, it will be necessary to reduce the effectiveness of the G.A.F., particularly that part which can be brought to bear against the Caen area. 13. The necessary air situation to ensure a reasonable chance of success will therefore require that the maximum number of German fighter forces are contained in the Low Countries and north west Germany, that the effectiveness of the fighter defence in the Caen area is reduced and that air reinforcements are prevented from arriving in the early stages from the Mediterranean. Above all, it will be necessary to reduce the overall strength of the German fighter force between now and the date of the operation by destruction of the sources of supply, by the infliction of casualties by bringing on air battles, and, immediately prior to the assault, by the disorganisation of G.A.F. installations and control system in the Caen area. 14. As it is impossible to forecast with any accuracy the number and location of German formations in reserve in 1944 while on the other hand, the forces available to us have been laid down, an attempt has been made in this paper to determine the wisest employment of our own forces and then to determine the maximum number of German formations which they can reasonably overcome. Apart from the air situation, which is an over riding factor, the practicability of this plan will depend principally on the number, effectiveness and availability of German divisions present in France and the Low Countries in relation to our own capabilities. This consideration is discussed below (paragraph 35). 15. A maximum of 30 and a minimum of 26 equivalent divisions are likely to be available in the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations on the 1st May 1944. Further build-up can be at the rate of three to five divisions per month. 16. Landing ships and craft have been provided to lift the equivalent of three assault divisions and two follow up divisions, without 'overheads,' and it has been assumed that the equivalent of an additional two divisions can be afloat in ships. 17. Airborne forces amounting to two airborne divisions and some five or six parachute regiments will be available but, largely owing to shortage of transport aircraft, it is only possible to lift the equivalent of two thirds of one airborne division simultaneously, on the basis of present forecasts. 18. Even if additional landing ships and craft could be made available, the beaches in the Caen area would preclude the landing of forces greater than the equivalent of the three assault and two follow up divisions, for which craft have already been provided. Nevertheless, an all round increase of at least 10 per cent in landing ships and craft is highly desirable in order to provide a greater margin for contingencies within the framework of the existing plan. Furthermore, sufficient lift for a further assault division could most usefully be employed in an additional landing on other beaches. 19. There is no port of any capacity within the sector although there are a number of small ports of limited value. Maintenance will, therefore of necessity be largely over the beaches until it is possible to capture and open up the port of Cherbourg. In view of the possibilities of interruption by bad weather it will be essential to provide early some form of improvised sheltered waters. 2O. Assuming optimum weather conditions, it should be possible to build up the force over the beaches to a total by D plus 6 of the equivalent of some 11 divisions and five tank brigades and thereafter to land one division a day until about D plus 24. Proposed Plan. Preliminary Phase. 21. During the preliminary phase, which must start forthwith, all possible means including air and sea action, propaganda, political and economic pressure and sabotage, must be integrated into a combined offensive aimed at softening the German resistance. In particular, air action should be directed towards the reduction of the German air forces on the Western front, the progressive destruction of the German economic system and the undermining of German morale. 22. In order to contain the maximum German forces away from the Caen area diversionary operations should be staged against other areas such as the Pas de Calais and the Mediterranean Coast of France. Preparatory Phase. 23. During this phase air action will be intensified against the G.A.F., particularly in north west France, with a view to reducing the effectiveness of the G.A.F. in chat area and will be extended to include attacks against communications more directly associated with movement of German reserves which might affect the Caen area. Three naval assault forces will be assembled with the naval escorts and loaded at ports along the South Coast of England. Two naval assault forces carrying the follow-up forces will also be assembled and loaded, one in the Thames Estuary and one on the West Coast. The Assault. 