F15 STRIKE EAGLE III
                 <<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

                             PART 3

                      FUNDAMENTALS OF FLIGHT


THE FOUR FORCES



There are four basic forces which affect each and every object which 

moves through the air. Lift, Thrust, Drag, and Gravity. The same 

forces which act upon a football to determine how far it is thrown 

also affect huge airliners with hundreds of people aboard. Controlled 

flight is the art of managing these four forces in order to travel 

through the air and reach a desired destination.

Lift is perhaps the least understood of all the forces which affect 

aircraft. Lift is the difference in air pressure, above and below an 

object, caused by air rushing past it. As air strikes the leading 

surface of an object, the even flow of air is deflected over. under, 

and around the object. These deflected air streams change speed as 

they are forced past the object.

In the case of an airplane, air moving over top of a wing surface 

moves at a greater speed than the air moving below. Since slow moving 

air has a higher air pressure, it causes the wing surface to rise. As 

the speed of the air moving over top of the wing surface increases, 

the difference in pressure above and below the wing becomes greater. 

The greater the difference in pressure becomes, the more Lift is 

ultimately generated.

This same principle works on any object, not just wing surfaces. To 

test the theory. one only has ride in an automobile with a hand 

extended into the wind. (Remember to exercise caution when performing 

this experiment) The air striking your hand from underneath will force 

it upwards because of the difference in air pressures.



Thrust is the aerodynamic force which propels an object through the 

air. The principle is the same whether the wing is pulled through air 

by a propeller or pushed from behind by a jet engine. The purpose of 

Thrust is to force air across the wing surface in order to create 

Lift. Obviously the faster an object moves through the air, the more 

air is forced past the wing.



THE FOUR FORCES



Lift



Draa

ANGLE OF Attack



LOW SPEED HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK



To explain the principle behind Thrust we can refer back to our 

automobile experiment. By depressing the car's accelerator pedal, the 

driver adds power to the engine (Thrust) which in turn converts this 

additional energy into speed. As the automobile increases speed, more 

wind is forced past your hand causing it to rise. Notice that slowing 

the car down has an opposite effect.

Drag is another force which is ofen misunderstood. To grasp the 

concept, it is first necessary to separate Drag from the idea of 

weight. Aerodynamic drag is anything which impedes the movement of an 

object through the air.

While weight is a counter-balance to Lift, Drag is in direct 

opposition to Thrust. The more Drag created by a moving object, the 

greater amount of thrust is needed to overcome it. Returning yet again 

to the automobile experiment, Drag is the difference between keeping 

your hand horizontal, pointing in the direction of travel and raising 

a palm into the wind. Your palm creates more drag than your fingers 

slicing through the air like a knife.

The last of the four forces and the only one we cannot control to some 

extent. is Gravity. Gravity is the force behind the saying, "Whatever 

goes



1 1 4 up, must come down." It must constantly be overcome by Lift in 

order for anything to remain airborne for long. If the force of 

Gravity becomes greater than the Lift being exerted, the object wing 

will be drawn toward the ground, eventually ending the flight.



ANGLE OF ATTACK (AOA)



The amount of lift generated by a particular surface is a function of 

its "angle of attack." Basically, AOA is the difference between the 

aircraft's flight path and the "chord line" of the wing. In level 

flight, the "chord line" of the wing is facing directly into the 

airflow. When climbing, the "chord line" of the wing is pitched upward 

relative to the airflow. With its nose and wing pitched up, the 

aircraft is said to have increased its angle of attack. The reverse is 

true when diving.



STALLING THE AIRCRAFT



It is a common misconception among the non-flying public that 

"stalling"

an aircraft means trouble with the engines. If this were true. gliders 

(which

have no engines) would be in a permanent stall. That simply isn't the 

case.



G-FORCES WHEN BANKING



LEVEL FLIGHT 1G

Stalling an aircraft refers to a condition which occurs when a wing 

fails to produce the amount of lift needed to maintain flight.  In 

other words, a stall is the lack of an adequate airflow passing under 

the wings to overcome the force of gravity.

It is important to note that speed, pitch attitude, and bank 

inclination are all factors in determining whether a plane is about to 

stall. An aircraft in level flight may stall if it attempts too sharp 

a turn without increasing its speed. This is due to insufficient lift 

being generated by the wing in direct opposition to gravity's effect 

on the aircraft.

The effects of a stall are different depending on the aircraft. Some 

aircraft simply assume a mild nose-down attitude until returning to 

level flight. Other aircraft may enter a sudden and potentially 

dangerous spin. On low level missions a pilot may not have time to 

recover before striking the ground. This is especially true if one 

wing stalls before the other.



1 1 5

11. AIR TO AIR COMBAT (DOGFIGHTING)



During the normal course of a mission, an F-15E should not be used as 

an interceptor. That type of mission should be left to the Eagle-

Charlies. That's what they are there for. However, there may come a 

time that you are engaged in air combat at a time and place not of 

your choosing.

If your aircraft is engaged while returning from a mission the enemy 

will quickly discover that without ordnance the F-15E retains all of 

its exceptional dogfighting ability. But if you are "bounced" while 

in-bound to the target area, a fully loaded F-15 will be fighting at a 

disadvantage.

The worst time to become engaged is always on the approach to a 

target. Your back-seater will have his head "inside the cockpit", 

preoccupied with delivering ordnance. While it is not impossible to 

dogfight while loaded with ordnance, it is exceedingly difficult. 

Certain maneuvers are out of your flight envelope.

In most instances, an aircraft will jettison ordnance if attacked. 

This automatically aborts the mission since you may as well return to 

base. If however, you decide to retain your ordnance, you must assume 

an offensive posture early in the fight.

The following section is offered as a brief familiarization with air 

combat. It includes how to perform maneuvers that have been common to 

dogfighting since 1915. Performed correctly they will help you in 

gaining the advantage over attacking aircraft or aid you in escaping 

from unfavor

able situations.



HOW TO FIGHT



Assuming you have read the preceding chapter on how to fly an F-15E, 

you are now ready to take on the opposition. Its a cruel world out 

there and there are no points for second place.  This section is 

dedicated to giving you some tactical experience before you go head-

to-head with your first MiG-29.

Aerial combat tests all your flying skills during periods of extreme 

stress. Engaging an enemy aircraft requires split-second timing. 

Reactions in combat must be instinctive since there is little time for 

decision making travelling at Mach 1.



The first thing every pilot should learn in order to become a top-

notch fighter-jock, is Energy Management. The principle behind energy 

management is being able to fly the aircraft while maximizing the 

benefits derived from the four forces discussed earlier. Used 

properly, the "Big Four" can give you distinct advantages in combat. 

Ignoring them only leads to trouble.

Think of your F-15's flight envelope as being egg shaped. In the 

horizontal plane, it will fly a perfect circle if constant g-force and 

speed are maintained. In the vertical plane, however, the circle will 

be distorted by gravity. At the top of the circle, the fighter will be 

traveling slow and turning tightly. Near the bottom the aircraft will 

have picked up speed during its descent and have a much longer and 

flatter arc.

To begin with, a pilot that is caught flying low and slow is a poor 

manager. Granted, sometimes a pilot is forced into this predicament by 

circumstances beyond his control. A pilot found in such a situation 

has few options if "bounced" by enemy fighters. He cannot accelerate 

fast enough to escape nor can he trade altitude for speed. Low and 

slow is a deadly combination. Remember, speed equals life.

An aircraft does not carry enough fuel to allow a pilot to fly in full 

afterburner throughout an entire mission. Afterburners are fine at 

high altitudes where the air is less dense and offers less resistance 

(Drag). But the heavier air at low altitudes causes an afterburner to 

use too much fuel for practical use.

Remember also, that the IR signature of an aircraft's jet-engine is 

like a beacon to heat-seeking missiles. The more throttle you apply, 

the better I R target you become. So, pilots must learn to make the 

most of the speed that is available to them.

The primary means of gathering speed without boosting the throttles is 

to point the nose of the aircraft down. Even shallow dives of short 

duration enable an aircraft to build-up considerable momentum. 

Converting this momentum into speed is a tactic which can only be used 

for so long. Sooner or later the aircraft must either pull out of the 

dive or strike the ground.

One sure way to lose all the energy you've built up in the dive is to 

pull up too abruptly. To transition from a dive. gently pull back on 

the stick until your wings are horizontal to the ground. Your energy 

and airspeed will then bleed off gradually. This way you are making 

the most of your dive momentum. Diving is like energy stored in a 

battery. A battery releases its energy gradually and only as needed. 

It continues to provide energy until it runs out of juice.

Another way of losing speed unnecessarily is by making high-g turns 

when less sharp turns would work equally well. Even aircraft as 

aerodynamically maneuverable as the F-15 have trouble sustaining high-

g turns for long. Try it once and watch how rapidly your speed drops 

off. Once you load-up your wings in a sustained turn, all your lift is 

being directed horizontal. The aircraft runs the risk of stalling 

since nothing is being used to oppose gravitational forces.

Of course, the most obvious way to lose energy and air speed is by 

climbing. Increasing your altitude is like putting money in the bank 

for future use. The more altitude an aircraft possesses, the more 

potential energy will be available once in combat. The problem is that 

the higher you go, the more visible you become. As the pilot, you must 

be judge whether flying at a higher altitude is worth the added risk.



1 1 7



Energy management is a necessary part of everyday flying but is 

absolutely essential once in combat. Not only do you need to remain 

aware of your own aircraft's energy status, it is always a good idea 

to pay attention to what the other guy is doing with his aircraft. 

Watching the other guy is part of another major element involved in 

air combat. Situational Awareness.

Situational Awareness (or SA, in fighter-speak) is the concept of 

taking in the whole picture. New pilots become so focused on their own 

aircraft that they lose track of what is going on around them. In a 

effort to shoot down an opponent, a pilot may forget to look out for 

the enemy's wingman until it is too late. Bearing in for the easy 

kill, the novice often finds another "bandit" tucked neatly in his i 

six "

Two-seat aircraft, like the F-15, have the advantage of a second pair 

of eyes when it comes to SA. The "GIB" (Guy In Back) is usually 

detailed to take some of the work load off the pilot. In return for 

the free ride, the Wizzo must be able to spot enemy aircraft the pilot 

may have missed.

Although air combat is a three dimensional affair, inexperienced 

pilots tend to fight in only two. Pilots must learn to fight in the 

vertical as well as horizontal plane. As part of a pilot's situational 

awareness, he must be able to judge the distance relationships between 

his aircraft and the enemy's. Adding a third dimension to combat 

sometimes distorts this spatial perception.

Despite some truly remarkable advances in technology, the basics of 

air combat have not changed since the Wright brothers. Missiles and 

jet engines have quickened the pace of combat considerably but a 

dogfight is still a dogfight. The human element has remained the one 

constant in an ever changing world and air combat continues to be a 

man against man proposition. The better man almost always wins, even 

when flying an inferior aircraft.

In fact, modern gadgetry often hinders rather than assists a pilot in 

completing his mission. The noise generated by all these systems is 

deafening and a distraction. Imagine having to concentrate on SAM 

warnings, missile-ready growls and your back-seater talking all at the 

same time. Add to that vector commands and real time intelligence 

coming over your headset from an AWACS. The pilot rapidly experiences 

an information overload and no longer hears anything being said.

Many pilots in the Vietnam era went through a personal check list 

whereby they began turning off various systems as soon as they left 

the ground. The advanced systems in contemporary fighters are nice to 

have but in the final analysis only a pilot's skill and instinct will 

bring him home.

The most important quality for fighter pilots to possess is the 

selfconfidance of being number one. Fighter pilots by nature are 

aggressive "go-getters" not afraid to use their God-given initiative. 

One thing they are not, however is reckless or foolhardy. Even though 

fighter-pilots tend to push themselves to the limit, they are also 

professionals trained to instinctively calculate the risks they take.



"Only the spirit of attack born ill a brave heart, will overcome the 

odds.

--Adolf Galland, WlI Luftwaffe Ace



_ THE FIVE PHASES OF AIR COMBAT _



Despite how aerial combat looks in the movies there are five distinct 

phases of every engagement. Only after the aircraft become locked in a 

"furball" does the battle take on these familiar "Hollywood" 

characteristics. Dogfighting is just one phase of aerial combat. The 

losing pilot has usually already been defeated before it reaches this 

phase. He just doesn't know it yet.



1. DETECTION



You can't shoot what you don't see. Detection is perhaps the most 

critical of all the preliminary phases of combat. The fast paced 

nature of modern combat allows little time for decision making. 

Therefore, getting even a few seconds jump on your opponent can mean a 

great deal. Early detection of an enemy allows you to begin your 

maneuvering, and possibly catch him unaware. Even if you are detected, 

you have already gained the initiative.

Modern aircraft possess powerful radars which can detect aircraft at 

ranges exceeding 100 miles. Still, even at cruising speed, an enemy 

aircraft could cover that ground in a very short time. Early detection 

adds to your situational awareness and gives you the ability to keep 

the enemy at arm's length.



1 1 8



Once you have detected an enemy, either visually or on radar, keep him 

in sight. There's old fighter-pilot saying that goes, "Lose sight- 

lose fight " If you lose sight of the enemy, you must start the 

detection process all over again. It may be too late. The enemy will 

have already started his pre-engagement maneuvering by the time you 

spot him again.

The simple fact of air combat from World War I to the present day, is 

that most pilots are shot down before they ever detect the enemy. 

Surprise is a key element of every engagement and usually deters the 

outcome of the battle. Stay alert.

In fighter slang, being "padlocked" means that you have visually 

spotted an enemy and are afraid to take your eyes off him. Aircraft 

are so small and travel so fast that if you look away for a moment, 

you might not spot him again.

To deal with this problem, aircraft controls and displays have been 

configured to limit the number of times a pilot must avert his eyes 

from a target. The Head-Up Display (HUD) superimposes visual flight 

cues directly in line with the pilot's field of vision. This keeps him 

from having to continually refocus his attention inside the cockpit to 

check his status.

In addition to the HUD, the "stick" has been redesigned to give the 

pilot fingertip control over the aircraft. The "Hands-On Throttle and 

Stick" or HOTAS design allows the pilot to perform common flight 

functions without having to take his hands off his principal means of 

controlling the aircraft.



2. CLOSURE



The second phase of air combat is known as Closure. During this phase, 

you are faced with a number of very basic decisions. After making a 

detection, you must first determine if the contact is hostile and 

then,

whether it constitutes a threat to your mission.

This phase usually opens with one or both sides launching radarguided 

missiles at targets detected at long range. The longer distances make 

radar-guided missiles more effective since it is easier to keep a 

target within the radar envelope. Depending on the effectiveness of 

the electronic counter-measures, radar-guided missiles will continue 

to track targets they are "locked onto " Survivors of this initial 

exchange proceed to the closure phase of battle.

Once you decide to engage the contact, you are committed. The 

objective in this phase of combat is to bridge the distance between 

yourself and your intended target. You must quickly figure out how to 

approach the target so as to arrive in a superior firing position. The 

most advantageous firing position is directly behind your target, 

known as being in his "six o'clock."

From this position the enemy pilot will have a difficult time shaking 

you off his tail. Not only can you follow him through his maneuvers 

but he will be unable to bring his weapons to bear on your aircraft. 

You must pay careful attention to your relative speeds. If you make a 

mistake and overshoot, the roles will be reversed. The enemy will now 

be in your "six' and fixing to give you problems.

If the detection is made by radar you probably have already tipped 

your hand. The opposing pilot's RWR is likely to be activated by your 

radar sweep. However, just because the enemy is alert to your presence 

does not mean that he knows your exact bearing. If closure is 

performed properly, you may be able to arrive at a firing solution 

before he can locate you. To some extent, your maneuvering during 

closure will depend on what type of ordnance you are carrying.

Closure does not mean to imply being "close" to the enemy. Sometimes 

the closure phase ends when the aircraft are still many tens of miles 

apart. The missile age has pushed back the engagement envelope to 

beyond visual detection ranges. In a modern context, the closure phase 

ends when you are able to bring a weapon system to bear. Remember, 

that the enemy pilot will also be maneuvering to achieve the same 

thing and speed is essential to cut down on his reaction time.

As you and the enemy close, your aircraft will either have the 

advantage, be disadvantaged, or be neutral in relation to the opposing 

aircraft. Which of the three positions you find yourself in determines 

your action in the next phase of combat.



"A MiG at 'six' is better than no Mig at all."



3. ATTACK

The Attack portion of air combat is considered by many pilots to be 

merely the execution segment of the previous phase.



1 19



At the conclusion of the Closure phase, it should be easy to obtain a 

"kill" if you have reached an advantaged position. All that is left to 

do is select the proper ordnance, push the button, and avoid the 

debris.

Things are slightly different if you are in a disadvantaged position. 

It is imperative that you evade your opponent at the earliest 

opportunity and regain the superior position. As a minimum you should 

attempt to spoil your opponent's firing solution by performing one or 

more maneuvers discussed in the following segment.

If neither you or your opponent has achieved a superior position, the 

battle is momentarily a draw (neutral).  Under these circumstances, 

the first pilot to make a mistake, loses the battle. There are few 

second chances in air combat, so don't be the one to make the first 

mistake.



4. MANEUVER



If a mistake is to be made, it is usually made here. The first pilot 

to pick a wrong maneuver or perform one incorrectly has given his 

opponent an edge. This phase of air combat is characterized by the 

twisting and turning battle often depicted in the movies. It is where 

pilots go head to head, performing Basic Fighter Maneuvers (BFM) in a 

effort to get a clear missile or gun shot.

This section is devoted to familiarizing the new pilot with Basic 

Fighter Maneuvers. In order to survive in combat, you must learn how 

to perform them correctly and be able to recognize them when an 

opponent tries them on you.

Your objective in this phase of combat is to position your aircraft in 

the opponent's "six o'clock" position. Once in his "six", your 

objective becomes staying in there until you have shot him down. 

Easier said, then done. Your opponent is trying his best to shake you 

off his tail and

disengage. Given the opportunity, you can bet he'd love to get in a 

quick burst of gunfire of his own.

The g-forces involved in conducting BFM at a high rate of speed is a 

task multiplier. Flying at a constant rate of speed in level flight a 

pilot experiences only the normal effects of gravity or 1 9 But as a 

pilot enters a hard turn, he begins to be forced down into his seat as 

the effects of gravity become more pronounced. Simple things become 

difficult as your body assumes many times its own weight. Even moving 

his hands around the stick becomes tiring.

If a pilot continues to pull back on the stick, his turn becomes 

sharper but g-forces increase proportionately. The blood in his body 

starts pooling in his feet under the additional gravity. Unless he 

unloads the stick, the pilot may experience a g-induced blackout.

Bear this in mind as you blissfully perform all these wonderful 

maneuvers. Keep an eye on the HUD and make note of the g-forces you 

are imposing on yourself and the aircraft. While your F-15 can take 

nineg's no sweat, to a human body it is quite a painful experience.



BREAK TURN

A Break turn is merely an abrupt change of direction made in response 

to an opponent's attack. It is usually made toward the enemy aircraft 

in an effort to spoil his aim or firing solution.

A Break is made at the maximum turn rate with wings inclined at 90 

degrees. It is a high-g maneuver which if sustained leads to a rapid 

loss of airspeed. This may cause your opponent to overshoot, so be 

prepared to take advantage of his mistake.

Even if your opponent is able to stay on your tail, his "angle-off'' 

perspective makes you a difficult target. If nothing else, a Break 

turn gives you time to recover from your initial surprise and start 

your own maneuvering. You cannot win air combat by remaining on the 

defensive. Use the Break turn to begin your offensive strategy.



EARLY TURN

If the closure battle for position has resulted in a stalemate, your 

opponent may decide to barrel straight in to bring on an engagement. 

The early turn maneuver is used to counter this head to head 

confrontation. As depicted in the diagram. it is a transitional 

maneuver used to get behind your opponent from a head-on aspect.

The trick to performing the early turn is to anticipate your 

opponent's future position in relation to your own. Inexperienced 

opponents usually fail to react to this maneuver in a timely fashion. 

They are soon caught in a turning battle they can't win.



