
Recently two things were released in Prima Aprilis mood:

* 4EF9 trojans
* Bastard linkvirus


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This text says some words about trojans recently made by UAE lamer
who thinks that having 4ef9 linker makes him hacker.
Such lame trojans have been seen about five years ago,
but now addtional code instead of mannipulating BBS:user.data
tries to insult innocent via internet.
This is the only difference during the years, this means the lamers
still on the same level.


BlazeWCP.lha	  32862 bytes	the file 'BlazeWCP' had been
				linked with shitty e-mail sender,
                                and the file version got faked
				said to be: v1.8

FBlit.lha	 142086 bytes	the file 'FBlit' had been linked
				with shitty e-mail sender,
				and the version got faked
				said to be: v3.84

StackAttack.lha	  69229 bytes	the file 'StackAttack' had been linked
				with shitty e-mail sender,
				and the version got faked
				said to be: v1.2b

Safe.lha	  20737 bytes	the file 'Safe' had been decoded,
                                version had been changed, then code was
				linked with the same shitty e-mail sender,
				and crunched until size reached 7000 bytes.
				Lamer used quite old Safe. Maybe he was
				thinking about attack from longer time.
                                This archive was replaced with correct Safe,
				as soon as it was possible (Thanks Error!)
				said to be: v14.10


Please check Your system with e.g. VirusZ and note that,
4eb9 or 4ef9 linker can't mean anything good to you.
Those linkers were used to make trainers or add crack intros,
but also (surprise!) were often used to make trojans.
Experience learns that linked code always does more harm than good.
If You were watching Your fresh stuff with good (even old)
AV software You would easily see such strange things.

The linked code is 940 bytes long and is EOR crypted.
Same code was used to make all four trojans.
Safe v15.2 is able to stop processes created by this added code,
so email won't be sent every 60 seconds.
Linked part tries to send some insulting text.
After decoding You can see inside such shit:

(...)
0290  aage-partner.com
02A0  >..DATA..From: M
02B0  OS Rul3z y0u bit
02C0  ch! <>..Subject:
02D0   MorphOS - The R
02E0  eal Slim OS4ady.
02F0  ..Fuck U JERKIN 
(...)

The e-mail is sent to haage&partner and contains some insulting text.


Note to lamer:
What da fuck the 'memory leak is'?
I don't have UAE, so I am wondering about that...

Thanks to Jan for sending all the archives, and to Error for
keeping eyes opened.


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What is more important!

There appeared brand new link-virus. It is well coded, and seems
to have nothing to do with the work of lamer described above.
Here is the first analyze of that virus.
At the moment the range of spreading is unknown,
but I heard the installer is an archive with pointers or somthing
in this kind. Jan Andersen of VHT-DK is working on it or already finished.


Entry...............: BASTARD (temporary name)
Alias(es)...........: -
Virus Strain........: Motaba(?)
Virus detected when.: 4.2001
              where.: internet
Classification......: Linkvirus,memory-resident, not reset-resident
Length of Virus.....: 1. Length on storage medium:     c.a.2100 Bytes
                      (uses polimorphic engine)
                      2. Length in RAM:                    8192 Bytes

--------------------- Preconditions ------------------------------------

Operating System(s).: AMIGA-DOS Version/Release..: 2.04 and above (V37+)
Computer model(s)...: all models/processors (MC68000-MC68060)

--------------------- Attributes ---------------------------------------

Easy Identification.: none

Type of infection...: Self-identification method in files:

                      - checks first byte of first codehunk for $61
                        (part of jump to viruscode)

                      Self-identification method in memory:
                      - indirectcly the virus is aware of itself:
                        * checks for $-1 in tc_userdata
                          field of every process, this value
                          is stored by exec/TaskWait list scanner,
                          already checked processes are skipped
                        * the try to hack asl.library fails,
                          so memory is freed

                      System infection:

                      -  tries to guess paths to runned programs
                         via pr_Homedir and task name.
                         This gives about 2-5 valid filepaths
                         (mainly in WBStartup) to infect.