24. After a very short air bombardment of the beach defences three assault divisions will be landed simultaneously on the Caen beaches, followed up on D-Day by the equivalent of two tank brigades (United States regiments) and a brigade group (United States regimental combat team). At the same time airborne forces will be used to seize the town of Caen; and subsidiary operations by commandos and, possibly, by airborne forces will be undertaken to neutralise certain coast defences and seize certain important river crossings. The object of the assault forces will be to seize the general line Grandcamp Bayeux Caen. Follow-up and Build-up Phase. 25. Subsequent action will take the form of a strong thrust Southwards and south westwards with a view to destroying enemy forces, acquiring sites for airfields and gaining depth for a turning movement into the Cotentin Peninsula directed on Cherbourg. When sufficient depth has been gained a force will advance into the Cotentin and seize Cherbourg. At the same time a thrust will be made to deepen the bridgehead south- eastwards in order to cover the construction and operation of additional airfields in the area south east of Caen. 26. It is considered that, within 14 days of the initial assault, Cherbourg should be captured and the bridgehead extended to include the general line Trouville Alencon Mont St Michel. By this date, moreover, it should have been possible to land some 18 divisions and to have in operation about 14 airfields from which 28 to 33 fighter type squadrons should be operating. Further Developments after Capture of Cherbourg. 27. After the capture of Cherbourg the Supreme Allied Commander will have to decide whether to initiate operations to seize the Seine ports or whether he must content himself with first occupying the Brittany ports. In this decision he will have to be guided largely by the situation of the enemy forces. If the German resistance is sufficently weak, an immediate advance could be made to seize Havre and Rouen. On the other hand, the more probable situation is that the Germans will have retired with the bulk of their forces to hold Paris and the line of the Seine, where they can best be covered by their air forces from north- east France and where they may possibly be reinforced by formations from Russia. Elsewhere they may move a few divisions from Southern France to hold the crossings of the Loire and will leave the existing defensive divisions in Brittany. It will therefore most probably be necessary for us to seize the Brittany ports first, in order to build up sufficient forces with which we can eventually force the passage of the Seine. 28. Under these circumstances, the most suitable plan would appear to be to secure, first, the left flank and to gain sufficient airfields for subsequent operations. This would be done by extending the bridgehead to the line of the River Eure from Dreux to Rouen and thence along the line of the Seine to the sea, seizing at the same time Chartres, Orleans and Tours. 29. Under cover of these operations a force would be employed in capturing the Brittany ports; the first step being a thrust Southwards to seize Nantes and St Nazaire, followed by subsidiary operations to capture Brest and the various small ports of the Brittany Peninsula. 30. This action would complete the occupation of our initial lodgement area and would secure sufficient major ports for the maintenance of at least 30 divisions. As soon as the organisation of the L.of C.in this lodgement area allowed and sufficient air forces had been established, operations would then be begun to force the line of the Seine and to capture Paris and the Seine ports. As opportunity offered, subsidiary action would also be taken to clear the Germans from the Biscay ports to facilitate the entry of additional American troops and the feeding of the French population. Command and Control. 31. In carrying out Operation 'Overlord' administrative control would be greatly simplified if the principle were adopted that the United States forces were normally on the right of the line and the British and Canadian forces on the left. Major Conditions Affecting Success of the Operation. 32. It will be seen that the plan for the initial landing is based on two main principles concentration of force and tactical surprise. Concentraion of the assault forces is considered essential if we are to ensure adequate air support and if our limited assault forces are to avoid defeat in detail. An attempt has been made to obtain tactical surprise by landing in a lightly defended area, presumably lightly defended as, due to its distance from a major port the Germans consider a landing there unlikely to be successful. This action, of course, presupposes that we can offset the absence of a port in the initial stages by the provision of improvised sheltered waters. It is believed that this can be accomplished. 33. The operation calls for a much higher standard of performance on the part of the naval assault forces than any previous operation. This will depend upon their being formed in sufficient time to permit of adequate training. 34. Above all, it is essential that there should be an over-all reduction in the German fighter force between now and the time of the surface assault. From now onwards every practical method of achieving this end must be employed. This condition above all others, will dictate the date by which the amphibious assault can be launched. 