1 20



BREAK TURN



LAG ROLL

Another maneuver designed to cause an opponent to overshoot is the Lag 

Roll. The object of the maneuver is to quickly reduce your speed by 

increasing your aircraft's Drag.

Simply push the stick all the way over, left or right. Hold the stick 

in the direction of the roll while being careful to maintain the 

proper heading. If performed correctly, your opponent will be forced 

out in front of you. In this position, he's just dead meat. Add him to 

your collection.



SCISSORS

A Scissors maneuver is actually a series of turn and counter-turns in 

which the opposing aircraft are each attempting to get behind the 

other. This naturally causes both pilots to fly as slow as they dare 

in order to tighten their turns. Whichever pilot forces the other to 

take the lead in this type of battle comes out the winner Speed brakes 

and flaps help to slow you down but caution must be used to prevent an 

accidental stall.

If both pilots are equally experienced, the scissors maneuver usually 

ends in a draw. As airspeed continues to drop, the hard turning 

involved may easily lead to a stall situation. Before that happens, 

disengage from the scissors and reposition yourself.



Disengaging from a scissors battle takes careful timing. Wait until 

you are pointing away from your opponent in an outward turn, roll 

inverted and dive away to increase the separation distance. Your 

opponent's airspeed will be low as well, giving you time to escape.

SPLIT-5 TURN





               SPLIT S  An Immelmann is best performed when begun 

from level flight or a

The Split-S is a reversal maneuver combining a half-roll and dive to

    slight nose-down attitude. Simply pull back on the stick, 

applying pressure

increase speed. It is a quick way of changing your direction 180 

degrees until you reach the vertical plane. As your air speed 

continues to drop off,

and is usually begun from level flight or slight climb. you must 

judge for yourself when to complete the maneuver before stalling.

  To perform a Split-S, simply roll inverted. Once inverted, pull 

sharply The Immelmann is completed by pulling through the maneuver 

back

back on the stick to enter a dive. This maneuver causes you to lose 

consider-   into level but inverted flight. Once in level flight, a 

simple half-roll returns

able altitude so make sure you have room before attempting a Split-S

    you to a normal flight profile.

  As you enter the dive, punch the throttle and go to afterburner if 

your

airspeed is under 350 knots. You are now travelling 180 degrees from 

your    LOOP

original heading with a reservoir of stored energy. Use this energy to

    By now you undoubtedly have noticed that a Loop is nothing more 

than

disengage or reposition yourself for a missile shot combining a 

Split-S with an Immelmann, or vice versa. Loops are per-

    formed to avoid an enemy in your six o'clock while trying to aim 

your guns



           IMMELMANN TURN   at his tail at the same time.

The Immelmann turn is named after its inventor, Max Immelmann, a

    Either half of the maneuver can be performed first depending on 

the

German World War I ace. It is the exact inverse of the Split-S. 

Whereas the circumstances. If you are traveling fast and wish to 

slow down, pull into an

Split-Sis performed as a dive maneuver, the Immelmann; as climbing 

half-   Immelmann. Continue to apply constant back pressure while 

reducing

loop used to get on the tail of an enemy coming head-on.    your 

throttle Once the nose comes over the top, your speed increases as

  Speed is the critical factor in performing an Immelmann turn. Before

    you come down the back side of the Split-S. Add or subtract power 

as needed.

attempting an Immelmann, check your air speed to insure that your 

aircraft    Start your Loop with a Split-S if you do not have enough 

energy to

has the energy to complete the maneuver without stalling    perform an 

Immelmann immediately. Depending on how much altitude



1 22

you wish to lose, keep your throttle open . This provides you with 

additional energy for when you pull into your climb. Note that you end 

up flying inverted along your original heading.



STRAIGHT PURSUIT YO YO

A Straight Pursuit Yo-Yo is used when pursuing an enemy trying 

desperately to disengage from combat. For example, an opponent has 

caught you off-guard with a sudden Split-S and is rapidly leaving the 

battle area. You turn to pursue and find him well below and far in 

front.

To close the distance, you dive down until you reach the opponent's 

altitude. If you are still unable to close within weapon's range the 

Yo-Yo maneuver is used to trade altitude for air speed. Simply enter a 

shallow dive, until you gradually begin to overtake him. When in 

range, pull the aircraft's nose up to engage. This maneuver is 

repeated as often as is necessary.



5. DISENGAGEMENT



Disengagement is a critical part of air combat. The best way to 

disengage from combat is to shoot down your opponent. If this seems 

unlikely, maybe it's time to start thinking how you are going to get 

away.



Given the reach of modern air-to-air missiles, getting out of combat 

is much more difficult than getting in. You must figure out a method 

of putting some distance between you and the enemy before he realizes 

what you are up to. It requires careful timing to avoid being shot 

down while trying to get away.

If your opponent is not equipped to carry missiles (or has run out), 

the job of disengaging is much easier. All you need do is maintain a 

lateral separation which exceeds the range of his guns. If he gets in 

your "six" and wants to follow you home, fine.

A missile equipped opponent has a much longer reach. Even if your 

disengagement is successful, chances are your opponent will get at 

least a parting missile shot. There's no way to prevent this launch 

although ECM and skillful maneuvering may keep it from hitting you.

If you have managed your fuel properly you can afford to use a little 

afterburner for extra speed. Hopefully your opponent has been less 

careful with his fuel and must weigh his chances of getting home 

should he prolong his pursuit.



CANNON/GUN COMBAT



At the beginning of the Vietnam era, certain USAF fighters went to war 

without a cannon or gun. Believing that the missile age heralded a new 

era in air combat, theorists considered a gun unnecessary. To destroy 

an opponent, a pilot needed only to detect a target on his radar, 

select one of a number of missile options and push a button.

Theorists were quick to point out that guns were useless except at 

very close range and that the speed of modern aircraft made close 

engagements unlikely. Furthermore, enemy aircraft were to be kept at 

missile range and destroyed beyond visual range (BVR). Pilots were 

told not to expect the type of twisting and turning "fur-ball" 

engagements which were a common occurrence during Korea. The Vietnam 

War proved the theorists wrong.

The use of gunfire in air combat has not changed since World War 1 It 

is still a matter of maneuvering in close to your enemy and then 

pumping lead into his aircraft until it goes down. The trick is to 

obtain a good firing position from where the enemy can not return your 

fire. This generally means that most strafing attacks occur when one 

aircraft gets in the six o'clock arc of another.

Firing from an position not directly in line with the target's flight 

path is known as an "angle-off" or deflection shot. Firing from an 

angle-off position gives you less time to line up the shot and 

requires you to lead the target. The best firing method for a 

deflection shot is to put up a wall of lead and let the enemy fly 

into.

In 1969, the original F-15 contract called for the development of a 

pure air superiority fighter. There was never any intention of 

building a secondary capability into the design. The McDonnell-Douglas 

engineers went by the motto, " not a pound for air to ground." In 

other words, no feature of the aircraft was to be used for anything 

other than dogfighting.

But the F-15 proved to be such a versatile machine that continuing to 

neglect its air to ground potential was deemed a waste of a good 

design. Over 30% of the aircraft was completely re-engineered to 

accommodate air-to-ground missions. With the addition of sophisticated 

targeting equipment and dedicated back-seater, a dual role capability 

was built into the basic fighter design.



MISSILE COMBAT



There are two types of air-to-air missiles carried by modern aircraft, 

radar-

guided and heat-seeking missiles. It is important to remember that 

each

type of missile has its own unique set of advantages as well as 

limitations.



RADAR GUIDED MISSILES



Radar-guided missiles come in three basic categories: beam riders, 

semiactive radar-homers, and active homers. The first two categories 

require the firing aircraft to maintain a radar "lock" on the target 

aircraft. This means the firing aircraft is essentially stuck with 

having to track the target aircraft while the missile is in flight.

Beam-riding missiles are surface to air missiles launched from either 

fixed sites or mobile launchers. The missile follows the path of a 

laser beam directed from the launching site at the target aircraft.  

The beam must be held on the target throughout the missile's flight to 

insure a hit.

Semi-active radar missiles require the target to be continually 

illuminated by the firing aircraft's radar. The missile then guides 

itself by using the reflected radar energy it detects coming off the 

target.



Active homing missiles transmit and receive their own radar signals 

allowing them to track a target without help from the firing aircraft. 

These are the most deadly. To the firing aircraft, active-homers are 

"fire and forget". After they are launched the firing aircraft is free 

to continue maneuvering.



INFRARED MISSILES (HEAT SEEKERS)



Infrared missiles use heat as the source of their guidance rather than 

radar signals. These missiles also are "fire and forget" but generally 

have shorter ranges than their radar-guided cousins. Heat-seeking 

missiles operate by homing in on the greatest source of heat within 

their seeker's cone of detection.

These missiles must be used with care during a general engagement 

because they are just as likely to home in on friendly aircraft as 

enemy.  The early models were often fooled by active counter-measures 

such as flares. Some missiles could even be decoyed by the Sun or 

glare off the tops of clouds.

To obtain the greatest assurance of a hit, heat-seekers must be aimed 

at the hot exhaust area of a target. On later models, the I R 

sensitivity has been increased to allow the missile to track a target 

from any aspect. These missiles are less easily fooled by ECM.



DEALING WITH MISSILE ATTACKS

The primary way of dealing with missile attacks is to avoid them. Your 

preflight briefing covers the location of known or suspected SAM 

locations. If you have paid close attention you can plan your route of 

ingress around them.

Sometimes the target is so heavily defended (like Baghdad), it is 

impossible to plan a flight without encountering a few SAM sites. Make 

careful note of the locations and types of SAMs you are unable to by-

pass.

An audio signal is usually your first warning that a missile has been 

fired. Once you receive this cue, it's time to start carrying out your 

plan of action. You have two choices, evasive maneuvering or the use 

of ECM.



EVASIVE MANEUVERING

When it comes to flying, the same rules apply as when driving the 

family car. You must fly defensively, watch out for the other guy, and 

expect the unexpected. Defensive flying is what Situation Awareness is 

all about. If you are not aware of what is going on, you can hardly be 

expected to react to it.



Despite being totally aware of your surroundings and best defensive 

flying efforts, the enemy will eventually get a shot off. Once the 

warning lights start going off in your cockpit. it is too late to 

devise a strategy. You must fly with a plan already in mind.

The Basic Fighter Maneuvers (BFM) described for use in dog fighting 

can also be used to defeat enemy missiles. The job is somewhat more 

difficult because a missile is faster and can perform without regard 

for a human pilot. But at the same time. missiles only have to be 

fooled once before going ballistic.



TURNING INSIDE A MISSILE:

When a missile is closing in on your F-15, keep your head and don't 

panic. Because the missile's turning arc is wider than your 

aircraft's, you still have a chance to outmaneuver it.

If a missile is approaching from the rear you can perform a high-g 

turn hoping to get inside its turning radius. It is best to wait until 

the last moment before starting your Break. If you try this turn too 

early. the missile may still turn into you.



TURNING TOWARD A MISSILE



The F-15 is evading a missile using its maneuver power alone. As the 

Eagle turns, the missile tries to follow, but cannot turn fast enough. 

The missile "falls behind" and passes harmlessly to the rear.



TURNING TOWARD A MISSILE:

If a missile is approaching from more of a side angle, turning toward 

it may also get inside its turn radius. As depicted in the diagram, 

your turn must keep the missile's flight path at a right angles to 

your own. Gradually, the missile will fall into a lag pursuit profile 

and pass well behind you.



EVADING HEAD-ON MISSILES:

Evading a missile which is approaching from a Head-on position is a 

two step procedure. First, when the missile reaches a point between 8 

and 12 kilometers away, perform a 90 degree Break turn. The missile's 

flight path is now perpendicular to your heading. Step two is simply 

following the procedure under turning toward a missile.

111. ELECTRONIC COUNTER-MEASURES



Electronic Counter-Measures come in two basic types, those designed to 

fool radar-guided missiles and those used against heat-seekers. It is 

important to identify the type of missile tracking your aircraft in 

order to deploy the appropriate counter-measure.



CHAFF



Chaff is stored within the aircraft in (CMDs) Counter-Measure 

Dispensers located directly underneath the main engine intakes. It is 

used to defend your aircraft against radar-guided missiles by 

releasing a cloud of metal strips cut to a particular wave-length. The 

strips serve to confuse the enemy radar by cluttering the image with 

many false returns.

The classic technique for deploying chaff is to release a bundle as 

soon as your RWR alarms. With luck, the chaff has a chance of breaking 

the contact. If the missile continues to guide, wait to deploy 

additional chaff until the missile is within three to five kilometers. 

Since your supply of chaff is limited you must use it judiciously.

Once the missile "locks-on" to the chaff, it will fly into the cloud 

and explode on contact. The trick is to deploy the chaff at just the 

right moment. If deployed too early the missile will not be fooled. If 

deployed too late, it won't do any good.



FLARES



For defense against IR homing (heat-seeking) missiles, the F-15 is 

equipped with a number of heat producing devices, commonly known as 

Flares. Flares are used to decoy heat-seeking missiles away from your 

aircraft. Like chaff, your aircraft carries only a finite supply of 

these Flares.

A Flare burns for only a short time (5-10 seconds). During this time, 

the IR missile hopefully is lured away from your aircraft. Once the 

Flare burns out, however, the missile is free to re acquire a new 

target. The new target may again be your aircraft if you have not 

maneuvered out of its view.

It is never a good idea to trust ECM entirely. It is always better to 

have an evasive maneuver ready in case it fails. It is far more 

reliable (and cheaper) to physically evade a missile, rather than try 

to confuse it with ECM.



TEWS



The F-15 features a specially designed ECM system known as the 

Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS). It consists of two main 

components; the AN/ALR-56 RWR and the AN/ALQ-135(V) radar jammer. 

These systems, described in greater detail in Chapter 1, detect the 

presence of both ground-based and aerial radars. The primary job of 

the TEWS is to provide you with prompt radar warnings, giving you 

ample time to deal with the threat.

The TEWS is a completely hands-off internal system. The AN/ALR56 RWR 

detects the radar and gives audio signals when an enemy is attempting 

to gain a radar "lock" on your aircraft. The AN/ALQ-1 35(V) is an 

internal jammer which functions automatically to defeat the hostile 

radar's acquisition. The pilot, who must first activate the jammer, is 

then free to maneuver or deploy chaff to further confuse his 

aircraft's radar signature.

IV GROUND A ATTACK MISSIONS



PREFLIGHT BRIEFING

The most important part of any mission takes place before the pilots 

ever leave the ground. The preflight briefing is the last chance for 

all the members of a particular package to get together and discuss 

tactics, coordination, etc. Mission details are laid out at this time 

to sort out any lingering confusion.

Smart pilots use this time wisely. They know it's always better to be 

on the ground wishing they were in the air, than already in the air 

wishing they were on the ground. Once in the air, its too late to 

start sorting out details.



THE FLIGHT PROFILE



One of the first things to get settled during the briefing is the 

flight profile. In other words. pilots need to figure out how they 

intend to fly from their base, attack the target, and then return 

home. A number of factors go into this decision such as weather, range 

to target, enemy disposition and equipment, etc. Flight profiles are 

usually broken down into three mission segments, ingress, target, 

egress. Altitudes are assigned to each of these segments accordingly.

A Flight profile might read Hi-Lo-Hi. In this instance, strike 

aircraft are proceeding to the target up high to conserve fuel. Upon 

reaching their Ingress Point (IP), the package drops down low for 

their target run. After striking the target, they climb to a preset 

high altitude for the return trip home.

Based on the flight profile, certain assumptions can be made regarding 

the mission. Because the ingress is being conducted at high altitude 

the package is apparently not concerned about being spotted. Air 

superiority has either been achieved or the SAM threat is negligible. 

The target is probably heavily defended by triple-A so the attacking 

aircraft drop down to use the terrain for cover. On the way out, the 

formation again takes advantage of high altitude fuel conservation so 

it is likely that the target is some distance away.



If the flight profile had been Lo-Lo-Lo, the target is likely to be 

close by and heavily defended by both point and area air defense 

weapons. LoLo-Lo missions require the package to fly low to the ground 

to avoid detection or enemy air patrols. While a low flight profile 

protects against SAMs, it exposes the aircraft to all kinds of triple-

A ground fire. These are the tough missions. The combination of high 

speed and low altitude leaves no margin for error



SURVEYING THE TARGET

The target should be thoroughly researched and surveyed prior to the 

mission. Photo-intelligence from satellites or even RF-4 Phantoms 

should be disseminated at this time so that the pilots have an 

accurate picture of the target.

Once in flight, the next opportunity the attacking aircraft have to 

survey the target is by LANTIRN.  The systems displays provide the 

Wizzo with photo-quality, high-resolution images. Even if flying a Lo 

profile, the FLIR's "squint" angle is such that ground features are 

distinguishable even from a distance.

A last minute survey is necessary to insure that the attacking 

aircraft are properly aligned with the target. The target run should 

be performed at high speed to minimize exposure to hostile fire. 

Locating the target(s) early gives the Wizzo extra time to select and 

deploy his weapons.



ORDNANCE OPTIONS



The target run and weapons release is dictated to some extent by the 

type of ordnance carried "Fire and Forget" weapons, like the AGM-65 

Maverick missile, allow the aircraft to stand-off at a safe distance 

from the target. Other "smart" weapons require guidance from the 

aircraft's LANTIRN system and a direct line of sight to the target.

The most difficult type of ordnance to release are still the unguided 

iron bombs or "dumb bombs." These weapons have changed little since 

World War ll. They still require that the attacking aircraft overfly 

the target

area. Modern aircraft, however, are not locked in to the straight and 

level bomb runs of the past. A good pilot develops special techniques 

using both terrain and maneuver to get in close and drop his unguided 

munitions.



TARGET APPROACH OPTIONS

DIVE BOMBING



The easiest target approach is the time-honored Dive Bombing 

technique. Dive bombing requires the target run to begin at medium 

altitude between 6-12,000 feet. Because the aircraft has built up 

excess speed during the ingress, speed brakes must be applied before 

transitioning into the dive.

Once the aircraft is properly aligned on the target, nose over into a 

30 degree down angle . I n the few seconds you have while in the dive, 

make any final targeting corrections and release the ordnance. The 

release should be performed at around 3,000 feet.

You must allow yourself time to escape the blast effects of your 

ordnance. Immediately retract your speed brake, open the throttle and 

exit the area. Pilots which damage their aircraft with their own bombs 

should perhaps consider a new career. If they make it back to base, 

they have some explaining to do at the very least.



POP UP BOMBING



Another method of unguided delivery is the Pop-Up. This technique is 

more difficult than the simple dive bomb method but exposes the 

attacking aircraft to less triple-A. It takes careful timing and good 

spatial perception (Situational Awareness). If you are not used to 

working in three dimensions, stick to dive bombing and take your 

chances with enemy ground fire. Pop-Up bombing is very unforgiving if 

you make a mistake.

The idea behind Pop-Up bombing is to approach the target at a very low 

altitude. At the last minute the aircraft is pulled into an inverted 

climb to identify and pin point the target. Once the target is 

identified, the aircraft noses over into a dive, half rolls, then 

delivers ordnance normally. The egress is usually performed at low 

altitude.



The biggest danger in performing a Pop-Up maneuver is misjudging 

altitude and being unable to pull up in time. The margin for error is 

very narrow. Rather than pressing your luck, it is better to go 

around. By now they know you're coming. So change your approach 

heading and strike from an unexpected direction.

This attack option, if performed correctly the first time, gives the 

enemy no time to react. You are exiting the area unscathed just as the 

first bombs begin going off. It takes practice to perfect the Pop-Up 

but it is well worth the effort.



LEVEL BOMBING



Level bombing is perhaps the most dangerous of all your available 

options. You are trading predictability for heightened bombing 

accuracy. However, deploying stand-off weapons such as the Maverick 

missile or various glide bombs, lets you keep a safe distance away 

from the target's fixed air defenses.

In actual practice, level bombing has changed very little since World 

War ll. Although massed bomber formations are a thing of the past, 

level bombing still involves a steady run-up to the target. Approach 

speeds have greatly increased but advances in radar-controlled triple-

A technology have made this method of bombing extremely risky. It is 

seldom used if other means of delivery are available.