                      -  Tries to hack in memory code of AllocRequest
                         of asl.library with patch that tries to
                         hack VirusCheckerII process (gets
                         via seglist Open call of this killer and
                         patches it!). I don`t know
                         which version(s) author of virus had tested.

                      Infection preconditions:

                      - File is between 2000 and 32000 bytes   
                      - Hunk Code is found
                      - File is not infected already
                      - device is validated
                      - device contains free blocks

Infection Trigger...: 1. Accessing files via checking them with VirusCheckerII.
                      2. Direct infection of some runned programs
                         after run of an infected file.
                      Files containing a "l" or "L" or "-" or "V" or "v"
                      will be not infected.

Storage media affected:
                      all DOS-devices

Interrupts hooked...: None

Damage..............: Permanent damage:
                      - Crashes system.
                      Transient damage:
                      - none
Damage Trigger......: Permanent damage:
                      - File ENV:mui/spirit.1.prefs exists
                      Transient damage:
                      - none

Particularities.....: Polimorphic decrypt routine.
                      The decryptor is 256 bytes long and before
                      it is always: movem.l d0-a6,-(sp)
                      This engine is (for me) a new one, but doesn`t
                      contain enough stuff to prevent "checksum"
                      detecting of the infected files.
                      The truth is even better. We can decode virus
                      using the technic found inside it
                      (the crypter and decrypter are same!).
                      The polimorphic engine always contains
                      one loop, one eor, one move.l 4.w,a6,
                      two lea.l rest are random moveq and shitfs
                      like lsl.l #2,d4 etc.
                      The decrypt algo may vary
                      if in the decrypt loop appear random
                      instruction that changes cryptkey register,
                      I didn't get any crashing example.

                      The virus replaces first longword of the
                      first codehunk with bsr.w to virus code.
                      The original value is restored by
                      decrypted virus code. And the stack will
                      be mainipulated to call the program first
                      and then call the main virus code.
                      Note that there is no detailed check for
                      this long, so every file without $61
                      at the begin will be infected.
                      This means also that files with reloc instruction
                      in first long will cause guru after infection.

                      New ideas at all. The virus looks excellent
                      compared to Motaba-3 that is supposed to
                      be the base of this viral engine.
                      Direct hacking of things that are ram only
                      is problematic subject and there is incredibly
                      large amount of things that can be hacked
                      in future in the same way.

                      One of these bastards that
                      if run from an icon will not crash
                      with the wellknown GURU 87000004. Thats because
                      of the executing of virus code AFTER program.

Similarities........: Link-method is first hunk increasing.
                      The main code is comparable to motaba-3.
                      Length polymorph is same!
                      The change of lenght is depending on
                      'a' in filepath.
                      The path creator is idea comparable to
                      Antonio and PolishPower viruses.

Stealth.............: FindTask must be pointing to $fxxxx or virus
                      will not try to hack VCII.
                      Open must be pointing to $fxxxx or virus
                      will not perfom any action.
                      Write must be pointing to $fxxxx or virus
                      will not perfom any action.
                      Lock must be pointing to $fxxxx or virus
                      will not perform check for ENV:mui/spirit.1.prefs.
                      The virus doesn`t patch ROM library vectors,
                      and the hackings of VC and asl.library are done
                      in quite tricky way.

Armouring...........: Polymorphic decryptor is used, length
                      of added code is changing in small range and
                      at the end of the virus is more or less garabage.
                      The virus contains some of the popular tricks
                      like bsr and then increasing sp to mix code
                      with data and some confusing/antidisassembling
                      instructions.

Comments............: -

--------------------- Agents -------------------------------------------

Countermeasures.....: -
above Standard means......: -

--------------------- Acknowledgement ----------------------------------

Location............: Pawlowice, Poland  4.2001
Classification by...: Zbigniew Trzcionkowski
Documentation by....: Zbigniew Trzcionkowski
Date................: 4.2001
Information Source..: Virus disassembly and reverse engineering
Copyright...........: This documentation is public domain

===================== End of BASTARD ===================================


The virus doesn't seem to be able to spread on so many machines,
but of course file removals will be ready as soon as possible.

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