35. The next condition is that the number of German offensive divisions in reserve must not exceed a certain figure on the target date if the operation is to have a resonable chance of success. The German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole, excluding divisions holding the coast, G.A.F. divisions and training divisions, should not exceed on the day of the assault 12 full strength first quality divisions. In addition the Germans should not be able to transfer more than 15 first quality divisions from Russia during the first two months. Moreover, on the target date the divisions in reserve should be so located that the number of first quality divisions which the Germans could deploy in the Caen area to support the divisions holding the coast should not exceed three divisions on D- Day, five divisions on D plus 2, or nine divisions by D plus 8. During the preliminary period, therefore, every effort must be made to dissipate and divert German formations, lower their fighting efficiency and disrupt communications. 36. Finally there is the question of maintenance. Maintenance will have to be carried out over beaches for a period of some three months for a number of formations, varying from a maximum of 18 divisions in the first month to twelve divisions in the second month, rapidly diminishing to nil in the third month. Unless adequate measures are taken to provide sheltered waters by artificial means, the operation will be at the mercy of the weather. Moreover, special facilities and equipment will be required to prevent undue damage to craft during this extended period. Immediate action for the provision of the necessary requirements is essential. 37. Given these conditions a reduced G.A.F, a limitation in the number or effectiveness of German offensive formations in France, and adequate arrangements to provide improvised sheltered waters it is considered that Operation 'Overlord' has a reasonable prospect of success. To ensure these conditions being attained by the 1st May 1944, action must start now and every possible effort made by all means in our power to soften the German resistance and to speed up our own preparations. THE FUEHRERS DIRECTIVE ON DEFENCE OF WESTERN EUROPE Dated as 3 November 1943, just a few months until the launch of Overlord, the following fascinating document shows how aware Hitler was of an attack and what measures he was taking to prevent it. Fuehrer Headquarters - 3 November 1943 Top Secret The Fuehrer OKW/WFSt/Op.No. 662656/43 g.K. Chefs - 27 Copies Directive No. 51 For the last two and one half years the bitter and costly struggle against Bolshevism has made the utmost demands upon the bulk of our military resources and energies. This commitment was in keeping with the seriousness of the danger and the over all situation The situation has since changed. The threat remains but an even greater danger looms in the West: the Anglo American landing! In the East the vastness of the space will, as a last resort, permit a loss of territory even on a major scale, without suffering a mortal blow to Germany's chance for survival. Not so in the West! If the enemy here succeeds in penetrating our defences on a wide front, consequences of staggering proportions will follow, within a short time. All signs point to an offensive against the Western Front of Europe no later than spring, perhaps earlier. For that reason, I can no longer justify the further weakening of the West in favour of other theatres of war I have, therefore, decided to strengthen the defences in the West, particularly at places from which we shall launch our long-range war against England. For those are the very points at which the enemy must and will attack; there unless all indications are misleading will be fought the decisive invasion battle. Holding attacks and diversions on other fronts are to be expected. Not even the possibility of a large-scale offensive against Denmark may be excluded. It would pose greater nautical problems and could be less effectively supported from the air but would, nevertheless, produce the greatest political and strategic impact if it were to succeed. During the opening phase of the battle, the entire striking power of the enemy will, of necessity, be directed against our forces manning the coast. Only an all-out effort in the construction of fortifications, an unsurpassed effort that will enlist all available manpower and physical resources of Germany and the occupied areas, will be able to strengthen our defences along the coasts within the short time that still appears to be left to us. Stationary weapons (heavy AT guns, immobile tanks to be dug in, coast artillery, shore defence guns, mines, etc ) arriving in Denmark and the occupied West within the near future will be heavily concentrated in points of main defensive effort at the most vulnerable coastal sectors. At the same time, we must take the calculated risk that for the present we may be unable to improve our defences in less