The target approach should be conducted as low as the surrounding 

terrain permits, preferably 300 feet or less. Because the mapping 

radar is unable to generate HRMs at such a low altitude, pilots are 

required to expose their aircraft to enemy radar coverage while 

designating targets. The course should be off-set at least 25 degrees 

from the target's bearing while producing targeting maps. This cuts 

down on the delay time in processing the map image.

Once the target is designated, turn to the proper target bearing and 

assume your delivery altitude. Engage your afterburner to minimize 

your exposure time over the target defenses. With ranged "smart" 

weapons,

you may launch the ordnance from a safe stand-off distance. Iron bombs 

(unguided) require that you overfly the target. If this is the case, 

deliver your ordnance fast and "get out of Dodge."

EGRESS



The last important consideration is the egress, or exit from the 

target area. To a great extent, your exit is predetermined by the 

enemy disposition. If the target is heavily defended, remaining low 

may be your only safe option. But against less well defended targets, 

you may decide to regain cruising altitude soon after leaving the 

area.



This is usually a good time to hit your afterburner if your fuel 

status allows it. You should be concentrating on putting as much 

distance between you and the target area as possible. Even though the 

ordnance has been released, the mission is far from over.

Begin checking the general condition of your aircraft for possible 

damage from ground fire. Be sure to scan your instrumentation for 

abnormal readings and prepare for the long ride home.

1. IRAQ: DESERT STORM



"In just 100 hours, they went from the fourth largest army in the 

world to the second largest army in Iraq."

--Lt. General Thomas W. Kelly



THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR



Throughout the 1980s, Iraq fought a bloody, stagnant war of attrition 

with the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the war was characterized by 

heavy ground fighting, air power was used infrequently and never to 

any great effect. With the exception of a number of air strikes 

against economic targets (oil facilities and tanker traffic in the 

Gulf), sorties were relatively few and far between.

The Iranian Air Force consisted primarily of U.S. aircraft that had 

been purchased by the Shah before his overthrow. Despite possessing 

some of the most capable and advanced aircraft in the world, the 

Iranian air force spent the majority of the war grounded for lack of 

spare parts.  Iran had started the war with hundreds of modern U.S. 

fighter-bombers including F-14s Tomcats and F-4 Phantoms. The 

inventory quickly dwindled as aircraft were cannibalized for spares. 

By the end of the war, Iran was lucky to have 80 aircraft combat ready 

at any one time.



IRAQI STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE



Iraq had eight years to construct a national air defense capable of 

dealing with the Iranian threat. A centralized system was developed 

which reflected the doctrinal preference of Iraq's chief military 

benefactor, the Soviet Union. While the system worked reasonably well 

against Iran (which wasn't doing that much flying), it was hardly 

suited to conditions that might be imposed by a more determined 

opponent.

The Iraqi air defense scheme sectioned the country into four zones, 

each responsible for its own airspace. While these zones were 

independent of each other, all four were tied to a central air defense 

ministry located in downtown Baghdad. Intermediate radar control 

centers in the chain were located in major cities such as Kirkuk, 

Nasiriya, and Rutba, among others. Ground Control Intercept radars 

(GCIs) were dispersed throughout the country to complete the lower 

echelon network.

One factor aided the Coalition's air campaign immensely. Most Iraqi 

air defense headquarters and communications facilities were 

constructed above ground. Since Saddam Hussein had initially come to 

power in a coup backed by the military, he was always on guard against 

being overthrown in a counter-coup. Hussein was therefore reluctant to 

position his command centers out of easy reach should he be forced to 

attack disloyal members of his own army. Being stationary above-ground 

targets made them easy prey for Coalition aircraft.

Tall King low frequency radars provided Iraq with an umbrella-like 

coverage although they frequently were out of action with maintenance 

problems. When operational they gave Iraq the ability to detect high 

altitude targets at ranges in excess of 500 kilometers. For coverage 

at lower altitudes, fast scanning Squat Eye radars were used. Iraqi 

interceptors relied on ground guidance from Bar Lock radar systems 

which gave both height and range information. This interlocking system 

of coverage and command is preferred by the Soviet Union and is 

designed to closely tether its interceptors to ground controllers. In 

military circles, this type of interlocking defense is referred to as 

an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).



THE INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM



The operational principal behind IADS is that all facets of a nation's 

air defense (interceptors, SAMs and triple-A sites) can be coordinated 

and combined as part of a total defense plan . Crucial to the success 

of this type of air defense plan is the ability to communicate with 

the component parts.

Each element must be able to communicate instructions as well as 

receive guidance from higher up the chain of command. Failure to 

maintain communications is the "Achilles"' heel in such a system.

Ideally, an IADS is constructed in such a manner as to provide 

overlapping and layered coverage. For example, long range, high 

altitude SAMs would provide blanket coverage to the entire nation 

while being protected by shorter range SAMs suited for low altitude 

engagements. Triple-A sites would be tactically positioned near high 

value targets such as industrial plants or air bases. Fighter aircraft 

would be redeployed to dispersal fields and used to fill gaps in SAM 

coverage.

Once again, communication is the key. Interceptors must remain linked 

to a network of ground radars for guidance. SAM sites must alerted if 

friendly aircraft are operating inside their engagement envelope to 

avoid accidental downings. Finally, communication between the various 

radar installations and higher command authorities is vital since 

detections must be passed on before appropriate targeting orders can 

be disseminated.

In theory this system works fine unless it becomes overloaded, 

something which did not happen during the Iran-Iraq war. Once too many 

things start happening simultaneously, a centralized system loses its 

ability to deal with individual threats. This type of system has a 

built in resiliency and can withstand a fair amount of body blows. 

However, only one blow to the head is needed to paralyzed the entire 

system. Knocking out the central command authority essentially 

isolates the component parts making them susceptible to systematic 

destruction.

Iraqi air defenses were about to be put to the ultimate test. Saddam 

Hussein, by invading the tiny kingdom of Kuwait in 1990, unleashed the 

most sophisticated aerial armada ever assembled.  A coalition of over 

thirty nations gathered under United Nations' auspices to oppose this 

blatant case of Iraqi aggression.  When the air war over Iraq began on 

17 January 1991, a knock out blow was exactly what the Coalition 

strategists had in mind.



OPERATION DESERT SHIELD



So overwhelming were the assembled Iraqi forces, the conquest of 

Kuwait

basically took an afternoon. By halting his army at the Kuwait's 

southern

border with Saudi Arabia, Hussein committed his first and perhaps

greatest strategic blunder of the war. Had he continued into Saudi 

Arabia,

a major U.S. deployment into the region may well have proved 

impossible. Without bases in Saudi Arabia, the Coalition would have 

been hard pressed to find a suitable staging area for its build up.

In a secluded basement wing of the Pentagon, the most respected 

members of our military establishment met in the late 1980s to discuss 

contemporary aspects of the Air-Land Battle doctrine. Designed to meet 

NATO's operational needs in western Europe, the tactical concepts were 

being studied for their relevance in potential Third World hot spots. 

The officers taking part in this super-secret think tank were referred 

to as the Jedi Knights.

The Air Force contingent of this interservice round table was known as 

Project Checkmate. Checkmate's job was to prepare a deployment and 

logistics study to support a major air effort in the Persian Gulf. 

This hypothetical campaign plan was given the numerical designation 

1002-90. "Ten-Oh-Two" called for deployment of F-15Es to the Gulf on 

the first day of the operation. Heavy ground forces would need at 

least thirty days to deploy and until they arrived the F-15s would 

have to hold the line. When the invasion of Kuwait became a reality in 

August 1990, it was a simple matter for the Jedi Knights to dig up 

1002-90.

Initially the overall strategy was merely defensive, a measured 

response designed to deter Iraq from invading the weak Gulf states on 

the Arabian peninsula. Now, with Hussein's forces digging in at the 

Kuwaiti border, the strategy was shifting to a more offensive stance. 

If economic sanctions and strategic bombing were not persuasive 

enough, Hussein's forces would have to be ejected from Kuwait by a 

ground campaign. Should that become necessary, air power had to be on 

hand to minimize Coalition casualties.

F-15E squadrons from the 4th Fighter Wing based at Seymour Johnson Air 

Force Base, North Carolina, began their deployment as scripted in 

1002-90. Fresh from their victory in the Air Force's Long Rifle 

competition, these squadrons made the flight to Tabuk, Saudi Arabia in 

14 hours. Eventually all F-15Es would wind up at Al Kharg air base, 

south of Riyadh. Affectionately known as Al's Garage, this brand new 

facility was comparable if not better than what they had left behind.



"INSTANT THUNDER"



The air campaign ( Instant Thunder revolved around a single list of 

targets, or Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO is similar in many 

respects to a football team whose playbook for the entire season must 

be laid out in advance. When conducting a major air operation such as 

Instant Thunder, assembling the plays can become a Herculean task. The 

first several days of the operation, for example, required an ATO over 

300 pages in length. As the air war progressed, a 300 page ATO would 

become required on average for every 24 hours of air operations.

Architect of Instant Thunder's ATO was Lt. General Charles "Chuck" 

Horner. Gen. Horner had been appointed by Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf to 

head up the Coalition's unified air forces. Assisting him in targeting 

assignments was Brigadier General Buster C. Glosson. Glosson and his 

team of professional targeteers (fraggers) had the responsibility of 

developing a systematic approach to the air campaign. These men, along 

with

their staffs, occupied a hastily refurbished storage area in the Royal 

Saudi Air Force Headquarters off Abdul Aziz Boulevard in Riyadh.

Within walking distance of the RSAF complex was a soccer field 

belonging to the U.S. Military Training Mission. Located on this 

playing field were a number of pre-fab buildings. Inside one of these 

was a confined work area made up of eight cubicles underneath a 1 5x30 

foot tent. It was from this spartan work station, known as the "Black 

Hole' that all the targeting data for Instant Thunder would be 

assimilated and processed.

Targets were initially gathered by "national technical means" a now 

familiar euphemism for satellite intelligence. Once these targets were 

defined and passed on to the Black Hole, the ATO prioritized them in a 

proper sequence. Specific aircraft and ordnance could then be assigned 

by Horner's fraggers to eliminate each target in a predetermined 

manner. This aerial ballet was choreographed to make the most out of 

each aircraft and its weapon systems.

Instant Thunder was designed with specific campaign objectives in 

mind. Obviously not all targets in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations 

(KTO) could be hit simultaneously, so priorities were established 

which grouped similar targets into campaign phases. Each of these 

phases were designed to compliment each other as the campaign 

progressed. In this manner subsequent phases could build on the 

success of the preceding strikes.



OPERATION DESERT STORM



On l7 January l991 at approximately O045 hours, F-15Es belonging to 

the 4th TFW and over a hundred other tactical aircraft were flushed 

from AI's Garage. Less than two hours later, strategic bombing of Iraq 

commenced. Operation Desert Shield had turned into a Desert Storm. 

Over 1,400 sorties were staged over Iraq in the first twenty-four 

hours of the war. For the next forty days and forty nights, Iraq would 

be exposed to a biblical torrent of bombs, rockets, and missiles.



INSTANT THUNDER PHASE 1



The first phase of the air campaign required the Coalition to disrupt 

Iraq's air defense system by knocking out communication facilities. 

The radar "eyes" of the network would also be struck in the first wave 

so subsequent strikes could go undetected.



Certain GCIs, especially in the western desert, were particularly 

important. Even before the first raids began, Special Forces teams 

were inserted by MH-53J Pave Low helicopters to assist air attacks 

from the ground. These teams designated targets using hand held 

lasers. Apache AH-64s and A-10 Thunderbolts destroyed the radar sites 

and opened up detection-free corridors into Iraq's interior.

Of course, the F-117 Nighthawk Stealth fighters needed no such 

corridor. These aircraft apparently worked as advertised although 

there were at least two recorded incidents of ground radar detection, 

one Iraqi and one British. Even so, F-117s performed the difficult 

missions over Baghdad without a single loss.

High priority Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C31) 

targets in Baghdad were struck at the outset with precision guided 

munitions (PGMs). Later, the media would receive videotape footage 

taken from the initial strike. One scene showed a 2,000 lb. GBU-27 

being guided down a ventilation shaft in Iraq's Air Defense Ministry. 

Courtesy of the stranded CNN reporters in Baghdad Al Rashid Hotel, the 

world got a play-by-play account of the first night's raid over the 

capitol.

Although Saddam Hussein was not directly targeted per se, as the 

commander of Iraq's military forces he was obviously part of its C31 

that the Coalition wished to disrupt. As a general rule it is never 

necessary to specifically target the leadership as individuals. But, 

if the leadership can be prevented from communicating with its forces, 

the net effect is the same. In this first phase, likely command 

centers we retargeted . If Hussein happened to be caught in one, so be 

it.

Tomahawk cruise missiles or Tactical Land Attack Missile-C (TLAM) were 

fired from Navy vessels, including the submerged Los Angeles class

submarine, the USS Louisville. These attacks made up a significant 

portion of the first day's strikes. Over 100 of these million dollar 

missiles were fired during the first 24 hours but only at targets 

requiring a great degree of precision, i.e. targets located in 

civilian areas, near schools, hospitals, etc. The missiles were also 

used against heavily defended targets to minimize exposure of manned 

aircraft to hostile fire.

This initial phase of the air campaign was crucial. While there was 

little question concerning who would ultimately win the war, this 

first phase of the air campaign would decide the price of victory. 

Iraq was hopelessly outclassed but it could still extract a heavy 

price.

STRATEGIC TARGETS



Although the principal reason for the Gulf War was to eject Iraq from 

Kuwait, destruction of Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) 

capability was equally important. Under the glare of world attention, 

Iraq was found to have quite an advanced weapons program. According to 

prewar estimates Iraq had been anywhere from eight months to two years 

away from having a working nuclear device. Post-war revelations have 

showed how little we actually knew about Iraq's nuclear weapons 

program. U.N. inspectors traveling through Iraq after the war 

uncovered whole facilities left untouched by the bombing.

Iraq's nuclear weapons program had been dispersed throughout the 

country following the Israeli strike at Osirak in June l981.  The 

Osirak strike and mysterious deaths of key Iraqi technicians had set 

the Iraqi program back years. Ironically, the Israeli strike was 

composed of F-16s with F-15s assigned as fighter escorts. Ten years 

later, the roles were reversed during Desert Storm. F-15s delivered 

laser-guided bombs on Iraqi facilities while F-16s flew escort. Had 

the Osirak complex not been hit, it is entirely possible that the 

Coalition might have been facing an Iraqi military in possession of 

one or more nuclear devices.

After the Israeli strike, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers became 

dotted with NBC complexes. The greatest concentration of these sites 

lay near Baghdad north along the Tigris to Mosul and Kirkuk. This area 

was chosen undoubtedly because it was considered safe from internal 

unrest by the Ba'athist regime. Not only were Republican Guard units 

stationed there but Saddam Hussein had family ties in this region. 

Born near Tikrit, just north of Baghdad, Hussein's political and 

religious connections were strongest in this area.

Also included in this first phase were strikes directed against Iraqi 

electric power facilities, the transportation network and oil 

industry. Reportedly, much of the electric grid was knocked out by 

Tomahawks missiles releasing spools of wire made of carbon fibers. The 

wire would float to earth to lay across power lines causing short 

circuits. (Other reports hint at Tomahawk missiles releasing confetti-

like material to produce the same results.) When the cease-fire went 

into effect Iraq was left with only 15% of its prewar electricity 

remaining.



With the civilian power grid knocked off line, the military was forced 

to crank up its generators. This had an added benefit for FLIR 

equipped aircraft searching out targets in populated areas. Military 

complexes radiating heat stuck out like sore thumbs against dark 

backgrounds.

Coalition aircraft were particularly effective against Iraq's 

transportation network. Because the country is conveniently divided by 

two major rivers, bridges were lucrative targets for several reasons. 

Many bridges over the Tigris and Euphrates contained fiber-optic 

communication lines. A break in a bridge would mean a break in 

communications. Secondly, all military traffic and supplies had to 

cross at least one of these unfordable rivers on the way into Kuwait. 

Once these spans were dropped, the troops in Kuwait were effectively 

isolated. Not only could military traffic be prevented from crossing, 

congestion at these downed bridges would present Coalition pilots with 

concentrated targets.

Having damaged Iraq's principal means of C31, the air campaign could 

now direct its energy towards destroying Iraq's air force. This could 

be accomplished either on the ground or in the air but the preferred 

method was of course, to destroy them on the ground where they posed 

no threat. With this in mind, F-15Es and F-117As began a series of 

strikes on the hardened aircraft shelters. When Iraqi pilots did 

manage to get airborne they were immediately detected by AWACS and 

engaged by F-15s. The fact that Saddam had the chief of his air force 

taken out and shot is but one indication of the Coalition's 

effectiveness.

Strikes directed against the Iraqi air force continued throughout the 

campaign even though air superiority had been achieved early on. 

Declaring air superiority over Iraq became a matter of splitting hairs 

with the media over semantics. Did we have air superiority or was it 

air supremacy? No matter what name you gave it, Coalition pilots owned 

the sky over Iraq and the hardened shelters proved incapable of 

protecting enemy aircraft on the ground. With no other way to save 

themselves, Iraqi pilots began flying their aircraft to Iranian 

airfields. More than anything else, these desperate flights to Iran 

demonstrated that the Coalition had won the air war over Iraq.

INSTANT THUNDER PHASE 2 INSTANT THUNDER PHASE 4



After Iraq's key targets and installations were struck, emphasis 

shifted towards establishing air superiority over the Kuwaiti Theater 

of Operations or KTO. This second phase called for numerous ground 

strikes against mobile SAM and triple-A sites stationed with Iraqi 

units in the field. These sites were not tied into the national 

defense scheme but were intended to protect maneuver units. By 

attacking these assets, Iraq's air defense umbrella was stripped away 

prior to the start of the ground war. When the ground war commenced 

these units were completely open and vulnerable to close air support 

missions.



INSTANT THUNDER PHASE 3



The third phase of the air war began after Iraq's ability to interfere 

with tactical air support missions was eliminated. Known as "shaping 

the battlefield" this phase concentrated on attacking various ground 

targets supporting enemy troops at the front. F-15s were called upon 

to eliminate logistic support centers and disrupt supply traffic 

heading to Iraqi troops at the front.

In Vietnam the USAF had been unable to accomplish this mission to the 

degree necessary. The jungle cover had made the job of detecting enemy 

supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail far too difficult. The 

North Vietnamese were also able to capitalize on the fact that U.S. 

aircraft were unable to "see" at night. The unsophisticated nature of 

their forces required far less supply to maintain his combat 

operations. NVA "beans and bullets" resupply operations could easily 

be transported on the backs of individual soldiers.

The Gulf War was an entirely different situation. Not only were supply 

routes traced over desert terrain (hence very little overhead cover) 

but these routes could be effectively interdicted by destroying only a 

few bridges. Moreover, the Iraqi army in Kuwait was highly mechanized 

and required huge amounts of supply just to survive, let alone 

maintain combat readiness. Unlike Vietnam, Iraqi logistics were given 

no respite at night either. Ground surveillance went on around the 

clock and anything that moved was attacked.

Although by now a significant portion of F-15E missions were Scud 

hunts, Strike Eagles also assisted in the final phase of the air 

campaign, direct ground support. To aid the F-15s, Joint Surveillance 

and Target Attack Radar System aircraft (J-STARS) could look deep into 

Iraq and "see" enemy ground activity. If the enemy moved, J-STARS 

instantly detected it and F-15s would pounce on it. Movement on the 

ground ultimately proved fatal.

Faced with no alternative, Iraqi ground troops simply dug deeper and 

in so doing planted the seeds of their own destruction. During this 

phase of the air campaign, F-15Es were spared from other duties and 

assigned to nightly "tank-plinking" missions. The dug-in Iraqi armor 

was now helpless, unable to move and unable to hide, even at night. 

The LANTIRN equipped Eagles swooped in and destroyed the armored 

vehicles one after another. A new chapter was being written in the 

history of air combat.

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell had 

stated, the strategy was first to, "cut the Iraqi army off, and then 

kill it." Airpower had made it possible. The war had been so one-sided 

that after 100 hours it had to be called off, the other side was 

leaving the field. Iraq's army had been broken by incessant bombing 

and was reduced to an unwashed rabble fleeing Kuwait.