threatened sectors. Should the enemy nevertheless force a landing by concentrating his armed might, he must be hit by the full fury of our counterattack. For this mission ample and speedy reinforcements of men and material, as well as intensive training must transform available larger units into first rate, fully mobile general reserves suitable for offensive operations. The counterattack of these units will prevent the enlargement of the beachhead and throw the enemy back into the sea. In addition, well-planned emergency measures, prepared down to the last detail, must enable us instantly to throw against the invader every fit man and machine from coastal sectors not under attack and from the home front. The anticipated strong attacks by air and sea must be relentlessly countered by Air Force and Navy with all their available resources. I therefore order the following: A) Army: 1.) The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Inspector General Staff and the Inspector General of Panzer Troops will submit to me as soon as possible a schedule covering arms, tanks, assault guns, motor vehicles and ammunition to be allocated to the Western Front and Denmark within the next three months. That schedule will conform to the new situation. The following considerations will be basic: a) Sufficient mobility for all panzer and panzer grenadier divisions in the West, and equipment of each of those units by December 1943 with 93 Mark IV tanks or assault guns, as well as large numbers of antitank weapons. Accelerated reorganisation of the 20 Luftwaffe Field Divisions into an effective mobile reserve force by the end of 1943. This reorganisation is to include the issue of assault guns. Accelerated issue of all authorised weapons to the SS Panzer Grenadier Division Hitler Jugend [In this month (November 1943) this division was converted to a Panzer division [12th SS)], the 21st Panzer Division, and the infantry and reserve divisions stationed in Jutland. b) Additional shipments of Mark IV tanks, assault guns and heavy AT guns to the reserve panzer divisions stationed in the West and in Denmark, as well as to the Assault Gun Training Battalion in Denmark. c) In November and December, monthly allotments of 100 heavy AT guns models 40 and 43 (half of these to be mobile) in addition to those required for newly activated units in the West and in Denmark. d) Allotment of large numbers of weapons (including about 1,000 machine guns) for augmenting the armament of those static divisions that are committed for coastal defence in the West and in Denmark, and for standardising the equipment of elements that are to be withdrawn from sectors not under attack. e) Ample supply of close combat AT weapons to units in vulnerable sectors. f) Improvement of artillery and AT defences in units stationed in Denmark as well as those committed for coastal protection in the occupied West. Strengthening of GHQ artillery. 2.) The units and elements stationed in the West or in Denmark, as well as panzer, assault gun and AT units to be activated in the West, must not be transferred to other fronts without my permission. The Chief of the Army General Staff, or the Inspector General of Panzer Troops will submit to me a report through the Armed Forces Operations staff as soon as the issue of equipment to the panzer and assault gun battalions, as well as to the AT battalions and companies, has been completed. 3.) Beyond similar measures taken in the past, the Commander in Chief West will establish timetables, conduct manoeuvres and command post exercises for the procedure of bringing up units from sectors not under attack. These units will be made capable of performing offensive missions, however limited. In that connection I demand that sectors not threatened by the enemy be ruthlessly stripped of all forces except small guard detachments. For sectors from which reserves are withdrawn, security and guard detachments must be set aside from security and alarm units. Labour forces draawn largely from the native population must likewise be organised in those sectors, in order to keep open whatever roads might be destroyed by the enemy air force. 4.) The Commander of German Troops in Denmark will take measures in the area under his control in compliance with paragraph 3 above. 5.) Pursuant to separate orders, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army will form Kampfgruppen in regimental strength, security battalions and engineer construction battalions from training cadres, trainees, schools and instruction and convalescent units in the Zone of the Interior. These troops must be ready for shipment on 48 hours' notice. Furthermore other available personnel are to be organised into battalions of replacements and equipped with the available weapons so that the anticipated heavy losses can quickly be replaced. B) Luftwaffe: The offensive and defensive effectiveness of Luftwaffe units in the West and in Denmark will be increased to meet the changed situation. To that end, preparations will be made for the release of units suited for commitment in the anti invasion effort, that is, all, flying