THE GREAT SCUD HUNT



Even though the Coalition won the war convincingly in a very short 

time, it was not without its share of surprises. One of these 

surprises had been the mass exodus of the Iraqi air force to Iran. Far 

more deadly, however, was the surprise awaiting the Coalition as 

evening came on the third day of the war.

True to his word, Saddam Hussein unleashed a salvo of Scud ballistic 

missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Coalition had been lulled 

into a false sense of security by its own glowing press accounts of 

the battle. So it came as somewhat of a shock that after suffering two 

nights of heavy aerial bombardment, Iraq proved it could take back the 

initiative.

It had retained the ability to launch ballistic missiles and influence 

the course of the war. The Coalition's worst nightmare was coming 

true.

The Scud campaign was one of the most controversial aspects of the 

war. Clearly there had been a pre-war intelligence failure to detect 

the existence of so many mobile launchers and missiles. Initially, 

intelligence sources figured Iraq possessed around 36 mobile launchers 

but with the beginning of the air campaign, Coalition pilots began 

placing the number of launchers in the hundreds.

Because the Coalition had so poorly estimated the number of launchers, 

little effort was devoted toward destroying them at first. It wasn't 

until after Scuds began striking Israel that the anti-Scud campaign 

began in earnest. By then it was too late. the launchers were well 

dispersed and tucked away.

In terms of combat efficiency, the military threat posed by Scud 

missiles was insignificant. With only inertial guidance and small 

payload, the missile has evolved very little from its first generation 

cousin, Germany's V-2 rocket. It is designed to provide tactical 

support at ranges greater than conventional artillery but without 

active guidance the Scud is simply aimed

 in the direction of the target. At a pre-set time the missile's 

engine is turned off causing it to nose over and detonate on impact.

Once launched the missile's flight trajectory cannot be altered. In 

many respects it is not much brighter than a child's bottle-rocket. 

The missile is fired with range and bearing information only giving it 

a Circular Error Probability (CEP) that is measured in thousands of 

feet. To be effective, the Scud requires a large stationary target 

like a city. Iraq had modified its inventory of Scud missiles by 

dramatically increasing their range.

The two new versions of Scud missiles were named Al-Hussein and 

AlAbbas. With increased range however, came a decrease in payload and 

accuracy. Hussein's missiles now had even less military value than 

before. They were meant only to be weapons of terror to be used 

against civilians. Because the warhead could contain only a small 

amount of high explosive the real fear was that these modified 

missiles might contain chemical payloads.

During the Gulf War Scud missiles played a role which far outweighed 

their military importance. Lacking an air force to strike back, firing 

off Scud missiles showed the world that Iraq could survive the best 

efforts of the Coalition. But the indiscriminate launching of Scud 

missiles had an even more sinister purpose. Hussein hoped to use his 

missiles as a political ploy to drag Israel into the war.

In contrast to the reluctance concerning declaration of air 

superiority, Coalition briefers seemed willing to state early on that 

the Scud threat had been dealt with. Israeli civilians breathed a 

cautious sigh of relief at the news. When sirens all across the 

country began wailing, the early optimism turned to panic. Scud 

missiles were headed for the state of Israel after all. One could only 

guess at their contents.

For Hussein, striking Israel was a win-win stratagem regardless of 

what Israel's response might be. Israel certainly could not add to the 

damage already being inflicted on his country and he could portray 

himself as a hero to the Arab people by attacking the Jewish state. 

Hussein was gambling that Arab sensitivities would cause them to 

withdraw from the Coalition, not wanting to appear to be aiding Israel 

in the destruction of another Arab nation. It cost him little while 

placing all kinds of diplomatic pressure on the U.S. and its allies. 

For Israel, a nation which prides itself on its military prowess, it 

was a political embarrassment. It was forced to accept help from 

foreign troops on its soil for the first time in its history.

Israel had built a reputation based on its policy of quick and 

decisive retaliation when attacked. Israel had two retaliatory options 

immediately available. It could launch its own air strikes backed up 

by division-sized commando raids into western Iraq; or it could launch 

Jericho I missiles at Baghdad and return the favor. It chose to do 

neither at the request of the United States. For political reasons it 

was forced to absorb the Iraqi blows and bide its time.

The great hunt for Scud missile launchers was literally equivalent to 

searching for the proverbial "needle in the haystack " U.S. 

intelligence had seriously underestimated the number of mobile 

launchers available in Iraq. Fixed sites were more readily detected by 

satellite photography but mobile launchers presented a problem. Little 

more than a pickup truck with a launch rail on the back, mobile 

launchers could easily be disguised or hidden.

Often times the Scud launchers would only be detected after they had 

launched their missile. Once a missile was launched, it would become a 

matter of tracking the mobile launchers back to their hiding places. 

Great use was also made of Special-Forces teams placed well behind 

enemy lines. Special Forces teams in sophisticated dune-buggies were 

able to pinpoint Scud locations with hand-held lasers and then call in 

F-15s with devastating accuracy.

It was estimated that the effort to find and eliminate the launchers 

cost the Coalition approximately one week's worth of sorties. F-15Es 

with their Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night 

(LANTIRN) laser-designating pods became major players. In fact, over 

half of all F15E missions flown during Desert Storm were directed 

against the mobile Scud launchers. The F-15E flew approximately 2,200 

sorties with only two combat losses. Both aircraft were lost while 

hunting Scud launchers in western Iraq.

Despite the difficulties. Scud launchings were dramatically curtailed 

after the first two weeks of the campaign. By the end of the second 

week, 43 had been launched. Iraq was only able to launch six more 

during the whole third week as the anti-Scud effort gathered steam. F-

15Es could only do so much, however. To be effective Coalition pilots 

would almost have to know in advance where the missiles were located.

As the war progressed, the number of missile launches did in fact drop 

off appreciably. Whether this was due to Coalition efforts or because 

the Iraqis were running out of missiles is not clear. There is 

anecdotal evidence to support both theories. One thing is certain. 

Scuds continued to fall on Israel and Saudi Arabia right until the end 

of the war.

Although each Arab member of the Coalition reaffirmed its commitment 

to the Coalition, who really knows what the outcome might have been if 

Israel had responded? Overflights may have driven Jordan and Israel to 

the brink of war. Syria, whose troops had occupied Lebanon while 

everyone's attention was on Iraq, might well have pulled out of the 

coalition. President Assad may have decided that Syria had already 

gotten as much out of the war as it was likely to get. Taking a long 

term view of the situation Syria's geopolitical interests might have 

been better served by making amends with Iraq.



LEADERSHIP



An important reason for the success of Desert Storm was the defeat in 

Vietnam. Since the Vietnam War a generation of military leadership has 

had time to reflect upon those mistakes. Many of Desert Storm's top 

leaders were junior officers back then. Coming up through the ranks 

they got a first hand look at the effects of mismanagement and failed 

policy. From the President on, military leaders felt obliged to 

reassure the American public that this war would not be another 

Vietnam.

The biggest mistake made during the Vietnam War was to commit military 

forces without widespread domestic support for the conflict. Rather 

than being a force for national unity like World War II, the Vietnam 

War was divisive. This "Vietnam syndrome," the idea that Americans are 

reluctant to use force fearing domestic unrest, has plagued our 

national psychology since 1972. Military leaders wanted Desert Storm 

to put this notion to rest once and for all. Although some factions 

within the United States differed on the sanctions question, an 

overwhelming majority of Americans supported the President's action 

once war was underway. With the nation solidly behind the men in 

uniform, America proved its people still

had the will to fight if necessary.



COMMAND AND CONTROL



The Coalition air campaign was an extremely complex undertaking.

Imagine trying to efficiently manage the combined air assets of a 

multi-

national force, each nation having different types of aircraft with 

different

arming and maintenance requirements. Consider scheduling missions 

utilizing all these various aircraft in concert, all flying at 

different altitudes and speeds, in all kinds of weather, day and 

night.  Remember that all these operations are taking place in a 

relatively confined space and you are quickly able to visualize an air 

traffic controller's nightmare. Oh yes, add in one last minor detail, 

the fact that there is a war on and you begin to get an idea of the 

magnitude of the job.

The amazing success of the air campaign came without a single incident 

of blue on blue air loss (fratricide). This fact alone is a testament 

to the professionalism of the Coalition air forces. The campaign could 

not have happened if not for the extraordinary amount of planning and 

preparation that went into organizing the effort. Much of this 

planning took the form of Pentagon staffers creating hypothetical war 

scenarios and identifying possible problems well in advance.



IRANIAN EXODUS



The Iraqi decision to send its top of the line aircraft to Iran was 

puzzling to Western analysts. There was speculation in the press that 

Saddam Hussein was husbanding his aircraft for later use in some type 

of surge operation. Others believed that the Iraqi aircraft based in 

Iran would be used to outflank U S naval groups in the Persian Gulf. 

Their wild theories just go to prove that reporters make for lousy 

tacticians. (In fairness to the profession it should be pointed out 

that most generals would probably make lousy reporters ) The fact that 

Iraqi aircraft were placing themselves farther away from the 

battlefield by fleeing to Iran doesn't seem to have made much of an 

impression.

The optimal time for Iraq to have employed its air power was at the 

outset; in the first few days of the campaign when its integrated air 

defense system was still relatively intact. With each passing day, 

hundreds of Coalition sorties were gradually destroying Iraq's ability 

to coordinate its air effort.

The military analysts here at MicroProse theorize that between the 

second and third week of the campaign Hussein accepted the destruction 

of his air force as a foregone conclusion. Faced with this 

inevitability, we believe Hussein engaged in a bit of Machiavellian 

"realpolitik" and cut a

 deal with his former enemy. Perhaps having no alternative, Hussein 

may have decided to offer the aircraft to Iran as an added inducement 

to Iranian leaders not to stir up trouble among Iraq's Shiite 

population in the south. Conspiracy theorists will undoubtedly have a 

field day with this after tiring of JFK.

In the absence of any other compelling reason to emerge since the war, 

this seems to be the most likely explanation. The aircraft transfer 

may have also been intended to curry favor with the Iranian leadership 

with whom he still shared a lengthy border. To free troops stationed 

along that border, he had already given back territory taken in the 

Iran-lraq war. The aircraft may have been further insurance against 

Iranian activity against his regime.



NBC CONSIDERATIONS



Once the initial suppression of Iraqi air defenses was considered 

accomplished, Coalition strikes began to target nuclear! chemical and 

biological (NBC) facilities. There was little fear that Iraq was in a 

position to use nuclear weapons during the conflict since Coalition 

strategists were reasonably certain that Iraq did not possess an 

operational device in 1991. The real fear was that Iraq might pull out 

of Kuwait and end the conflict before giving the Coalition an 

opportunity to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. For this 

reason, nuclear facilities were placed high on the list. Over five 

hundred sorties were used to strike 31 nuclear-related targets during 

the first few days of the air campaign.

Chemical and biological weapons were a different matter entirely. Iraq 

was known to possess stocks of chemical weapons, having previously 

used them on its own Kurdish population. Politically it was necessary 

to rapidly eliminate chemical weapon manufacturing centers as well as 

delivery systems. While the Coalition military forces were adequate

trained and equipped to deal with chemicals, civilian populations were 

totally exposed. And after publicly threatening to burn half of 

Israel, no one doubted Hussein's intentions in this regard.

Iraqi chemical and biological weapons facilities were apparently 

disguised as fertilizer and pharmaceutical manufacturing plants. The 

trick is an old but effective one. Foreign contractors from one nation 

are called to construct a legitimate facility. Upon completion, the 

complex can then

be converted for military use by contractors from a different country. 

This same shell game construction was used by Libya in the 1980s to 

disguise its chemical weapon production



COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

The Vietnam-era specter of civilian casualties was again quite evident 

in the daily briefing from both Riyadh and Pentagon. It was clear that 

the spokesmen were conscious of the effect Iraqi civilian deaths would 

have on domestic support for the war. But beyond that was a sincere 

expression of regret and anguish over civilian deaths being caused by 

the bombing. Most officials went on at length about the precautions 

taken to minimize collateral damage. Mind you! many of these added 

restrictions exposed our pilots to greater risk.

Despite pilot restrictions and the high degree of precision obtained 

by our "smart" weapons, collateral damage did occur in isolated 

incidents. The military infrastructure was too interwoven within Iraqi 

society to prevent it entirely. Yet considering the amount of ordnance 

dropped on the country, civilian casualties were light. Naturally the 

Iraqi government did everything within its power to magnify the extent 

of damage done in civilian areas. These efforts included documented 

cases of intentional damage done by Iraq to its own structures.

Another fact which seems to have escaped most civilian observers is 

that the nightly fireworks display that Iraqi gunners were putting up 

over Baghdad was coming back down on their heads. The metal fragments 

and debris being created by all those exploding shells must have made 

venturing outdoors quite hazardous.

Iraqi civilians population had been expecting massive damage to occur 

in their residential areas. They were somewhat surprised after months 

of mental preparation that it did not happen. Anticipating air raids 

like those which took place during the London "blitz" in 1940, they 

were confused over the selective nature of our air strikes. Rather 

than demoralize or impress the average Iraqi, the population became 

enraged over air strikes they believed to be conducted out of sheer 

spitefulness.

One particular case of 'civilian" damage which drew much media 

attention was the celebrated "Baby Milk Factory" at Abu Ghraib. The 

Baby

Milk Factory story was first reported by the Iraqi government then 

picked up the international press. It involved an Iraqi facility 

involved in the production of biological weapons which had been 

destroyed in pin-point bombing. Iraq stated that the plant actually 

produced infant formula and condemned the Coalition for trying to 

deprive Iraqi children of their milk.  To complete the charade, Iraqi 

TV showed workers picking through the debris dressed in smocks labeled 

"BABY MILK FACTORY" written in English.

It was a hilarious scam but sadly, some in this country were 

completely taken in by it. After the war a respected journalist was 

allowed to "tour" the site. His hosts invited him to sample some pure 

white residue neatly piled in the midst of this building which had 

been devastated in the air strike. Well sure enough, it was powdered 

baby milk. Gee, it must have been a "Baby Milk Factory" after all.

Admittedly, some mistakes were made. A Defense Department analyst has 

since concluded that at least 50 out of the 800 strategic targets 

struck during the war were hit because of faulty intelligence. Not 

that each of these 50 resulted in civilian casualties, just that these 

targets were misidentified by U.S. intelligence prior to the war.



THE AMARIYA SHEUER



A campaign of this magnitude simply could not have been conducted 

without at least a few things going wrong. An intelligence failure was 

responsible for what would become Iraq's biggest propaganda windfall 

of the war, the destruction of the Amariya bomb shelter. Otherwise 

known as Department of Civil Defense Public Shelter #25, the Amariya 

shelter in the suburbs of Baghdad was used by Iraq's upper class, 

government officials and their families. Unfortunately, it was also 

being used as a communications center by the military.

Built initially during the Iran-Iraq war as a bomb shelter, the 

Amiriya shelter was subsequently converted into an electromagnetic 

pulse (EMP) hardened communications facility. In the war of words 

which followed the

attack, U S officials were quick to point out that the facility had 

been fenced i n with barbed-wire and camouflaged. Fences and armed 

guards are not what one would rationally expect to find outside of a 

civilian bomb shelter.

The Amiriya command center had been identified as a possible target 

and placed on the ATO early in the campaign. When Iraq's principal 

means of

communication broke down, the shelter was activated as a secondary 

command node. Tragically, what the Black Hole fraggers did not know 

was that the facility was doubling as a civilian bomb shelter at 

night.

On 12 February 1991 at 0430 hours, a single F-117A sent two 2,000 lb. 

laser-guided smart bombs crashing through the camouflaged roof of the 

structure. Penetrating the hardened concrete ceiling, the bombs 

detonated several floors down. Instantly killed in the blast were 

between 300 and 400 Iraqi civilians. The removal of their remains was 

broadcast live over Iraqi and U.S. television the next day.

An example of an equipment failure took place less than two days later 

during a raid on the bridge over the Euphrates river at Fallujah. Many 

Iraqi civilians were reportedly killed when a laser guided "smart 

bomb" proved not to be so smart and landed in a crowded marketplace. 

On 14 February, a RAF Tornado struck the bridge being laser designated 

by an RAF Buccaneer. One bomb failed to guide properly and landed some 

800 yards east of the actual aiming point. Subsequent reports of at 

least 130 dead could not be confirmed.

The heavy! continuous bombing in the aftermath of these two incidents 

was beginning to generate sympathy for Iraq. The perception was that 

we were now merely "bouncing the rubble" and causing needless civilian 

suffering. International concern was growing that the U.S. was 

exceeding its U.N. mandate and destroying the country. It is notable 

that countries expressing the most concern were located the farthest 

away from Saddam. Very little compassion was being shown by Iraq's 

neighbors because perhaps they knew something the rest of the world 

didn't.

In a long war such as Vietnam, losing the propaganda battle had been 

our undoing. Collateral damage done to North Vietnam had led to 

charges that the U.S. was guilty of genocide. Clearly, the Iraqi 

leadership had studied the legacy of our involvement in Vietnam. By 

selectively showing damage to civilian residential areas, the Iraqi 

government was making use of its only truly effective weapon against 

our air campaign. Hussein was gambling that elements within our own 

society would force a premature cessation of the bombing campaign. Had 

the ground war not been so decisive, Hussein may have ultimately been 

proven right.



GULF WAR COMMENTARY



Now you must  be the thunder and lightning behind Desert Storm."

--General Norman H. Schwarzkopf



Although MicroProse's F-15E Strike Eagle 111 is intended to simulate 

the contributions of a single aircraft, much of the design effort went 

into developing an accurate campaign environment. It was evident from 

the start that the Iraq scenario would have to take into account the 

larger context of air power in general. If nothing else, it may give 

you something to think about while seated in your cockpit on those 

long missions over Baghdad.

Desert Shield/Storm was such an anomalous event that it defies 

critical analysis in many respects. However, as the next millennium 

looms near, it will inevitably be studied as a model for conducting 

21st century warfare. In the short time that has elapsed since the 

actual event, much has been written trying to place the war in proper 

historical perspective. The same people who before the war were 

predicting chemical devastation and horrendous American casualties are 

now writing post-war critiques. It is safe to say that most civilian 

writers are as far off now as they were before the war. By focusing on 

the sensational, they have missed the obvious.

F-15E missions did not just occur in a vacuum and in fact the whole 

theory behind the use of air power underwent a radical reevaluation 

during Desert Storm. Coalition pilots came close to realizing the 

dream of all air enthusiasts since Giulio Douhet wrote his treatise, 

The Command of the A r, in 1921. For the first time in history an 

entire nation was being defeated by men attacking from the air.

Having said that, it is important to realize the danger in making 

definitive conclusions based on our experience in Desert Storm. While 

the Persian Gulf conflict contained universal elements common to all 

wars, Desert Storm was an event unlikely to be repeated. For one 

thing, the Coalition faced an enemy which by the stupidity of its 

leaders, cooperated in its own destruction. The ineptitude of Saddam 

Hussein on a strategic

level was astounding. Any operational analysis based on performance in 

Desert Storm is bound to be misleading if used to portend future 

conflicts.

Currently there is an ongoing debate within military circles over the 

effectiveness of the strategic air campaign, i e hitting targets 

within Iraq. While the efficacy of the tactical air support is not 

disputed, the necessity of bombing all those strategic targets is 

being criticized. The central point of the argument is that the Iraqi 

army collapsed as a result of direct airstrikes and that the effort 

spent on hitting strategic targets was wasted. Furthermore, air assets 

utilized in the strategic campaign would have had a far greater effect 

had they been used in a tactical support role from day one. Lastly, 

and perhaps the salient point of the discussion is that the strategic 

bombing campaign had little correlation to the eventual outcome of the 

war.

Advocates of this position make valid points. Obviously, seeing your 

unit pounded into dust by tactical bombing will have a greater effect 

on morale than concern over targets being hit far off behind the 

lines. Troops at the front might even take some comfort in knowing 

that not everything is going to be thrown at them.