units and mobile Flak artillery that can be spared from the air defences of the home front and from schools and training units in the Zone of the Interior. All those units are to be earmarked for the West and possibly Denmark. The Luftwaffe ground or organisation in southern Norway, Denmark, north western Germany and the West will be expanded and supplied in a way that will - by the most far reaching decentralisation of own forces deny targets to the enemy bombers and split the enemy's offensive effort in case of large-stale operations. Particularly important in that connection will be our fighter forces. Possibilities for their commitment must be increased by the establishment of numerous advance landing fields. Special emphasis is to be placed on good camouflage. I expect also that the Luftwaffe will unstintingly furnish all available forces, by stripping them from less threatened areas. C) Navy: The Navy will prepare the strongest possible forces suitable for attacking the enemy landing Fleets. Coastal defence installations in the process of construction will be completed with the utmost speed. The emplacing of additional coastal batteries and the possibility of laying further flanking mine fields should be investigated. All school, training and other shore-based personnel fit for ground combat must be prepared for commitment so that, without undue delay, they can at least be employed as security forces within the zone of the enemy landing operations. While preparing the reinforcement of the defences in the West, the Navy must keep in mind that it might be called upon to repulse simultaneous enemy landings in Norway and Denmark. In that connection, I attach particular importance to the assembly of numerous U-boats in the northern area. A temporary weakening of U boat forces in the Atlantic must be risked. D) SS: The Reithsfuehrer SS will determine what Waffen SS and police forces he can release for combat, security and guard duty. He is to prepare to organise effective combat and security forces from training, replacement, and convalescent units, as well as schools and other home front establishments. E) The commanders in chief of the services, the Reichsfuehrer-SS, the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Commander in Chief West, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, the Inspector General of Panzer Troops as well as the Commander of German Troops in Denmark will report to me by 15 November all measures taken or planned. I expect that all agencies will make a supreme effort toward utilising every movement of the remaining time in preparing for the decisive battle in the West. All authorities will guard against wasting time and energy in useless jurisdictional squabbles, and will direct all their efforts toward strengthening our defensive and offensive power. signed: Adolf Hitler DIVISIONS AVAILABLE TO GERMANY ON 6 JUNE 1944 (BASED ON GERMAN SITUATION MAPS) Theater Inf type Pz type Misc Denmark 2 1+2 Brig 3 Norway 11 Finland 10 Eastern Front 122 25+1 Brig 17+1 Brig OB SUEDOST (Balkans) 20 2 3 OB SUEDWEST (Italy) 17+1 Brig 7 1 OB WEST (France and 41+1 Brig 11 9 low Countries) Zone of Interior 3+1 Brig 1+2 Brig 4+2 Brig Total German Divislons 226+2 Brig, 47+5 Brig 37+3 Brig 1 Rgt AXIS SATELLITES DIVISIONS AVAILABLE TO GERMANY ON 6 JUNE 1944 (BASED ON GERMAN SITUATION MAPS) Theater Inf type Pz type Misc Finnish, Eastern Front and Finland 14+8 Brig 1 1 Brig Romanian, Eastern Front and Romania 17+5 Brig 1 2 Hungarian, Eastern Front and Hungary 9+2 Brig 2 5 Bulgarian, Occupation Duty in Balkans and Bulgaria 11 Italian In Zone of Interior 4 Total Axis Satellite Divisions 55+16 Brig 4 7+1 Brig OVERLORD: THE CAMPAIGN THE PRELUDE The Allies, at the beginning of 1944, had a measure of numeric and technical superiority over the German forces. However, the upcoming 'invasion' of France required some sort of surprise as the whole operation could still end in catastrophe. Elaborate security precautions were thus taken and a comprehensive deception plan was worked out. That an invasion was to be undertaken was pretty obvious to all concerned. The object of the security measures and the deception plan was to attempt to conceal the time and place of the operation from the Germans. The plan was in two stages first to lead the Germans to think that the landing was planned for the obvious area, the Pas de Calais: the second even after the landing in Normandy had taken place, to cause them to believe that this was a diversionary operation to be followed by the 'real' landing in the Pas de Calais. So important was this considered that, during the whole period of the air preparation, for every target attacked in the assault area two other targets outside that area were dealt with. Tne success of these measures may be judged by the fact that on June 6 the bulk of the German forces in France were north of the Seine. As far back as 1943 General Morgan had drawn attention to two problems upon the solution of which the operation might well depend: reduction of the German fighter strength and reduction of the German reinforcement rate. By early 