The counter to this argument is that the Gulf War provided the United 

States and its allies the chance to eliminate Iraq's potential to 

build nuclear weapons. By degrading the overall military 

infrastructure the Coalition was also seeking to redress an imbalance 

of power in the region. These reasons were at least as important as 

forcing the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. The strategic campaign against 

Iraq fulfilled a dual role that could be achieved no other way.

There is an old maxim which goes, we learn the most from our mistakes 

. But as human beings, we have a tendency to stick to what works with 

the attitude if it ain't broke, don't fix it. Military planners are 

caught somewhere in the middle. On the one hand, it is hard to argue 

against success, but if the past has taught us anything, it is that no 

war is ever fought like the last. History books are filled with 

examples of nations being defeated because they used tactics carried 

over from the previous conflict.

The Gulf War is no different in this respect. The strategies and 

tactics used successfully by the Coalition will ultimately have a 

short shelf life. Most of the lessons learned during the war will be 

recognized in time as unique to this conflict. Over 100,000 combat 

sorties were flown in support of Operation Desert Storm. Only 28 U.S. 

fixed-wing aircraft were lost for an unbelievably low attrition rate 

of 0.03%. A rate this low is unlikely to be matched in any future 

conflict.



In the Desert Storm scenario, you will be called upon to perform many 

of the missions actually conducted during the war. Seated in your F-

15E at Al Kharg, you and your "Wizzo" will have one last chance to go 

over the upcoming mission. On route to the target a myriad of 

technical sensors and electronic devices are working automatically to 

make your missions go smoothly. Still, success will depend in large 

degree upon your piloting skill.

The focus of your missions will be delivering ordnance on a variety of 

Iraqi targets, both strategic and tactical in nature. This is not to 

say that the air to air threat is missing, it isn't. The few Iraqi 

planes that do manage to get off the ground are usually flown by their 

top pilots. Even though they are Iraqi and not Soviet pilots, a MiG-29 

is a MiG-29. You fly the plane, let your Wizzo lock 'em up.

Certain missions require that you go "downtown" into the heart of 

Baghdad and the heaviest concentration of triple-A in the Gulf region. 

Other missions, such as interdiction strikes on roads and bridges are 

less risky but no less demanding. Scuds remain a priority target. 

Anti-Scud patrols may be less glamorous than streaking over Baghdad 

but you



F 15 OVER BAGDAD

already know how important these missions are. You may not get them 

all but every Scud site or launcher you knock out is one less Saddam 

can use to terrorize innocent civilians. How's that for job 

satisfaction?

One final word about ground strikes. Even though your ordnance 

consists of precision guided munitions, accidents do happen. Central 

Command is counting on you to be extremely careful when delivering 

ordnance. You have already read how collateral damage is used by the 

enemy to wage a propaganda war back home. Don't make Hussein's job any 

easier. Avoiding civilian casualties and limiting collateral damage 

are paramount issues. Even if it means taking the long way towards a 

target, avoid extended flights over major residential areas where 

possible.



FUTURE MILITARY CONFRONTATION

The extent of Iraq's nuclear program is still being uncovered more 

than a

year after the Gulf War. United Nations inspection teams continue to 

turn

up elements of the program which were untouched by the war. Even more

disturbing is Iraq's refusal to allow inspection teams access to 

certain

facilities labeled as "agricultural plants." Given what we know about 

Iraq's elaborate deceptions, it should come as no surprise that 

documents relating to nuclear weapons production are stored in the 

Agriculture Ministry.

By standing up to the United Nations, Hussein will once again win the 

propaganda war even if Iraq suffers retaliatory damage. This time the 

United States will be unable to restrain Israel and ground combat in 

western Iraq will likely ensue. Unfortunately, the only way this 

crisis will probably be resolved is by the death of Saddam Hussein, 

natural or otherwise. The Middle East is a powder-keg even on a good 

day without having to deal with an unstable despot in command of 

nuclear weapons.

A resumption of this conflict is likely to follow a far different 

pattern than the previous campaign. The United States will once again 

rely on airstrikes against Iraqi production facilities and military 

installations. As before, wholesale military occupation of Iraq will 

be impractical even if sufficient ground forces remained in theater. 

Strategic bombing will once again become the UN's only viable leverage 

over the Iraqi warlord.

After having agreed to permit Iraqi helicopter flights during the 

cease-fire negotiations, on 27 August 1992 at 1015 hrs (EST) the UN 

imposed a "No-fly Zone" over Iraq south of the 32nd parallel. 

Continued Iraqi human rights abuses against rebellious Shi'ites in 

southern Iraq had proven to be an embarrassment to the U.S 

administration. The post-war bungling that allowed Hussein to massacre 

and make refugees out of tens of thousands of Kurds would not be 

repeated.

The Shi'ite population is centered in salt-marsh areas south of Basra. 

Unable to reach them on the ground, the Iraqi military began using the 

remnants of its air power to strike at them. With the institution of a 

No-Fly Zone, the U S and its allies are effectively providing an 

active CAP over southern Iraq. Until now, Iraq has not sought to 

challenge U S aircraft south of the parallel. There have been a few 

exceptions, however, mainly lone MiGs intentionally straying close to 

the Zone.

Should a major violation of the No-Fly Zone occur at some point in the 

future, F-15s will undoubtedly become involved. The unsurpassed 

accuracy of the Eagle, coupled with its excellent defensive ability, 

makes this aircraft the logical choice for payback.

PRE-WAR IRAQI ORDER OF BATTLE

GROUND UNITS:



Regular Ground Forces: 6 Armored divisions, 3 Mechanized Infantry

divisions, 1 Naval Infantry division, 10 Motorized Infantry divisions, 

17

Infantry divisions, 14 Reserve Infantry divisions, 1 Air Assault 

Brigade



Republican Guards: 2 Armored divisions, 1 Mechanized division, 1 

Motorized Infantry division, 3 Infantry divisions, 1 Special Forces 

division, 2 Surface-to-Surface Missile Brigades (Scud, FROG)



Major Equipment: (5500) MBTs T55/62/72, (2000) AFVs BMP, M-113, EE-11 

URUTU,BTR50/60/152,(2000)SPA and towed artillery pieces 85/ 

100/122/130/152mm. 155GCT SPA. BM-21. ASTROS ll



NAVAL UNITS:



(1) Training Frigate, (6) Osa 1, (4) Osa ll, (4) ZHUK patrol boats, 

(3) SO1 patrol boats, (2) Poluchat class patrol Boats, (1) T-43 

minesweeper/ layer, (3) Yevgenya class minesweepers, (4) Nestin class 

minesweepers, (3) Polnocny landing ships, plus several RO-RO cargo 

vessels



AIR FORCE:

Major Equipment: (250) MiG-21/23/25/29, (125) SU-7/20/24/25, (100)

Miraqe F-1, (12) IL- 76, (40) A-5 Fantan, (80) Jian F6 7, (8) AN-12, 

(12) AN-26



AIR DEFENSE:

Major Equipment: SA-2 316 71819114, Roland



Major Equipment



F-l5 NEARING KUWAIT CITY WATER TOWERS

11. KOREA: RETURN TO MIG ALLEY SCENARIO



HISTORY OF THE "FIRST" KOREAN WAR

KIM IL-SUNG INVADES SOUTH KOREA



On a sleepy Sunday morning in June 1950, North Korea flung 10 infantry 

divisions and more than 150 T-34 tanks south across the 38th Parallel 

into South Korea. In an effort to unite the two countries, the puppet 

government of Kim ll.-Sung had launched a surprise invasion. Only 

weeks before, the U.S. State Department had delineated those areas in 

the Pacific which it considered vital. The fact that South Korea was 

absent from the list was duly noted by the North Korean communists. 

Kim was convinced that he need not fear U.S. intervention.

Caught unawares by the ferocity of this massive assault the Republic 

of South Korea (ROK) was devastated. The ROK army was simply ill-

equipped to deal with the North Korean armor which spearheaded the 

offensive. By the end of July, over 40% of the South Korea army had 

been destroyed. United States ground forces stationed in-country were 

likewise swept aside. Largely a constabulary force, the troops in 

Korea had suffered due to budget cuts in the post World War lI 

demobilization. If South Korea was going to be held it would have be 

by outside forces.

The capital of South Korea, Seoul, was quickly taken by the North 

Koreans. Being located very near the border the city had little chance 

to prepare an adequate defense. As the ROK army broke apart and fled 

south, the United Nations voted to intervene in the conflict. NKPA 

forces, flushed with success, continued their push southward more 

concerned with speed rather than their safety.



"SPEED BUMPS"



U.S. troops were rushed to South Korea hoping to stem the tide but 

were committed piecemeal. Acting as "speed bumps" to slow the North 

Korean drive, units of the U.S. 24th Division were sacrificed in the 

process. By September, the remaining U.S. and South Korean forces were 

confined to an ever-shrinking slice of the peninsula known as the 

Pusan perimeter.

The USAF, like the army, had been ill-prepared to meet the communist 

invasion.  Nominal control of U.S. aircraft in the region was assigned 

to the Far Eastern Air Forces or FEAF (rhymes with leaf). In the 

preceding decade FEAF's only mission had been to provide active air 

defense for General Douglas MacArthur's ground forces in the Far East 

Command. Essentially a deterrent force, the FEAF had practiced little 

of the air to ground operations which it would soon be called on to 

perform.

The U.S. Fifth Air Force, FEAF's largest subordinate command, was 

stationed in the Japanese home islands. During World War II it had 

moved north from Australia with the U.S. island-hoping drive across 

the Pacific. The tactical fighter component of the Fifth Air Force was 

equipped primarily with F-80C Shooting Stars, F-51 Mustangs and F-82 

twin fuselage Mustangs. Two under strength squadrons of B-26s Invaders 

made up the Fifth Air Force's sole bombardment group.

The South Korean Air Force (ROKAF) at the start of the war consisted 

of 16 prop-driven aircraft and a total of 57 pilots. Only 39 of these 

57 pilots were considered fully trained. This meager force was caught 

and defeated on the ground during the first week of the war by Soviet 

built IL10s, heirs to the famous Sturmoviks of WW II. The North Korean 

Air Force then proceeded to place South Korean airfields near Seoul 

and nearby Suwon under aerial siege.

For the second time in nine years, the United States was surprised by 

a hostile power, attacking on a Sunday when vigilance was low. It 

showed that the military had apparently learned little from the 

earlier Pearl Harbor debacle. Despite the general East-West tensions 

in this era of no-notice atomic oblivion, U.S. forces in the Pacific 

were taken totally off guard.

B-29 Super-fortresses belonging to the Twentieth Air Force were 

hurriedly re deployed to Japan. These heavy strategic bombers, once in

theater, were wasted on tactical support missions such as hunting down 

individual truck and tank convoys. Direct ground support missions were 

flown by F-80 and F-82s operating from Japan. Lacking proper 

antipersonnel ordnance, F-82s would jettison their fuel tanks over 

enemy troop concentrations as makeshift napalm.



INITIAL ATTEMPTS AT INTERDICTION



Numerous bridges, railroad marshaling yards, dams and rail tunnels had 

been attacked by medium altitude bombing. But, the effectiveness of 

these strikes was open to debate. Since the USAF lacked adequate photo 

reconnaissance follow-up, bomb damage assessment was difficult.  

Ground tog and faulty maps certainly had a negative impact on the 

bombing campaign.

As ineffective as these tactics were, they were not completely without 

success. One of the most deadly air attacks of the war occurred during 

its first week. On 30 June, a flight of B-26s caught a North Korean 

column bottle necked at a downed bridge near Seoul. Flying wing-tip to 

wing-tip the B-26s dropped their entire bomb loads on the trapped 

column and destroyed hundreds of vehicles. In spite of these sporadic 

air attacks, North Korean armor remained road bound and presented the 

Fifth Air Force with excellent targets throughout their offensive.



KIMPO AND SUWON AIRFIELDS



The hasty retreat of UN and ROK ground forces toward Pusan however, 

placed the defense of South Korea in jeopardy. The two principal 

airfields in South Korea, Kimpo and Suwon were overrun early in the 

war. These two air bases were the only ones with airstrips long enough 

to support high performance aircraft. The third largest runway in 

South Korea was far to the south at Pusan. Unfortunately, its 4.900 

ft. paved surface was torn up by heavily laden transports bringing in 

much needed reinforcements.

The loss of Kimpo and Suwon forced a re deployment of all jet aircraft 

to bases in Japan. This had a severe effect on combat operations since 

the USAF's principal jet fighters had such limited ranges. For example 

the F80C "Shooting Star" the FEAF's principal fighter, at least in 

terms of numbers, had a combat radius of only 225 miles. Fuel 

consumption usually allowed the fighters only 15-20 minutes in a 

combat area before reaching "Bingo" fuel.



With this redeployment of jets taking place, F-51 Mustangs gained a 

new found prominence. As the commander of the Fifth Air Force put it, 

"One F-51 adequately supported and fought from Taegu airfield is 

equivalent to four F-80s based on Kyushu (Japan)." Relying on outdated 

equipment from the last war might have proved successful had not 

superior Soviet aircraft been introduced.

If control of the skies over South Korea was lost, the UN would be 

precluded from conducting the air missions which so far had been 

instrumental in staving off defeat. On a strategic level, the 

interdiction campaign had been the only means of slowing the flow of 

communist men and material into South Korea. Losing air superiority 

would also mean that the North Koreans would be given an opportunity 

to stage their own air attacks from captured South Korea bases.

The Fifth Air Force, recognizing this eventuality, shifted its 

emphasis from strategic interdiction to counter-air operations. The B-

26s and B-29s which had heretofore been used against troop movements 

made enemy airfields their primary focus. In a series of devastating 

raids on North



Korean airfields. the bombers forced the North Korean air force to 

withdraw their into Manchuria.



THE PUSAN PERIMETER



By August 1950, the NKPA had come perilously close to conquering South 

Korea in a single lightning campaign. All that stood between North 

Koreans and victory was the last ditch UN toehold around Pusan. 

Operating at the end of a tenuous lifeline stretching back to North 

Korea, it was imperative for the enemy to finish off the Pusan 

bridgehead before superior UN forces could arrive. For several weeks 

it appeared that the North Koreans were about to succeed. But the 

fruits of the interdiction campaign were becoming evident. Manpower 

and supplies simply could not reach the North Koreans around Pusan in 

sufficient amounts to allow them to mount the final effort.

The amphibious landing at Inchon came at a time when the North Koreans 

were already on the ropes. Having exhausted themselves in an



1 4 all-out effort to take South Korea, their army lay spent and 

broken. By the time the Inchon landings took place, UN forces 

outnumbered the North Koreans along the Pusan perimeter.

Contrary to popular belief, the Inchon operation had been preplanned 

since before the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had always intended to 

conduct a landing at Inchon in opposition to a North Korea drive 

southwards. The operation, which made a certain general famous, took 

place in September. Despite tricky currents and tides, the Marines 

gained a foothold and turned the tide of battle. Seoul was retaken by 

U.S. Marines and suddenly the North Koreans down south seemed 

desperately overextended.

As news of the Inchon landings filtered down to the North Koreans 

along the perimeter their morale finally gave way. Subjected to 

terrible bombing and lacking supplies, the North Koreans were routed . 

MacArthur's mishandling of the counter-offensive had allowed a good 

portion of the NKPA to escape but without question the UN was in 

position to occupy North Korea at its leisure.

UN ground troops closed in on the Yalu River border with China as 

winter drew near. MacArthur was insistent that China would not enter 

the fray and U.S. troops began looking forward to being home in time 

for Christmas. They had inflicted a disastrous defeat upon the enemy 

and considered the campaign concluded. Well, MacArthur was wrong.



CHINESE INTERVENTION



The Chinese had surreptitiously deployed over 300,000 "volunteers" 

inside North Korea by November 1950. After repeatedly warning the U.N. 

to stay away from the Yalu, China had decided to intervene in the 

conflict. Their massive armies tore into U U.S. units in the midst of 

their Thanksgiving celebrations. Their action saved the North Koreans 

from certain defeat and flung the UN forces fleeing headlong back into 

South Korea. There are perhaps no more poignant stories in the annals 

of military history than the saga of the frozen retreat from North 

Korea.

U.S. Army and Marines salvaged what they could and staged a fighting 

withdraw back down the peninsula. Many units still were cut off by the 

speed of the Chinese advance and had to be evacuated by sea. For the 

second time in the war Seoul was taken by the enemy. The Chinese

offensive however, had been slowed by USAF bombing just as the North 

Koreans before. The communists had once again outrun their ability to 

supply their troops at the front.

UN forces were able to establish a firm front along the narrow waist 

of Korea just south of Seoul. Any further Chinese attacks were met 

with determined resistance and thrown back; UN counter-attacks were 

similarly unsuccessful. There were now too many troops on both sides 

of the lines to make a war of maneuver possible . A maximum effort by 

the UN had barely managed to retake Seoul and suffered heavy 

casualties. By July 1951, both sides now recognized that the mobile 

phase of the Korean war had ended.

As the war entered this new phase, the prospects for either side 

achieving a decisive victory were slim. There were only two choices 

remaining; either continue the war under conditions reminiscent of 

World War I or opt for a negotiated settlement. Since the use of 

atomic weapons would mean an intolerable escalation of the conflict, a 

stalemate was inevitable.

After ranging up and down the peninsula for almost eighteen months, 

the war was going to have to be settled at the bargaining table. With 

MacArthur relieved of command by presidential order, the way was 

cleared for the diplomatic wrangling to begin. The unanswered question 

was at what point would the combatants decide that they had suffered 

enough and discuss terms for a cease-fire. The agreement would only be 

reached after both sides incurred hideous casualties in pre-cease-fire 

positioning.



AIR WAR OVER KOREA



"The Air Force is on trial in Korea."

--General Hoyt S. Vandenberg

Air Force TCS



North Korea began the war with 78 YAK-7Bs,30 PO-2s, and 70 IL-10s, all 

of which were prop-driven relics of the last war. Most of these 

aircraft were destroyed during the Fifth Air Force's early counter-air 

operations in 1950. Once that was accomplished, air supremacy was 

easily maintained by continually pounding North Korean airfields.



150



In the face of the UN fall counter-offensive in 1950, the Soviet Union 

undertook a massive effort to supply their communist brethren with 

first rate jet aircraft. The Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), which had 

entered the war in November, received the first of 3,000 aircraft 

promised by Moscow.



THE MIG 15



Many of the new fighters reaching the Chinese were MiG-15s, the Soviet 

Union's hottest new interceptor. Its combat debut proved that the MiG-

15 was without equal over Korea. Overnight, the F-80s and F-82s were 

being challenged by an opponent which could out dive and out turn 

them. The MiG-15 was also good 100mph faster in level flight than 

anything it would happen to come across. USAF Mustangs now flew over 

the battlefield at their peril.

The Fifth Air Force faced a window of vulnerability which would only 

be closed by deploying a fighter capable of taking on the MiG-15. 

Thankfully, as the Chinese armies plunged southward during the winter 

of 1950-51, the expected communist "aerial offensive" never 

materialized. It is possible that the CCF was reluctant to expose its 

aircraft to UN counter air measures. More likely, the CCF was afraid 

that staging its air power outside of Manchuria might be viewed as a 

serious escalation of the war.

American ground troops were unaccustomed to not being able to call on 

air support. Communist leaders were unsure exactly how the U.S. would 

react to being subjected to a savage air campaign. Such an escalation, 

the Truman administration darkly hinted, could possibly lead to atomic 

retaliation.

The Chinese and North Koreans were not the only participants in this 

war to fear escalation. The United States was also concerned that 

provocative actions by its air force might lead to a general widening 

of the conflict. One of the most controversial decisions of the war 

had to do with

the bombing of the infamous Yalu River bridges.

The Yalu River forms the northern border separating Chinese Manchuria 

from North Korea. When the Chinese army launched its campaign, the 

twelve major road and rail bridges over the Yalu provided the only 

means of supplying their massive army inside North Korea. Naturally 

these supply bottlenecks would have been excellent targets for UN 

interdiction missions.



The MiG-15 made its combat debut during the Korean War. It came as 

quite a shock to the USAF whose prop-driven fighters were quickly 

routed off the battlefield. Ordered into production in 1948, these 

aircraft were flown from the assembly line straight into combat. In 

response, the United States began to offer a bounty for each MiG-15 

pilot who defected with his aircraft. Known as Project "Moolah", the 

scheme was successful in bringing in a few stray MiGs.

The F-86 Sabrejets were able to incorporate design features copied 

from the defector's aircraft. Although the MiGs had their own 

limitations, they were an even match for the Sabrejet. Quick and very 

maneuverable, the MiGs also packed a more powerful punch. The F-86 

Sabrejets were under gunned but benefited from a stabilized gunsight 

that the MiGs lacked. Only the advanced level of pilot training and 

tactical co-ordination allowed the F-86 to compete successfully for 

control of "MiG Alley."

Sabrejet pilots would be astounded at the array of sophisticated 

targeting and flight systems available to the Eagle drivers. The 

cockpit would be totally alien and unfamiliar place. The same would be 

true for the MiG-15 pilot stepping into a Fulcrum for the first time.

As the century comes to a close, it remains a tight race for air 

supremacy. Again the clean, aerodynamic lines of the MiG-29 and F-15 

give an external appearance of similarity which belies their internal 

differences. The long range capabilities of these aircraft tend to 

make maneuverability a moot consideration . Rather than compare flight 

envelopes, in the 1990s we tend to think in terms of systems, radars 

and weapons. The aircraft itself is only thought off as the vehicle 

providing mobility to these systems. As before, the deciding factor in 

air combat may come down to simple pilot training and individual 

skills.

As tempting as these targets were, UN aircraft were forbidden to bomb 

that close to the Chinese border. Using the standard iron bombs of the 

day, the United States was unwilling to undertake the considerable 

risk of collateral damage within China's national boundary.

The chance of inadvertently straying into Chinese airspace would be 

great on such missions. Since the Yalu river formed the border, USAF 

bombers would be forced to make their approach runs at a perpendicular 

angle to the bridges. The chances of scoring hits on the bridges using 

this type of attack profile were minimal. The better method of attack 

using unguided munitions would have been to approach along the bridge 

axis. Pilots would certainly have had to cross into Chinese airspace 

to carry out these attacks, either on the bombing run or while 

exiting.



THE 4TH TFW ENTERS MIG ALLEY



With the introduction of the MiG-15, the hotly contested area 

surrounding the Yalu River quickly became known to U.S. pilots as "MiG 

Alley." The USAF responded to the MiG-15 by sending the 4th Fighter-

Interceptor Wing and 27th Fighter-Escort Wing to Korea. These units, 

made up of F84E Thunderjets and F-86 Sabrejets, were given their 

movement orders on 8 November. The 4th Fighter Wing, stationed in New 

Castle County Airport in Wilmington, Delaware, flew to San Diego where 

it was put aboard ship. By 15 December, F-86s from the 4th Fighter 

Wing were flying CAP over northwestern Korea, the heart of MiG alley.

The MiG-15 could claim a marginal superiority over the F-86 at high 

altitudes. Being lighter, the MiG could climb somewhat faster and had 

a higher operational ceiling than the F-86. The MiG's swept-wing 

design gave it a top end speed of almost 660 miles per hour. On a good 

day with an experienced pilot behind the stick, the MiG could hold its 

own. The F86, on the other hand, was more suited to lower altitude 

combat. The plane picked up momentum in a dive like a falling safe but 

tended to bleed off energy quickly once returning to level flight. In 

combat the F-86's .50 caliber machine guns lacked the punch of the 

MiG's cannons but could still shred an enemy aircraft in seconds.

The 336th Squadron, partially based at Kimpo, got its first recorded 

MiG-15 kill on 17 December only days after arriving in country. The 

other two squadrons, the 334th and 335th were stationed outside of 

Tokyo.



152 These squadrons had to make the long flight to Korea and back on 

each mission. By the end of the year (1950), the 4th Fighter Wing had 

racked up 234 counter-air sorties and claimed eight confirmed MiGs 

shot down.



POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS



Along the length of "MiG Alley" Chinese MiGs would climb above U.S. 

patrols while still inside Chinese airspace. Having reached a position 

above and behind, the MiGs would then dash across the border to strike 

the U.S. formations from a point of maximum advantage. Making only a 

single pass, they would "blow through" and then dash to safety over 

the border. Although MiG pilots tended to rely on slashing attacks 

from above, the plane was actually more suited to horizontal 

engagements.

Chinese MiGs were also making life uncomfortable for the multiengined 

bombers performing missions near the border. The favorite tactic was 

again to use Chinese airspace to reach a superior altitude. Once in 

position the MiGs would dive on the bomber formations and convert that 

dive energy into speed for the quick getaway back over the border.

Fuel consumption, which placed severe restrictions U.S. fighters, was 

not a concern for the MiG pilots. The Chinese established major 

airfields literally only minutes from the border. Antung (Dandong) air 

base located at the mouth of the Yalu was particularly active during 

this period. MiGs from this base took a heavy toll of B-29s on bombing 

raids near the border.

USAF pilots were expressly prohibited from engaging in "hot pursuit" 

into Chinese airspace. In effect, the MiG-15s were given safe conduct 

passes back to their Manchurian airfields. Despite the handicaps, UN 

pilots made a good showing for themselves. Superior training and 

coordination more than made up for the deficiencies. By the end of the 

war, UN pilots had destroyed over 800 MiG-15s in air-to-air combat 

while losing just over a hundred of their own. By 1952, UN pilots were 

enjoying a kill ratio of well over 13-1.

Even without being able to strike the Yalu bridges, the restrictive 

nature of North Korean terrain allowed the strategic bombing campaign 

to concentrate on just a few access routes. The mountainous regions 

and swift moving rivers confined supply columns to the easily 

identified road network. UN aircraft kept up continuous patrols over 

the network of roads

and immediately pounced on any Chinese that happened along. As the UN 

retreat from North Korea was taking place, the Chinese were decimated 

as they attempted to pursue.

Even though the communist ground offensive had slowed, the intensity 

of the air war had not. In fact, MiG pilots were becoming even more 

aggressive. The B-29 bomber streams flying night missions for safety 

now found themselves being engaged by night fighters. Communist radar 

stations were being established in North Korea to help direct the MiGs 

to their targets.

As the ground war spilled into South Korea, communist aircraft began 

to experience the same problems that had plagued UN pilots. Having to 

travel further to and from their Manchurian bases to reach the front, 

the MiGs had less time to spend over the battlefield. Flying outside 

the proximity of their Manchurian safe havens, the MiGs suffered 

accordingly. UN pilots maintained their control of South Korean 

airspace during daylight hours. Night was more of an even contest due 

primarily to the universal lack of effective night fighting equipment.



IN SEARCH OF A MISSION



Communist intransigence over terms for a cease-fire left military and 

political leaders looking for ways to employ their air power. One 

faction believed that air power could only anger the communists and 

keep them away from the bargaining table. Another faction believed the 

opposite, that increased pressure would force an armistice. The 

question remained how best to utilize aircraft and against what type 

of targets?

With the communist drive halted near the 38th Parallel, UN strategists 

in 1952 were forced to recognize that air power alone was unlikely to 

force the Chinese to come to terms. For one thing, North Korea 

received all its military equipment from outside sources. It did not 

have an indigenous industry capable of supporting the war effort. 

Hence, there was nothing to knock out that might cause a surrender.



"OPERATION STRANGLE"

The best air power was likely to achieve in 1952 was a continued 

campaign

of interdicting communist supply routes. It was realized that this 

effort



1 53 would not entice the Chinese to negotiate but it would forestall 

a renewed offensive until a solution could be found. The USAF had 

devised a massive campaign against the North Korean rail net and 

logistical support system known as "Operation Strangle" The campaign 

was a repeat of the interdiction effort directed against roadways 

early in the war. For ten months, UN pilots laid siege to communist 

rail lines. Strangle failed due largely to the ability of peasant 

workers being able to repair the rail lines just as fast as they were 

destroyed.

In March 1952, Operation Strangle was replaced by a new tactic. 

Instead of interdicting wide areas of railroad, UN bombers were to 

concentrate on specific two-mile long sections of track. The idea was 

to obliterate sections of the railway rather than just causing 

temporary damage. The change in tactics was given the code name 

"Operation Saturate." Unfortunately, communist workers proved too 

adept at repairing bomb damage. Heavy losses inflicted by triple-A 

forced a cancellation of interdiction efforts by the strategic bomber 

force.

With the armistice talks stalled and the failure of Strangle and 

Saturate, attention turned to a resumption of strategic bombing. From 

May 1952 until the end of the war, massed bomber formations were sent 

over North Korea to pressure the communists into accepting cease-fire 

terms. The air campaign toward the end of the war resembled the final 

days of World War ll. Strategic bombing could not win a war alone, but 

it could be used effectively as a political weapon of persuasion.



_ RETURN TO MIG ALLEY: SCENARIO _



Due to his advanced age, the death of Kim ll-Sung had hardly come as a 

surprise to anyone in North Korea. As happened with Japan's former 

emperor, Hirohito, the national leadership was paralyzed while in the 

midst of a death vigil. The portly, double-chinned dictator left North 

Korea without a clearly defined transfer of power.  Kim had, after 

all, ruled the country ever since World War ll. His xenophobic brand 

of Stalinism had kept an iron grip

on government aided by an army of secret police and paid informants.

Though espousing the communist line, Kim ll-Sung had been a monarch in 

everything but name. While living, Kim had done his best to insure 

that the mantle of government would be passed along to his heir.

F 15 IN THE HILLS OF KOREA



His son, the younger Kim, fancies himself a modern-day Alexander the 

Great, eager to assume his father's position and titles. And just as 

Alexander's father Philip had bequeathed him the Macedonian phalanx, 

the elder Kim had left behind a phalanx of Soviettanks and aircraft. 

Thanks to his father's adroit diplomatic skill at playing China and 

the Soviet Union against one another, young Kim stood to inherit an 

awesome military machine.



THE PRODIGAL SON



Like all ambitious sons, the young Kim aspires to surpass even his 

father's former glory. Having had many years to silently contemplate 

this moment, he has moved swiftly to eliminate his opposition within 

the party apparatus. He will succeed where his father had failed and 

in so doing, he will be the one people remember, and not his father.

Gone are all those men who fed their personal ambitions by orbiting 

around his father. Gone too, are all those in the cabinet who 

counseled moderation. Just as his father before him, Kim alone knows 

what is best



1 54 for the Korean people. Taking his cue from the success of German 

reunification, Kim has decided to bring together north and south, 

under his leadership, of course. By merging the populous south with 

the industrial north, Kim's plan is to forge an economic powerhouse 

more powerful than any other along the Pacific rim.

Although the Japanese were far ahead for now, he mused, their society 

was fast becoming too decadent and westernized. In Kim's mind, as the 

Japanese people begin to demand the fruits of their economic miracle 

and decades of hard work, they will become soft. Just as the 

capitalist West had allowed the Japanese to overtake them, Korea would 

in turn displace the Japanese. Like the Americans who had allowed 

their industrial base to erode into a service economy, the Japanese 

would do the same. Human nature and the pursuit of luxury would do his 

work for him.

Naturally he could not expect to walk into South Korea unopposed. 

South Korea governments had provided the people with a modicum of 

personal liberties and a standard of living that most found 

acceptable. His biggest allies inside South Korea were leftist 

agitators on university campuses. Using student demonstrations to 

ferment unrest was an inexpensive means of shaking up the government. 

Continued student demonstrations turned into serious civil 

disturbances requiring the government to react, sometimes violently. 

The students repeatedly protested against U.S. "imperialism" and 

called for reunification. Having been financed and supported by North 

Korean "bagmen," the demonstrations were certainly giving Kim his 

money's worth.



NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR THREAT



Over the past decade, the North Korean nuclear program had progressed 

smartly. It had benefited by not being in the spotlight of world 

attention as had certain Middle Eastern nations. Because of oil, the 

United States had become intimately familiar with the Arab world. 

Lacking oil, most Americans couldn't find North Korea on a map.

Except for a couple of back-page newspaper articles, the North Korean 

nuclear complex at Yongbyon had been constructed and brought on-line 

with little fanfare. Using a tributary of the Chongchon for reactor 

coolant, Yonqbyon had for many months been processing weapons-grade

plutonium from nuclear waste. Because of the North Korean penchant for 

burying their facilities, most of Yongbyon was underground, away from 

prying eyes.

The overall military and political strategy of North Korea could make 

little use of the nuclear weapons being produced. It was hard to 

envisage a situation where nuclear weapons would be used against South 

Korea, the very territory they hoped to occupy intact. Possession of 

nuclear weapons for their deterrent effect was also discounted. Even 

Kim ll Sung was not so deluded as to believe that the Soviet Union, 

United States or even China would be deterred by North Korea's tiny 

nuclear arsenal. Lacking a capability to deliver nuclear weapons out 

of theater, North Korean was inviting retaliatory destruction just by 

possessing them.

Why then, a nuclear weapons program? For North Korea, the whole point 

of their nuclear program was to produce weapons to be sold abroad. Of 

course North Korea might keep one or two low yield tactical warheads 

on hand, but for the most part nuclear weapons were built to sell. The 

money or bartered goods these weapons could bring would then be used 

to buy more useful conventional arms. With the Soviet military now 

holding a garage sale, North Korea would be able to re-equip itself on 

the cheap.



THE IRAQI CONNECTION



One of the best potential customers was Iraq. Following the Persian 

Gulf War, Iraq's own nuclear weapons program lay in ruins. Its most 

crucial facilities been leveled during the war. After the war, UN 

inspection teams uncovered additional facilities untouched by the 

bombing. With the world now alert, rejuvenating Iraq's nuclear program 

would be impossible. A startup program would be too visible and just 

too costly. The fastest and safest way to acquire nuclear weapons from 

now on was to buy or steal them.

Although details are quite sketchy, it appears that a number of Iraq's 

special service operatives were caught inside the former Soviet Union 

trying to capture a special weapons storage complex. Apparently, a 

fire fight erupted between the Iraqi commandos and a Soviet security 

detachment. The security force was only able to gain the upper hand 

following the explosion of an Iraqi transport loaded with ammunition. 

The majority of the commando team went up along with the plane. The 

remaining Iraqis were captured and killed outright or taken in for 

interrogation.  The raid had left a lot of Russian soldiers, most of 

them teenagers, lying dead on the ground. Moscow was not happy. Many 

of the captured Iraqi commandos were in for a rough time. Vae Victus. 

Having failed in their attempt to steal a warhead, the Iraqis made 

secret overtures to the North Koreans. Since both governments were 

diplomatically isolated on the world stage, they found it easy to 

accept that fate had joined their two countries in this venture. A 

sales agreement was signed whereby North Korea agreed to deliver two 

40 kiloton warheads along with mating schematics for Iraq's Scud 

missiles.

The purchase price was a minimum of 140 million barrels of Iraqi crude 

to be delivered over the next five years. In addition, North Korea 

would receive technical assistance in constructing a super gun like 

the one destroyed by the U.N. inspection team. Finally, North Korea 

would receive $1.2 billion dollars equivalent in U.S. currency upon 

receipt of the first warhead.



A FATEFUL VOYAGE

The first of the two warheads was loaded aboard a North Korean tanker, 

the C'huche, at Namp'o naval base less than a month after the 

agreement was signed. $1.2 billion would buy a lot of Soviet hardware 

and the young Kim was in a hurry. The C'huche, meaning "self-

reliance," set sail for the Persian Gulf at a leisurely 15 knots 

trying to appear as inconspicuous as possible. On the return trip it 

would be loaded with Iraqi crude oil to further the deception.

Unbeknownst to the North Koreans, the tanker was being tracked by a 

U.S. Lacrosse surveillance satellite from the moment it left port. In 

a rare successful use of HUMINT resources, the National Security 

Agency (NSA) based at Fort Meade, Maryland had gotten wind of the 

transaction. Disgruntled members of Kim's ousted cabinet eager to see 

the usurper disappear had passed the information to U.S. officials.

Four days out of Namp'o, the C'huche was intercepted by surface

elements of the U.S 7th Fleet. CH-53s (Sea Stallion) helicopters from 

the USS Peleliu, a Tarawa class LHA, dropped a Navy SEAL team directly 

on the tanker's spacious deck. Making the actual stop were two 

Spruance class destroyers, the John Young (DD 973) and Ingersoll (DD 

990). Covering the operation from a distance was the Thomas S. Gates 

(CG 51), a Ticonderoga class guided-missile cruiser. Its powerful 

Aegis radar kept a constant vigil during the entire boarding 

procedure.

A nuclear device was located in the tanker's hold and removed by 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) trained SEALs. In a tense transfer 

operation, the warhead was hoisted aboard one of the Sea Kings and 

flown directly to the Peleliu. U.S. Marines then boarded the C'huche 

and conducted a thorough top to bottom inspection. At the conclusion 

of the operation, ship and crew were allowed to continue.

Howls of protest and cries of international piracy immediately came 

from North Korean diplomats worldwide. To anyone who would listen, the 

North Koreans promised that this act of blatant theft would not go 

unpunished. While steadfastly denying that a nuclear weapon had been 

recovered, Kim charged the U.S. with deliberately interfering with 

North Korea's right to free trade on the high seas.

The Korean threats were viewed seriously by the administration but 

government officials believed they were prepared to deal with any 

eventuality. The State Department was quick to post travel advisories 

in its embassies and government employees were asked to delay their 

travel plans. The travel advisories were then very quickly made 

available to the general public. No one wished to repeat the 

controversy surrounding prior notification that occurred following the 

post-Lockerbie revelations.

Several days after the tanker was stopped, a South Korean freighter 

suddenly and mysteriously exploded in the Sea of Japan. Although 

rumors of sabotage were tossed around, one unconfirmed report 

mentioned witnesses seeing torpedo tracks. The report of a submarine 

was met with a good deal of skepticism until a second freighter blew 

up one day later.

Both the U.S. and South Korean governments lodged formal complaints at 

the United Nations in New York. North Korea, through its 

intermediaries, vehemently denied complicity in the sinking of the two 

freighters. It blamed the loss of these two ships on the South Korean 

government. According to the North Koreans, South Korea was engaged in 

planting contact mines off its coast. Undoubtedly, the two ships were 

lost as a result of premature detonations of the mines they were 

carrying.

Satellite reconnaissance of North Korean ports, however, showed that 

North Korean submarines were out in force. As a precautionary measure 

U.S. P-3 Orion sub-hunters began doubling their daily sweeps from 

their bases in Japan. With two ships lost in as many days, Lloyd's 

brokerage in London was threatening to suspend its underwriting of 

civilian merchant shipping entering the Sea of Japan.



After two days of stepped up efforts, a magnetic anomaly detection (or 

MAD) contact was finally made by an Orion crew some 220 nautical miles 

northeast of Wonsan. The P-3 bracketed the underwater contact with a 

neatly spaced double-row of sonobuoys set to active ping. Almost 

immediately the contact began evasive maneuvering but it was too late. 

Caught moving parallel to the buoys, the contact's revved-up prop 

returns identified it as a Whiskey class diesel-electric boat.



THE DEATH OF RENO ZERO ONE



As the P-3 crew (designated RENO 01) continued to work the sub 

contact, an AWACS flying out of Misawa AB, Japan detected a pair of 

"bogeys" closing in on the sub-hunter from the north . The female 

controller's steady voice was easily recognizable above all the 

extraneous chatter.



"RENO 01, This is FREEBIRD. Hot Dog, Hot Dog, Hot Dog....Bogies 

bearing 327, Angels 5 at 100 miles."

"FREEBIRD, this RENO 01. Authenticate Bravo Thr..."

"Authenticate nothing, RENO 01. Clear outta' there. You've got a pair 

of MiGs in the neighborhood and headed your way. Come right to a 

heading of 125, that'll put 'em in your seven 'o clock "

"Roger, FREEBIRD. Can you call in some friendlies for me?"

"RENO 01, This is FREEBIRD. Already done. There's a couple of Eagle-

Charlies on the way at the speed o' heat. Should be there in five. "

"FREEBIRD, This is RENO 01. We just got a radar spike. I think they're 

really gonna' shoot Tell those guys to hurry up."