1944, there were some 13,000 aircraft in the UK, of which nearly 11,000 were available for the support of Overlord. This figure included, however, nearly 3,500 heavy bombers in British Bomber Command and the United States 8th Air Force: they were working on a long term plan for the destruction of German industry - particularly the oil industry and were not under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander. It would be natural to suppose that the entire weight of the 7,500 aircraft constituting the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces would have been available for these preparatory air operations. Unfortunately this was not the case, for during the winter of 1943/44 German preparations for the flying bomb campaign against London became increasingly obvious and considerable effort had to be diverted to action against the launching sites. Nevertheless the air effort available for these preliminary operations was colossal by any standards. The success of the anti Luftwaffe operation was almost complete: during the last two months the Luftwaffe lost a total of 1,858 aircraft and when D-Day came, air opposition was practically nil. By its nature, the Transportation Plan was unlikely to achieve so complete a success nevertheless aided by the operations of the Resistance, it was undoubtedly a major factor in reducing the rate of arrival of German reinforcements round the bridgehead to an acceptable level. As might be expected the organisation of the actual assault was perhaps the most complicated problem the planners had to face. To carry the overall total of 40-50,000 men with their vehicles and equipment, an armarda of over 4000 landing ships, landing craft and barges of varying types was required; less than half of these were capable of crossing the Channel under their own power, the remainder having either to be towed or carried aboard the larger ships. Only when all this had been done, did the Royal Navy assemble for the escort and support of the operation a fleet of over 1,500 vessels, ranging from battleships to armed landing craft. Although from the point of view of the assaulting troops there was much to be said for an assault in darkness, both the navies and the air force had to have daylight to carry out their bombardment tasks and darkness would dangerously increase the likelihood of troops being landed in the wrong place. To assist navigation and for the airborne landings moonlight was essential. Finally, the German underwater beach obstacles meant that landing must be three to four hours before high tide. The only suitable periods for the operation therefore were those when there was four to five hours daylight between dawn and high tide and, at the same time, good moonlight was available. The question of rapid unloading initially appeared the most difficult of all: it could clearly not be done across the beaches as a long term measure and the likelihood of capturing port facilities intact appeared small, at any rate in the early stages. The problem was solved by perhaps the most famous devices of the entire operation - the artificial harbours known as Mulberries. They owed their existence primarily to the fresight of Churchill himself, who had directed their development as early as 1942 with his oft quoted minute, "They must float up and down with the tide.... Don't argue the matter, The difficulties will argue for themselves". They consisted of an outer breakwater formed partly of sunken blockships and partly of concrete 'caissons', 220ft long, which had to be towed across the Channel: in the area of sheltered water so created were floating piers adapted to take coasters, landing ships or barges: unloading was further assisted by a fleet of amphibious lorries known as DUKWs. The supply of motor and aircraft fuel presented a particular problem. Initially tankers were moored offshore and the fuel fed by buoyed pipeline into depots on land. preparations were made however for an underwater pipeline direct from England to the French coast - PLUTO or Pipe Line Under-the Ocean, and eventually, though not in the early stages fuel supply was in effect drawn direct from England. It must not be forgotten that the invasion was not just a British/American/Canadian operation. All of the Allies had a hand in it including the Dutch, Norwegians, Australians, Czechs, Poles, New Zealanders and of course the French themselves who supplied boats and a co ordinated resistance campaign assisted by the SOE (Special Operations Executive). The actual invasion was meticulously planned with accurate models of sections of the landing beaches which gave men a visual knowledge of their own roles. Practice landings, fine tuning, methodical briefings and specially designed and prepared weapons all played their part in the detailed build up to the final push. NEPTUNE Although the D-Day invasion itself was known as Operation Overlord, it is not so well known that the Channel crossing had its own label, Operation Neptune. The sustained attacks from the air on the elaborate Early Warning System of the enemy had succeeded almost too well. In the