P3 ORION (RENO-01)

The intercept order had already gone out to the Ready Fives on the 

ground at Kunsan. It was clear that they would never reach RENO 01 in 

time. Even though the Orion pilot had gone to full military power and 

was receiving guidance from the AWACS, the bogies' closure rate was 

just too high. The P-3 would not get away.

At a range of 40 nautical miles, two MiG-29A Fulcrums locked-up the 

slow moving sub-hunter on their "Slot Back" pulse-Doppler targeting 

radar. Closing to eight nautical miles the lead aircraft let loose a 

pair of AA10 "Alamo-A" radar guided missiles. The J-band seekers in 

the missiles' nose cone would have no trouble in distinguishing the 

target. The radar cross section of a P-3 would look like a barn door 

to the missile's microchip brain. As the first AA-10 slammed into the 

plane's mid-section the second buried itself in the starboard wing 

before exploding.

RENO 01 immediately went into a 45 degree right bank and nosed over. 

It hit the water at over 300 knots, cart wheeled, and broke apart. The 

AWACS controller solemnly watched her screen showing the two MiGs 

retreat back into North Korean airspace and land at Toksan airfield 

outside of Hamhung. Two F-15Cs reached the sinking wreckage within 

minutes only to report back that no survivors were sighted.

Diplomatic communications between the White House and government 

ministry building in Pyongyang all but ceased. Instead, a heated 

series of back channel exchanges took place, full of charge and 

countercharge.  The players weren't out to score debating points 

though;  American military personnel were dead and North Korea was 

going to pay. This wasn't some tree clearing incident along the DMZ. 

This had been a deliberate attack in international airspace.



HAIL TO THE CHIEFS



Back on the flight line at Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base in North 

Carolina, F-15Es belonging to the 335th Fighter Squadron or "Chiefs" 

were in motion . A major redeployment to Korea was about to get 

underway and the eagle-keepers had their hands full. Arcing skyward in 

the predawn hours off runway 08, F-15Es left Seymour-Johnson in 

flights of six at one hour intervals.

The first leg of the long flight to Korea would take them over the 

Great Lakes and then north into Canada. The F-15s would need to 

rendezvous



1 57 with at least four tankers before reaching their initial stopover 

in Alaska. As the lead group touched down on Elmendorf AFB's runway 

25, over on the right the morning sun was reflecting off Mt. 

Mckinley's snow-capped peak.

The stay at Elmendorf was a brief one for the 335th crews. The pilots 

and "Wizzos" had just enough time to catch a quick nap and maybe grab 

a Moose-nugget key chain from the local Base Exchange as a souvenir. 

Maintenance crews at Elmendorf worked feverishly checking and 

rechecking flight systems for the "feet-wet" leg of the trip to Korea. 

After an abbreviated turn around, the men of the 335th were once again 

on their way.

Leveling off at flight level 260 (26,000 ft), the F-15 crews had not 

even settled in before having to hit the first tanker. Each member of 

the flight would top-off with about 800 Ibs. of fuel just to ensure 

the fuel tanks were operating properly. Aircraft with defective fuel 

tanks would have to be identified and abort the mission prior to 

heading out over the Pacific.



ACROSS THE BIG POND



Travelling at 460 knots, the trans-Pacific leg into Kadena AB on 

Okinawa took about eight hours. Since taking off at Elmendorff the F-

15s had logged 3,900 miles before going wheels down at Kadena. Both 

men and machines were in need of rest. Maintenance crews would be 

flying into Kadena on C-141 Starlifters in the next several hours. In 

the meantime, the drivers and back-seaters would be catching up on 

some well-deserved sleep. Before long they would be making the short 

hop to Osan AB, South Korea.

In the interim, relations between the U.S. and North Korea had been 

steadily deteriorating. The National Security Council (NSC) and Joint 

Chiefs had reached a general consensus concerning North Korean sales 

of nuclear weapons to Iraq. If necessary, the U.S. would resort to 

ground strikes on North Korean nuclear facilities to prevent the 

transfer of nuclear hardware.

Word out of the ClA's Vint Hill Farms complex was that Kim was going 

to attempt another transfer in the near future. Having failed by sea, 

this second transfer according to sources would probably take place by 

air, making interception somewhat more difficult. Impromptu think 

tanks tried

to address the obvious questions. What if the warhead was secretly 

placed aboard a civilian airliner along with passengers? How do you 

stop and search a passenger jet? And finally, would the U.S. shoot 

down a plane loaded with civilians to prevent Iraa from obtaining a 

nuclear weapon?

A RETURN TO MIG ALLEY



The President was left with no alternative but to authorize a series 

of

air strikes on North Korean nuclear installations, ports and selected 

air-

fields. The Yongbyon processing plant in particular would have to be 

taken

out. The 335th Squadron's Strike Eagles at Osan were put on alert. At 

any

minute the call would come through to begin hitting predetermined 

targets.

After all these years, the Chiefs will be returning to "MiG Alley" 

once again.



KOREAN COMMENTARY



The first Korean War took place in an era far removed from the type of 

aerial combat you will experience in F-15 Strike Eagle lll. There were 

no long-range engagements. Everything was done up close and personal. 

Air-to-air missiles and precision guided ordnance had yet to make 

their debut. In fact, the majority of bombing raids were conducted by 

aircraft with piston-driven engines, remnants of the last major war. 

Even the venerable P-51 Mustang of WW ll was a common sight over North 

Korea early in the war.

The war did provide the venue for a classic confrontation, reminding 

one of the World War ll duel between German Me-109s and British 

Spitfires. The F-86 and MiG-15, two evenly matched fighters, became 

locked in a lethal air battle with the prize being air supremacy over 

Korea.



1 58

While neither aircraft could claim a significant advantage over the 

other, each had its own unique set of characteristics which could 

potentially give it an edge in a dogfight.

Aerial combat in the 1950s was almost exclusively a "stick and rudder" 

affair with guns thrown in.  It was actually more akin to the last 

aerial battles in WW ll than the first battles of the jet age. With 

both sides possessing similar aircraft, aerial combat was often 

decided by the individual skills of the pilots.

In F-15 Strike Eagle IlI's Korean War scenario, you are required to 

revisit many of the same targets struck during the 1950s. This time, 

however, you face significant threats that the earlier pilots did not. 

Since the Fifties, North Korea has purchased a substantial amount of 

SAMs and has invested heavily in triple-A guns. Not only are the air 

defenses better equipped but the air force is much improved. Its 

pilots are far better trained the "recruit pilots" which flew the MiG-

15s.

Staging from South Korean bases, your F-15E is required to penetrate 

the heart of the enemy's air defenses. Lavishly equipped with SAMs, 

North Korea can best be described as treacherous. Rugged North Korean 

terrain, with its numerous peaks and valleys, makes flying more 

difficult yet provides a sanctuary for you to hide in. An experienced 

pilot can shake a missile "lock" in a hurry by using terrain properly.

_ NORTH KOREAN ORDER OF BATTLE _

GROUND FORCES:



2 Armored divisions, 5 Mechanized Infantry divisions, 31 Infantry 

divisions, 6 Armored brigades, 4 Artillery brigades, 20 Artillery 

regiments, 5 Airborne battalions Major Equipment: (3,500) MBTs 

T54155162s, PT-76s, Type 62s, (2,000) APCs BTR40/50/60/152s, BMP-ls, 

(3,500) artillery pieces incl. 122mm and 152mm SPA



AIR FORCE:



3 Light Bomber squadrons, 10 F/GA squadrons, 12 Interceptor squadrons, 

3 Transport squadrons, 7 Training squadrons Major Equipment: (50) IL-

28, (30) SU-7, (10) SU-25, (50) MiG-19, (58) MiG-23, (48) MiG-29, (40) 

A-5 Fantan, (200) An-2, (10) An-24



NAVAL FORCES:



(2) Najin class Frigates, (1) Soho class Frigates, (16) Romeo class 

Submarines, (4) Whiskey class Submarines, (4) Soju class FACs 

(imrroved Osa). (12) Osa Is



AIR DEFENSES:

2 SAM divisions, 5 SSM regiments

Maior Equipment: 50) SA-2, (30) SA-3, (54) SA-5

III. CENTRAL AMERICA SCENARIO



"A MAN, A PIAN, A CANAL PANAMA"



Prior to the 20th century, Panama had been just a distant province of 

Colombia, separated from the rest of the country by mountains and 

jungle. But the proposed construction of a trans-oceanic canal through 

the region had made it a very desirable piece of property. Linking the 

Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the Panama Canal would make the lengthy 

voyage around South America's Cape Horn unnecessary.

The benefit of such a short cut was driven home during the 

SpanishAmerican war when the battleship USS Oregon had to sail around 

South America in order to join the U.S. fleet off Cuba. The Oregon had 

been instrumental in providing America's margin of victory in the 

Battle of Santiago. The military usefulness of such a link thus 

demonstrated, commercial transportation costs would also be cut 

dramatically by shortening the length of time goods spent at sea.

A French engineering firm had been awarded the contract to complete 

the canal in the 1880s. But after six years and the death of 20,000 

workers due to disease, the company abandoned the effort. Asking for 

over $100 million to cover its expenses, French investors put the 

unfinished canal up for sale. The United States quickly expressed an 

interest but at the same time entered into negotiations concerning an 

alternate route through Nicaragua.

Faced with this new competition, the French firm decided to cut its 

losses and lowered its offer to only $40 million. The United States, 

which had not been discouraged by the French failure, accepted this 

lowered asking price. However, if Americans were going to build the 

canal, we were equally determined to own it.

Even at $40 million, the Panama route was expensive when one considers 

the $15 million paid for the whole of the Louisiana territory, or 

$7,200,000 paid for Alaska. The United States opened a round of 

negotiations with Colombian authorities seeking to create a six mile 

wide Canal Zone. In 1903, the Hay-Herran treaty formally gave the U.S. 

rights



1 61 to the Canal Zone for $10 million down and $250,000 a year in 

rent. After the pact was concluded, Colombian officials decided to up 

the price to $25 million.

Referring to those "foolish and homicidal corruptionists in Bogota~" 

rough-riding Theodore Roosevelt flew in to a rage.  Now acting as 

President as a result of McKinley's assassination i n 1901, Roosevelt 

was determined to have the canal. Having won fame in the Caribbean for 

his charge up San Juan Hill, he was used to confrontational tactics 

with Latin Americans.

In a display of chicanery unparalleled since the Mexican-American war, 

Roosevelt engineered an uprising in the port of Colon against 

Colombian officials. Headquarters for this "people's revolt" was Room 

1162 of the New York Waldorf-Astoria hotel, an unlikely spot for 

Colombian revolutionaries to meet. It was here that the conspirators 

raised money to secure Panama's independence from Colombia. The 

revolution



FLYING DANGER-CLOSE OVER PANAMA CITY

was led by a number of former Colombian soldiers in the pay of the 

certain U.S. citizens. In case Bogota protested, the navy cruiser USS 

Nashville just happened to be on hand.

Not only did Colombia protest but it tried to send military forces 

into Panama to reclaim it. Unfortunately, an impenetrable jungle stood 

in the way and U.S. warships were in position to interfere with any 

move up the coast.

A civil war in Colombia had ended just prior to the Panamanian revolt. 

Known as the War of a Thousand Days, it had cost the military over 

lO,000 lives. Consequently, Colombia was in no shape to confront the 

U.S. on this issue and in the end was forced to recognize the 

independence of its former province.



"Tell them that I am going to make the dirt fly."

--Theodore Roosevelt in 1903



The revolt had been successful. After placing hand-picked Panamanian 

officials in power Roosevelt signed a treaty giving the U.S. rights to 

the canal in perpetuity. For $10 million down and $250,000 a year 

(terms of the original deal with Colombia), the U.S. had gotten its 

bargain after all. The canal was built ahead of schedule and by 

coincidence was opened for business only days after the start of World 

War I in 1914.

The unsavory manner in which Roosevelt obtained the Canal Zone never 

sat well with American ideals of fair play. When asked by Roosevelt 

himself to defend the President's actions, Attorney General Philander 

C. Knox responding, "Oh, Mr. President, do not let so great an 

achievement suffer from any taint of legality."

Though ownership of the Canal had been crucial to the conduct of our 

two-ocean war strategy in World War II, it still had a certain stigma 

attached to it. Continued possession lent credence to Latino charges 

of Yanqui imperialism and tainted relations with our hemispheric 

neighbors.



"We stole it fair and square, so why can't we keep it?"

--U.S. Senator during the 1977 debates



Serious consideration over the return of the canal to Panama began 

during the Carter administration in the late 1970s. President Jimmy 

Carter



1 62 and fellow Democrats pushed hard for Senate ratification of the 

Panama Canal Treaty which would relinquish control of the canal in 

1999. The debate was divisive. Republicans charged the Democrats with 

being soft on foreign policy but in the end the treaty managed to 

squeezed through passage. The 1977 Panama Canal Treaty was now law, 

committing the United States to return the Canal Zone to Panama by 31 

December 1999.



OPERATION "JUST CAUSE"



In 1989, after invoking the right of "self defense" clause contained 

in the treaty, the United States launched "Operation Just Cause." Just 

Cause came in response to repeated harassment of U.S. citizens, 

military and civilian, within the Zone.  But the underlying goal of 

the operation was the capture of Panama's "Maximum Leader" General 

Manuel Antonio Noriega. Noriega had been a onetime CIA paid informant 

but lately the U.S. had linked him to illicit drug trafficking.

Over a five-day period General Noriega had managed to elude over 

20,000 U.S. servicemen by making his way to the Vatican embassy in 

Panama City. Fed a diet of steady high volume rock 'n roll music by 

members of the 82nd Airborne Division, Noriega finally surrendered to 

U.S. authorities. He was immediately whisked away to eventually stand 

trial for various crimes including dealing in narcotics.

In the decade following the ouster of strongman and CIA confidant, 

Manuel Noriega, much has happened to the former Republic of Panama. A 

succession of civilian governments, all enjoying tacit U.S. approval, 

have failed due to rampant inflation and stagnant national economy. 

The support promised by the United States in the wake of General 

Noriega's departure did not materialize. With severe budgetary 

problems of its own, the United States was forced to curtail many of 

its foreign aid programs. Panama, never high on anyone's list to begin 

with, was dropped entirely.

As a result, Panama became a nation adrift. Burdened by a mounting 

national debt and nonexistent middle class, the tiny country descended 

into chaos. The few fortunate souls with means took their money and 

their families out of the country. Those remaining behind were mainly 

native mestizos. With no hope for the future a generation of poor grew 

up just outside governmental installations, subsisting on occasional 

handouts or scrounging through military refuse. The only source of 

steady income still open was plantation work on land owned by a few 

large corporations.

Obligated by treaty to turn over control of the Canal Zone, the United 

States was alarmed by what it saw happening in Panama. In secret 

Congressional deliberations, National Security Counsel (NSC) staffers 

testified in favor of postponing the return of the canal area 

indefinitely.

Citing unrest and the potential for terrorist activity, the NSC called 

for, ". . . the removal of all military forces from the region or 

reinforcing those forces already in theater to degree commensurate 

with the level of violence."

Civilian officials in the State Department had also taken a 

pessimistic tone, summing up their findings by concluding, ". . .an 

intolerable situation exists in which elected representatives in 

Panama are unlikely to exercise positive control over the Canal proper 

and its environs in the future."



THE YANQUIS GO HOME



Despite these dire predictions, the President ignored the warnings of 

this cabinet officials and dutifully carried out the letter of the 

treaty. The 193rd Infantry Brigade was removed from the Canal Zone 

accompanied by much public fanfare. Panama rejoiced over the 

proceedings as the Stars and Stripes was hauled down from Albrook Air 

Base for the last time. All U.S. Army personnel were redeployed back 

to the states while the Air Force sent its people to other overseas 

locations.

Months ahead of the required date the Canal Zone was for the first 

time in its history sovereign territory of the Panamanian republic. As 

the glow of celebration died down, the responsibility stemming from 

ownership began to sink in. The Canal had never been profitable since 

it began operating in 1914. It had survived year after year only as a 

result of huge U.S. subsidies. Whether Panama could now afford its 

prize possession remained an open question.



THE "LEBANON-IZATION" OF PANAMA



The social divide separating rich from poor in Panama resulted in the 

formation of very distinct political castes. The peasant class, which 

had originally banded together for economic survival, wound up 

fragmenting into a system of regional alliances. As the these ties 

grew, a more structured and formalized system of family loyalties 

emerged. As this fragmentation progressed, Panamanian society began to 

rely far less heavily on its central government.



1 63



Largely seen as a tool of northern imperialism, the government lacked 

both credibility and relevance. It was as if no one was paying 

attention any longer. As the various clans gained strength, they 

evolved into something closely resembling large fraternities. Though 

there were strong similarities between the clans and organized crime 

in the U.S. it would be wrong to make too much of this analogy. The 

Panamanian peasants gathered more to present a solid political front 

against exploitation than to engage sinister activities.

In a less anarchic state these groups might even been considered 

political parties. But, because the central government had to ceased 

to function effectively, there was no point in running for elective 

office. No one group could hope to win enough converts from the others 

to achieve anything close a national consensus. The break down in 

government led to a situation where the clans began exercising 

unchecked power. Recognizing no law higher than their own each group 

had taken part in the de facto dismantling of the country. A new 

period in Panamanian history was dawning, the country was becoming 

"Lebanon-ized."



"BARRIO BEIRUT";

PANAMANIAN CML WAR



A crisis was brewing that even Americans working in the Zone could 

detect. The nickname "Barrio Beirut" came into popular use when 

referring to Panama City. In deference to the U.S. involvement in 

Southeast Asia, military retirees began tooling around the city with 

bumper-stickers reading "PANA-NAM." Luckily for them, perhaps, the 

locals weren't hip to the humor.

It is hard to pinpoint the exact moment when civil war broke out in

Panama. There were never any declarations just a noticeable increase 

in the level of violence. As wars go, this one was fought more as a 

series of grudges. One faction would pick a fight with another over 

some perceived insult, either real or imagined. For the next few weeks 

both sides would bang away at each other and then things would go 

pretty much back to "normal."

Torn by civil strife, it wasn't long before outside influences began 

making inroads. The country was overrun by small groups of Cuban 

socialists, Peruvian-Marxists, right-wing totalitarians, 

hemispherists, and radicals of every conceivable political bent. But 

on the heels of this

ideological stew came a more insidious intrusion. Intent on opening 

new drug routes to the United States, narco-trafficantes flocked to 

the lawless "Wild West" atmosphere of Panama's steaming jungles.



"LITTLE COLOMBIA"



South American drug cartels looked upon Panama as an ideal spot from 

which to operate. In the day when Noriega was in charge, Colombian 

drug lords had paid a high sum in brides to use its facilities. Dirt 

strip runways abounded in areas which were otherwise inaccessible. 

Now, with routes already established, these same smugglers could open 

shop in jungle clearings for nothing. In fact, using their huge 

profits they could recruit battalions of impoverished natives as 

guards. Motivated by a desire to provide a decent life for their 

families these men willingly participated in the drug trade. What 

choice did they have other than watching their children slowly starve?

Within several years, drug activity through Panama became pandemic. 

Marijuana grown in clandestine fields competed with the jungle 

laboratories producing cocaine slag from Peruvian leaves. The 

Chucunaque river valley in eastern Panama became so infested with 

cocaine processing camps it became known as "Little Colombia." Nestled 

snugly between two mountain ranges, del Darien and de Canazas, to Drug 

Enforcement Agency (DEA) men, Little Colombia was Panama's A-Shau 

Valley.

Despite the U.S. declaration of war on drugs, very little had actually 

been accomplished. The reluctance to train and use military personnel 

in this war had crippled the effort. More importantly the DEA's high-

handed tactics had alienated the very foreign governments it depended 

on for help. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1992 to allow the 

kidnapping and extradition of wanted persons from foreign countries 

had not played well in South American capitals. The intrusive nature 

of America's "War on Drugs" had driven relations to a new low, worse 

even, than during the Falkland-Malvinas conflict.

The Colombian government in particular had been extremely upset by 

this policy and warned the U.S. against conducting such operations on 

its territory. As might be expected, DEA agents in Bogota and Medellin 

began to get rather frosty receptions from government officials. In 

Peru and Venezuela, cooperation in the drug war had never progressed 

much



164 beyond lip service, even before the Supreme Court's announcement. 

Relations between countries were further poisoned by the "accidental" 

attack on a P-3 Orion aircraft by a Peruvian Air Force jet, also in 

1992. U .S. agents were being asked leave South America and escorted 

to the border by host-nation police.

As worrisome as the situation in Panama was to the United States, 

Colombia was even more concerned. For a long time officials in Bogota 

had been turning a blind eye towards the drug related activities of 

its citizens within Panama. But while Bogota was well aware of Little 

Colombia, it could not overlook the fact that Panama also provided a 

safe haven for the terrorist organization, M-19.



M l9 (APRIL l9TH MOVEMENT)

M-19 made its first appearance during the early 1970s. Since then, it 

has waged a bloody terrorist campaign aimed at overthrowing the 

Colombian government. The group became famous for its theft of the 

priceless sword of Bolivar, the George Washington of South America. 

During the 1976 elections, M-19 gained a reputation for ruthlessness 

by kidnapping and murdering a local labor union leader. Then in 1980, 

the group staged a takeover of the Dominican Republic's Colombian 

embassy. With increased notoriety came support from Cuba. Throughout 

the eighties, Castro allegedly provided arms and terrorist training to 

the subversives causing Bogota to severe diplomatic relations.

Using the arms and equipment obtained from Cuba, M-19 conducted its 

most famous operation to date. In 1985, 24 of its members captured the 

Palace of Justice in Bogota. During the two day siege which followed, 

the terrorists murdered the supreme court justices they had found 

inside. The military was called in and finally retook the building but 

only after more than 100 people were killed. The exploit electrified 

the nation.

The Colombian government responded by declaring an "all-out offensive" 

on terrorism which continued into the mid-199Os. It reluctantly

made concessions to various drug barons in return for money and 

assistance. Their effort paid off. Within months, Colombia was 

successful in disrupting M-19 within its own borders. Cells were 

broken up, arms caches discovered and soon the group was out of the 

terrorist business. Recognizing the extent of their defeat, surviving 

members of the group surrendered to authorities.

With their weapons turned in, M-19 could no longer use terror as a 

means of persuasion. Over the next several years the group worked on 

repairing its image and sought to join the legitimate political 

process. Unfortunately, their brand of totalitarian socialism was no 

more palatable even when presented peacefully. The people of Colombia 

were not about to adopt anything remotely resembling communism, not 

after watching the Soviet Union implode during the 1990s.

Before long, ideological firebrands within the M-19 organization were 

once again advocating a return to violence. Clearly, the country would 

not become socialist through normal methods. Turning again to Cuba for 

support, M-19 discarded any pretense of legitimacy. Legal means were 

just too slow when the country could be won by force of arms. 

Gathering its membership among young Cuban idealists and disaffected 

Colombian migrants, the group was back in the terrorist business.

Not ready to challenge the government on its own soil, the guerrillas 

found the unrest in Panama to be perfect cover. Having been driven out 

of Colombia once, they established a network of jungle base camps just 

over the border. From these camps they were able to resume their 

terrorist campaigns within a very short time. In fact much of Colombia 

northwest of the Rio Atrato was soon under their influence.



COLOMBIA'S MASTER STROKE



Using the destruction of M-19's border sanctuaries as a pretense, 

Colombia has mounted a major land-sea-air campaign into eastern 

Panama. Prepared texts were sent out after the operation was underway 

to all O A.S. member states, including the United States. By comparing 

this operation to Israel's 1982 "Peace for Galilee" campaign, Colombia 

was trying to minimize unfavorable public opinion. According to the 

statement, Bogota viewed the incursion as a temporary measure only. 

Its forces would be withdrawn immediately upon completion of the 

operation.

By any standards the operation was deftly handled. Naval units from 

the port of Buenaventura on Colombia's pacific coast disembarked a 

battalion of naval infantry at the mouth of the Rio Tuira. Upon 

landing the marine unit headed inland to the InterAmerican highway 

where they would be in position to intercept any M-19 guerillas 

retreating northward.



On the ground, units of Colombia's 3rd Division had left their billets 

in Calli the day before. Pushing north up the highway, the 3rd 

Division's two mechanized brigades became the hammer against the 

marine battalion's anvil. True, the units were only equipped with M4A3 

Sherman tanks, but if all went well the guerillas would be destroyed 

by two squadrons of A-37s waiting overhead.

As the operation unfolded Colombian Rangers and Special Forces were 

airlifted deep into Panama. Riding in UH-ls and their new UH-60 

Blackhawks, these troops were to secure key bridges and other 

strategic points along the InterAmerican highway. For example, an 

entire company of Rangers was inserted next to the bridge connecting 

both sides of Lake Bayano. The mission of these airmobile troops was 

actually two-fold, preventing guerillas from escaping to the Canal 

Zone and preventing outside forces (possibly U S ) from interfering.

Flying Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the entire operation were twenty-

plus Mirage Ills and 5s. Pilots were told not to expect interference 

from Panamanian F-5 interceptors in the Canal zone but were warned to



HIGH-G TURN OVER THE CANAL

stay alert nonetheless. The Colombian jets circled along the border in 

long, lazy, oval Patterns being careful not provoke any reaction from 

Fort Howard.

For the United States, Colombia's abrupt decision to invade eastern 

Panama had placed it in a delicate situation. One the one hand, the 

security of Panama was still largely a U S responsibility. But, upon 

reflection, the U.S was guilty of resorting to the same thing in 1989, 

using force to remove terrorism in the form of Noreiga. How could the 

United States protest a Colombian operation aimed at ridding itself of 

a communist terror organization? It couldn't. Like it or not, the U.S. 

was trapped in the logic of its own policies. The momentary indecision 

cost the U.S. the opportunity to keep the Colombians out of the Canal 

Zone.

As efficient as the Colombians were, the operation failed to encircle 

the M-19 units. The guerillas had been tipped off by their undercover 

agents still in government. By picking up and moving their jungle 

camps deeper and farther west into Panama, they were able to elude the 

Colombian assault. Though the Colombian armored units rolling up the 

highway didn't yet know it, but they were throwing their best punch 

into thin air. Still, Colombian troops would soon be in control of 

most of eastern Panama. The fact that nothing had been heard from the 

Americans was encouraging.



COLOMBIA STRIKES THE CANAL



Very few guerrillas were captured during the initial phase of the 

Colombian operation. Aerial observation detected that many members of 

M-19 were heading for Panama City. Colombian mechanized units headed 

out of their bivouac cantonment near Lake Bayano. Moving at a high 

rate of speed for the canal, more than one hapless civilian lay 

crushed beneath their treads. Publicly it would be announced that 

these units were still engaged in rooting out the fleeing members of 

M-19. Privately, Colombian military officers had already decided to 

wrest control of the Canal Zone from Panama.

After the American invasion in 1989, the Panamanian Defense Force 

(PDF) was disbanded. Also disarmed were Noriega's "Dignity 

Battalions," Panama's local militia comprised of little more than 

street toughs and thugs. In place of the Dignity Battalions a new 

military infrastructure had been created. In reality these changes 

were only cosmetic. The Panamanian military after 1990 was largely an 

army consisting of administrative headquarters.



166



Having inherited excellent airbases from the Americans after their 

departure, the Panamanian Air Force had no planes to fly. The Navy 

consisted of a few LSTs and patrol craft. But with nowhere to go and 

hardly any troops to transport, it spent all of its time at anchor.

So while the 11,000 man Panamanian police force constituted the major 

opposition to Colombia, it could hardly be expected to hold the 

advancing armor for long. With the country in the midst of civil war, 

it had its hands full trying to maintain order in the first place. 

Since certain factions were actively assisting the Colombian military, 

prospects for halting their offensive were nil.

On the northern end of the Canal Zone, a protracted firefight was in 

full swing. Seeking to carve up the port of Colon, Colombian drug 

barons sent members of their private army into the streets to drive 

out loyal Panamanian police units. Outnumbered and outgunned, the 

police evacuated the city after several days, leaving it to the hired 

mercenaries.

What concerned Colombian military leaders the most was the possible 

intervention of U.S. air power. Although the decision to take on the 

United States was bitterly opposed by many junior officers, the ruling 

clique was solidly behind the plan. Having watched the performance of 

U.S. forces during the Gulf war spectacle, the generals still believed 

they could win.



BANKING ON THE 'VIETNAM SYNDROME"



For one thing, Colombia was not a desert nation. The area was covered 

with dense jungle growth and towering mountains. A war in this region 

would be largely an infantry affair, nullifying American advantages in 

armored forces. It would not be the type of fast moving, hard-hitting 

war fought in the Middle East or Europe.

It was assumed that the United States would probably react strongly 

once satellite reconnaissance spotted tanks moving on the Canal Zone. 

But by the time U S forces could respond, Colombian forces would be 

firmly in possession of Panama and daring the U.S. to expend its 

"smart weaponry" in the dense jungle cover.

Fighting in Central and South America would be more akin to fighting 

in Vietnam. Colombian soldiers were considered some of the best 

trained light infantry in South America, if not the world. Having 

fought guerrilla

groups like, M-19, FARC and ELN for decades, the Colombian military 

could rightly lay claim to being battle-hardened. Its forces were 

superbly equipped and accustomed to jungle warfare just in case the 

U.S. was foolish enough to take them on in their own backyard.

Most importantly however, Colombia had friends in the region it could 

turn to for help. Whereas, Iraq had been militarily and diplomatically 

isolated by the world community, Colombia was not.



SEARCHING FOR ALLIES



In 1981, Colombia's elected president Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala had 

flatly stated, " . . . i n view of the uncertain future and danger 

that is threatening the Caribbean ," Colombia had plans, "to improve 

all its deterrent military equipment ." In the 1980s and 1990s, 

Venezuela had been the danger he was speaking of. As a result, 

Turbay's rearmament program was specifically aimed at improving 

Colombia's conventional force deterrence. More recently however, the 

two countries have found cooperation more profitable than 

confrontation. Their economic policies have marched in lockstep for 

well over half a decade.

It had always been assumed that should a ground war break out with 

Venezuela, Colombia's coal rich Guajira peninsula would be the reason. 

Disputed ownership of the land had come close to touching off war many 

times late in the 20th Century. But in the spirit of the new 

ColombiaVenezuela relationship, profits from the Guajira mines were to 

be shared. As these strong economic ties were forged, military co-

operation and exchange further lessened tensions. It had allowed the 

Colombian military to concentrate on combating internal guerillas 

while Venezuela would be spared the expense of a costly arms race.

The price for Colombian generosity came with potential strings 

attached. Under terms of the 1947 Rio Pact, South American nations 

were obligated to come to the aid of fellow co-signers should they be 

attacked. Colombian military officials had every intention of 

requesting assistance from their Venezuela counterparts should the 

U.S. decide to intervene on Panama's behalf.

Colombian officials were particularly interested in Venezuela's three 

fighter squadrons. Equipped with F-16As, Mirages, and F-5s, the 11th, 

12th, 16th Interceptor/attack Squadrons would be necessary to deal 

with



1 67 the potential U.S. carrier and land based air threat. OV-10s 

belonging to the 15th Special Operations Group based at Maracaibo 

would be indispensable for jungle operations.

With the eastern flank secure now that Venezuela was tentatively on 

board, Colombia now turned its attention to enlisting additional 

conspirators. Since waving a carrot in the form of Guajira coal had 

worked so well with Venezuela, the military decided to take the same 

approach with others in the region.

A high level Colombian delegation was hurriedly sent to Managua, 

Nicaragua's lakeside capital. In secret meetings with Sandinista 

military and governmental civilian leaders, the emissaries placed two 

specific proposals on the table. First,Colombia promised not to oppose 

Nicaragua's plan to construct a second trans-oceanic canal in the 

future. To Colombia, this was a major concession since most future 

business would be directed to a wider and more modern canal system.

Secondly, Colombia agreed to enter into talks concerning the islands 

of San Andres and Providencia off Nicaragua's eastern shore. In 1979, 

these two islands were the subject of a territorial dispute which 

intensified when Nicaragua reasserted its claims. Fearing a possible 

Sandinista effort to take the islands by force, Colombia constructed a 

major military base on San Andres. This facility, complete with 

airstrip, served as the naval headquarters for the Caribbean. 

Increased naval and air patrols near the island was meant to send a 

message to the Sandinistas; hands off.

The cost for future negotiations concerning island repatriation was 

cooperation in harassing any United States response to the Panamanian 

operation. Anticipating that the U.S. might try to stage land-based 

aircraft in Costa Rica, the Colombians wanted to pre-position their 

aircraft at Nicaragua's Bluefields airbase. From Bluefields, 

interceptor/attack squadrons were in easy striking distance of Costa 

Rica and would be astride U .S. sea lanes of communication (SLOC).



A BELATED RESPONSE



As columns of tanks snaked their way along the InterAmerican highway 

to

Panama City, the Colombian ambassador was summoned to the State

Department. Behind closed doors, he was subjected to a verbal harangue

from the President and his advisors. The ambassador was unable to shed

any light on his government's actions and said nothing. In very 

undiplomatic terms, the U.S. president stated his administration's 

position and spelt out the repercussions if Colombia did not withdraw 

immediately.

The Colombian ambassador replied that before he could speak with 

authority he would first need to consult with members of his own 

government. He expressed his surprise at the level of American concern 

since his country was in effect ending Panama's civil war. 

Furthermore, Colombian troops stationed in Panama were likely to 

accomplish more in the war on drugs than had all the previous American 

administrations combined. By skillfully putting the best face on the 

situation, he had bought his country some additional time.

At about the same time the ambassador was being shown the door in 

Washington, the lead Colombian tanks were rolling bumper to bumper 

across the Bridge of the Americas. Scout jeeps fanned out to patrol 

Panama City's side streets while the main column of tanks proceeded 

down the Avenue of the Martyrs.

Unknowingly, the Colombian military had triggered a military response 

from the U.S. when they entered Panama City. The Bridge of the 

Americas west of Panama City had been designated as the tripwire. Once 

the Colombians crossed into the Canal Zone, the United States was 

locked into a unilateral military response.



CRISIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA



The initial reaction in any crisis management session is always, 

"Where are the carrier bttlegroups?" In this instance only one of the 

3rd Fleet's carriers was on station in the Caribbean. The Nimitz class 

USS United States was conducting tactical exercises off Puerto Rico 

when the invasion first took place. One additional carrier, the USS 

Carl Vinson, was off Long Island, New York. The two carriers plus 

their escorts were immediately ordered to rendezvous off Mexico's 

Yucatan peninsula before proceeding to Panama.

In the meantime, F-15E squadrons from Seymour-Johnson, North Carolina 

were put on alert.  These aircraft were to undertake a major shuttle 

operation to Juan Santamaria International Airport outside of San 

Jose, Costa Rica. Staged from Costa Rica, F-15Es would be in striking 

distance of all of Panama and most of Colombia with only a single 

refueling.



1 68



With Colombian troops spilling into the Canal Zone, airstrikes were 

probably a foregone conclusion. The two carrier groups and their 

component aircraft would buy the U.S. some needed time to deploy 

additional land forces. It would be at least several days before the 

82nd Airborne Division could be assembled. Undergoing desert training 

exercises near the southern tip of the Sinai peninsula, the 82nd would 

have to be refitted for a jungle environment.

The F-15Es in Costa Rica and the carrier-borne F/A-18 Hornets would 

have to bear the brunt of the initial action. The first task 

confronting them would be to establish air superiority over the Canal 

Zone before amphibious and airborne operations could commence.

The television media in the U.S. was quick to pick up a story out of 

the Pentagon concerning a bit of historical irony. The Nimitz class 

carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt happened to be in Norfolk repairing a 

minor problem with turbine vibration. The military had originally 

wanted it to join the USS United States instead of the Vinson. Located 

in Virginia it would have arrived in the area almost a day sooner. As 

the orders were being cut, a junior naval attache pointed out that 

Teddy Roosevelt had perhaps been the root cause of this crisis over a 

century ago. The orders were changed.



_ CENTRAL AMERICA COMMENTARY _



Despite our best intentions, the United States has never been able to 

maintain a stable relationship with our southern neighbors. Tension 

has always existed between Latin America and the United States since 

this country's founding. It has been hard to get beyond accusations of 

exploitation, since the 19th century is rife with examples of American 

imperialism. Even sincere and legitimate concerns over the region are 

often dismissed as either "Yanqui interference" or "Big Brother-ism" 

by South American nations.

The controversy over acquiring the Panama canal is just one case

which illustrates why there continues to be such a deep-seated 

suspicion of the United States. We are living with the legacy of 

"gunboat diplomacy." Having been pushed around as mere "banana 

republics" for so long, it only stands to reason that these nations 

might wish to band together against outsiders.

In this scenario the United States finds itself in a dilemma. It is 

trying to preserve Panamanian independence without becoming mired in 

another guerrilla war. After some diplomatic arm twisting, Costa Rica 

has graciously agreed to allow U.S. aircraft to stage missions from 

its territory.

The majority of F-15E missions will undoubtedly take place over Panama 

and northwestern Colombia. But watch out; rumor has it that Venezuela 

has joined forces with the Colombians. If true, we may wind up facing 

some of our own advanced equipment. The Venezuelan Air Force is known 

to possess F-16s. While the Venezuelan Falcons lack some of the moder 

navionics that are standard in our domestic models, they are still 

formidable dogfighters.

Nicaragua may become another possible participant in this conflict. 

Although our State Department is working overtime to convince Managua 

to stay neutral, no one knows how they will react. American airpower 

based right next door in Costa Rica may serve as a warning but it 

might also act like waving a red flag in front of a bull. The 

Nicaraguans may submit or they may charge in a reflex action.

The Panamanian Air Force was equipped with F-5s but it is unknown how 

many of these aircraft survived the civil war. It is also not known 

whether these aircraft, if they did survive, are supporting the 

Colombians or combating them. Determining the threat posed by the F-5s 

may come down to a case by case situation.

While judging South American intentions has always been difficult for 

our intelligence services, the military aspect of the campaign is 

relatively cut and dry. The Air Force has assigned F-15Es to strike a 

wide range of potential targets. From hidden jungle laboratories 

belonging to the drug cartel barons to communications centers in 

Bogota, hundreds of targets are about to be caught in a hail of 

"smart" bombs.



COLOMBIAN AND VENEZUELAN

ORDER OF BATTLE



GROUND FORCES:



Colombia: (4) divisions w/ nine brigades, (9) Mechanized-Cavalry 

Groups, (2) marine battalions, (1) marine jungle battalion, (1) Jungle 

battalion, (1) Ranger battalion. (1) AAA battalion



169 Venezuela: (3) Infantry divisions, (1) Mechanized-Cavalry 

Division, (1) Armor division, (1) Jungle division, combat engineers 

and Ranger Battalion



Major Equipment:

Colombia: (30) M4A3 Shermans, (30) M3A1 Stuarts, (120) EE-9, (80) EE-

11, (60) M3 halftracks

Venezuela: (90) AMX-30, (49) AMX-13, (100) EE-9, (80) V-100s



AIR FORCE:



Colombia: (2) Interceptor/Attack squadrons, (2) COIN squadrons, (1)

Helicopter Transport squadron

Venezuela: (3) Interceptor/Attack groups, (2) Special Operation 

groups,

(2) Light Bomber groups



Major Equipment:

Colombia: (25) Kfirs, (45) Mirage lll & 5s, (18) A-37s, (25) SA-315A, 

(24)

UH-1, (25) MD500, (10) UH-60s

Venezuela: (21) Mirage Ills & 5s, (20) F-5s, (25) F-16As, (15) OV-10s



NAVAL FORCES:



Colombia: (4) Type FS 1500 Frigates, (2) Type 209 Submarines, assorted 

gunboats and patrol craft Venezuela: (6) Lupo class Frigates, (2) 

Coast Guard Frigates, (2) Type 209 Submarines, (6) Vosper FACs, (4) 

Cormoran FACs, (4) LSTs, assorted gunboats and patrol craft



AIR DEFENSES:



Colombia: small caliber triple-A guns only, recent discount purchases 

of Soviet equipment possible Venezuela: small caliber triple-A guns, 

Roland-1, recent discount purchases of Soviet equipment possible


                             END OF MANUAL