entire Neptune area from Cap d'Antifer to Barfleur, 74 radar stations were out of action, and the 18 still capable of working were silent. But it was not enough to simply blind the enemy, it was important also to mislead. For this purpose 10 stations were deliberately left in working order north of the Seine and onto these screens the Royal Navy contrived to produce misleading web of shapes and echoes. There was no inclination on the part of the Allies to under-estimate the powers of the German army in the west. Thus, all through June 5 and the night, 105 aircraft of the RAF and 34 little ships of the Royal Navy contrived, by means of weaving patterns over the sky and sea and flying barrage balloons, to produce the 'echoes' in the enemy radars of a substantial fleet approaching the Pas de Calais. At the same time jamming operations and diversions were carried on against Cap d Antifer and Barfleur. The silent approach of the great armada to spread out in a fan from eight to 12 miles offshore enclosing the Bay of Seine is the measure of success. Five beaches were designated as landing areas codenamed Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno and Sword. The invasion began with the dropping of paratroops. A haphazard affair which lead to the mass scattering of for example, the 82nd Division. In fact, on the day the 82nd were 4000 men short and still only at one third strength three days later. Actually, this incoherent scattering amongst the enemy created so much confusion behind enemy lines as to prevent co-ordinated reinforcement at the landing beaches. In fact, by the time the US 4th Infantry Division came in to land the battle of Utah Beach was virtually won. The assault at Utah resulted in just 12 dead. The struggle for Omaha was very different. Heavy enemy cross fire created havoc, while waves six foot high caused many landing craft to flounder. The DUKW's were overloaded and, in many cases, capsized losing much of the artillery. The landing craft carrying support tanks came upon similar problems. There is a devastating simplicity about disaster. There were no dry landings. The assault craft and the larger LCVPs and LCMs grounded on the sandbanks, slewed in the sand runnels and cast scores of men knee, waist and neck deep into seas lashed not only by the wind but by mortar bombs, shells and machine gun bullets. Many believe that General Bradleys refusal to utilise British built specialised armour and weapons, made especially for the landing formed a major contribution to the resultant chaos. Why the refusal? Possibly, Bradley was unimpressed with British confidence and in some cases perceived (rightly or wrongly) arrogance. Whatever the reason the steady progress at the other beaches stood in stark contrast to Omaha. Despite those other beaches having experienced similar physical conditions to Omaha Beach. By midnight the deepest penetration was hardly a mile. In the central sector, specialised armour brought the British and Canadians swiftly over Gold and Juno Beaches and, by the afternoon, they were probing inland towards Bayeux and Caen. The Sword assault was equally rapid; by 14:00 hours leading troops had reached Bieville and the Commandos were linking up with the paratroops. This proved a vital factor, for it was through the gap between Juno and Sword that the Germans made their one major counterattack - a battlegroup of XXI Panzer Division swept towards the coast, but turned back when British reinforcements were flown into the airborne troops behind it. From the beginning, the main weight of German resistance was on the Allied left flank and it was there that the German armour was pinned down, fortunately far from the precarious toe hold at Omaha, which could have turned from a local disaster to a major crisis. The Normandy beaches had been won: the first German counterattacks had been beaten off - and rapidly growing but still confined Allied armies had still to break out through the German ring into the interior of France. However, the Beach head was now in place, the Allies were here to stay. OVERLORD - THE COMMANDERS OF THE AIR The air attacks precluding and during the day of 6th June 1944 were largely governed by nine air commanders: six on the Allied side and three on the German. ALLIED COMMANDERS - AMERICAN LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LEWIS H. BRERETON Brereton commanded the Ninth Air Force, the American element of the Expeditionary Force. An aviator since 1913 and subordinate to 'Billy' Mitchell, the far sighted commander devoted to air power. Lewis Breretons first taste of significant command during WW2 was controlling US Far East Air Force under General MacArthur. A situation he found overwhelming. "There was a comprehensive project on paper for the construction of additional airfields, but unfortunately little money had been provided prior to my arrival...." The US surrendered Manila in 1942 and Brereton was transferred to the Tenth Air Force in India. He then moved to commanding the US Army Middle East Air Force where he co-ordinated strikes against enemy supply lines focusing on Benghazi, Tobruk and convoys around Greece and Crete in an effort to bolster the RAF's North African campaign. Brerecon's willingness to co-operate and learn from the British forces helped, with the newly named Ninth Air Force, to end the North African campaign, the invasion of Sicily and the entry in Italy. His integration of the best in USAF and RAF techniques enabled him to produce a highly mobile force. Brereton streamlined his organisation making it highly effective. He also initiated attacks on enemy supply lines. One conspicuous assault being the Ploesti oil refinery raids in Rumania which was largely successful despite navigation errors which resulted in the loss of the leading aircraft. When Brereton arrived in the UK late in 1943 his wide experience enabled him to mould the Ninth Air Force into a useful tactical command that would be supportive to Overlord operations. His previous willingness to blend British and US air plans, ideas and techniques were to prove highly useful for the Overlord campaign and proved a testament to a highly adaptable and committed commander. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JAMES H. DOOLITTLE Doolittle commanded the US Eighth Air Force. An aviator since 1917 in the Army Air Service, Schneider Trophy winner in 1925 and Thompson Trophy winner in 1932, Doolittle worked as an experimental engineer in the Air Corps Material Division and took a leading part in blind flying making the first successful flight on instruments. His work was recognised by his award of the Harmon Trophy in 1930. Doolittle was an out spoken advocate of air power and the formation of a separate air arm during the 1930s and during 1942, he undertook the highly daring mission to attack Tokyo from an aircraft carrier. The aim - to gain revenge on Pearl Harbour and provide a psychological boost for the USA. His fiight of 16 B-25 Mitchells (equipped with dummy guns to save weight and dissuade air attack) flew from the USS Hornet on 18 April, 1942. The mission was a success and Doolittle was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honour. After appointments in North Africa in 1942 commanding the Twelfth Air Force and the North west African Strategic Air Force Doolittle was transferred to the Eighth Air Force where he provided for the integration of his heavy bombers into the overall pattern of air operations for Overlord. GENERAL CARL SPAATZ He was the Commander of the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe from January 1st 1944. After seeing the Luftwaffe's might first hand during his stint in the UK as an official observer during the days of the Battle of Britain, Spaatz was familiar with the UK war situation when he returned to the UK in 1943 as Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force. Spaatz's B-17s landed at Prestwick on July 1, 1942. Targets just outside Rouen were the first aim, six weeks later Spaatz learned all about attacking well defended coastlines two days later when his unlikely termed 'reconnaissance in force' flight of B-17s and Spitfires paralysed the fighter station at Abbeyville-Drucat for two important hours. Lessons were learned that would hold Spaatz in good stead for Operation Overlord. Before planning for Overlord became more intense, Spaatz aided General Montgomery's El Alamein offensive by providing his services as overall air commander a post that was desperately required at the time. Spaatz co ordinated operations of the Eastern Air Command and the Twelfth Air Force, later the Mediterranean Air Command, in February 1943. He followed the campaign through to the invasion of Italy. The planning stages of Overlord were to bring Spaatz into conflict with the British Commanders, Leigh Mallory and Tedder. This lead to a quick cessation of all co-operation between Spaatz and Leigh Mallory. The problem was that Spaatz wanted to help the Overlord campaign's strategic objectives with a combined bomber offensive as outlined in the Pointblank directive. He would, thus require complete freedom of action and control. Leigh-Mallory was against this concept. Although Spaatz and Harris were generally in agreement, their opinions diverged when it came down to the question of area bombing. Harris wanted it where as Spaatz wanted to adapt the Pointblank directive to the needs of Overlord. This directive was known as the Oil Plan and was centred around attacks on oil installations. The whole idea of the oil plan was an intriguing one with many possibilities to tie up the German offensive. However Leigh Mallory prevailed with his Transportation Plan as economic experts said that Spaatz's plan would not achieve its effects in time for the operation of Overlord. Although personality problems persisted, which included complaints to Eisenhower himself, Spaatz's oil offensive had begun by the back door before D-Day, with the Ploesti attack. Results on oil installations did finally, change operational thinking and directives gave priority to oil targets with transportation second. Spaatz was to end the war in command of the aircraft which dropped the two atomic bombs on Japan. END OF PART ONE --===========--